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West Europe Report

No. 1590

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LAPPS SEEK TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Apr 80 p 22

[Article by Jorma Korhonen: "The Lapps Developing Political Muscle"]

[Text] Political parties in the Nordic countries are getting nervous as the Lapps have become the factor that tips the scales in many a northern municipal council. The first Lapp policy program of the Nordic countries now demands for representation of the Lappish people in the Nordic Council.

The Lappish delegation of the Nordic Countries has just prepared the first Lapp policy program. It is intended as the basis to be used in negotiations with state governments.

The program emphasizes the national unity of the Lapps which must not be broken by state borders. It emphasizes the claim of the Lapps to the land and waters of their living areas as well as to the natural resources and means of livelihood.

The Lapp policy program demands that each state's legislation defines and assures the Lapps' societal order, language, culture and means of livelihood. It also demands official acknowledgment of the Lapps' representative authorities.

The Lapps are asking to be admitted as a member of the Nordic Council in order to have an opportunity to participate and exercise an effect in the decisions that concern their living areas and their life.

Before the program comes officially into effect, it will have to be approved by the Nordic Lapp Conference. The conference will meet next summer in Tromssa, Norway.

The program was already introduced in the conference 2 years ago, but the discussion was not resolved because the program was not yet finalized then. According to the public opinion, the program proposal prepared now is a compromise: a minimal program or a list of those matters and goals that will be approved of in all 3 Nordic countries.

Three Kinds of Views

There are differences in views of the program contents not only between Lapps of the 3 different countries but also between those who belong to different industries and different political blocs.

The attitude of the Finnish Lapps to the Lapp policy program is much more clear-cut than that of the Swedish and Norwegian Lapps. In Finland, as in no other Nordic country, the Lapps have their own parliamentary, elected Lapp delegation (the Lapp Parliament); in the other countries the affairs are managed by voluntary associations and organizations, and they are not representative in the best possible way.

In Norway, a movement was started recently that has a goal to create a Lapp parliament after the Finnish model. In the best of circumstances, it would cover a population of about 100,000 Lapps. According to estimates, this is the number of Lapps in Norway, provided they all are still willing to admit to being Lapps.

Prime Minister Oddvar Nordli recently spoke in support of the Norwegian Lapp Parliament undertaking. At the same time he promised that his government will investigate other questions having to do with Lapp politics, for instance securing their position in the constitution.

The debate over the Alta river hydraulic power plant is a key question of principle in the Norwegian Lapp policy. It is not a question any more of one power plant only, but of the relationship between the government and the northern natives.

The Norwegian Lapps hope that the administrative system dealing with them will be made into a kind of mid-level administrative sector. This model pleases also the Finnish Lapp politicians.

The affairs of the Swedish Lapps are still conducted through private organizations. It is suspected that the political activism among the Swedish Lapps is less strong than that of the others.

The Nordic Lapps cooperation began about the same time as the Nordic Council started its activity in the beginning of the 1950's. Achievements were beginning to be made in Lappish questions only as late as the end of the 1960's. The results of activity that started then are especially obvious in cultural life. Also the position of the Lappish language has become stronger, and schooling has developed satisfactorily.

"But for instance in legislation, the Lapps' affairs have not improved much at all during this time," remarks Department Head Samuli Aikio who works in the Nordic Lappish Institute.

"Not one law dealing with Lapps only has been passed in any of the Nordic countries yet."

Aikio says that only direct exploitation and discrimination have been done away with in the past 10 to 15 years. Otherwise the Lapps still live in the old way as a neglected minority.

The Two Camps of the Delegation

11 out of the 20 representatives in the Lapps' delegation that were voted in last fall are Center Party supporters. 2 are clearly tied with the left, one a Social Democrat, the other a People's Democrat. 2 members belong to the Coalition Party, and one is classified as a Constitutional. There are 4 nonaligned members.

Immediately in the organization meeting, the new delegation became divided into two camps. One of these can be considered to be conservative, the other Lapp nationality conscious and radically oriented.

The former secretary of the delegation, teacher Iisko Sara criticizes those who belong in the conservative group for not having internalized the essence and goals of Lappish politics and for therefore pursuing politics of submissiveness towards the Finnish community.

The Center Party which has a strong representation in the Lappish Delegation especially advocates full politicization of the delegation elections. The delegation itself opposes this idea. The basis of this is a need to have the advocation of Lappish matters a shared responsibility of all parties.

The delegation opposes increasing party politics also on the basis that its meager resources could be further dispersed.

"It would be ideal if the Lapps would pursue their common cause each through their own party and maintain internal unity in their own activity units," Nils-Henrik Valkeapaa, a delegation representative, says.

Party Politics Cause Dispersal

It is already thought that distorted party politics are causing dispersal among the Lapps. Adding to the fragmentation is also the legislative lack of cohesion which can be seen for instance in application of the Reindeer Farming Law: the reindeer herders receive significant support from society for bettering their housing conditions, while other industrial groups don't get this support.

In Norway, the internal politics of Lapps are divided in two main lines. One is the group based on old organizations and fed and spurred on by national idealism.

A new line of thought has come up alongside of this traditional line. It is advocated by SLF (Samernes Landsforbund) [National Union of the Lapps]. According to it, the Lappish matter is only a peculiarity in the general politics of the state. According to the SLF thinking, the Lappish matters should be found room in the generally approved framework of national politics.

The opposition considers the SLF to be directed from outside, to provide the way to Norwegianize the Lapps and supporting the power of authorities. So far, the SLF has very few members, but this does not keep it from loudly pursuing their course.

All Norwegian Lapp organizations dissociated themselves from the last fall's demonstration against the damming of the Alta river, which climaxed in a hunger strike in front of the Oslo Parliament Building. Although some of the organizations were on the demonstrators' side, they did not approve of their methods.

According to some views, radicalization is developing very slowly as long as the Lapps stay under the wing and care of the former political group orgs. But as soon as they unite in their own special Lapp parties, activity and goals become radicalized.

Lapps Tipping Scales

In Norwegian Kautokeino, in the worlds most Lappish municipality, the municipal elections last year brought to the municipal council 4 representatives chosen from the purely Lappish lists. They became the tip of the scales between the rightist and leftist groups and have no intention of aligning themselves with either power group any more than the center.

Similar trends can be detected also in the other Lappish communities in Norway. The parties were unpleasantly surprised by this development. Iisko Sara finds that in Finland too, there is a clear development towards a common Lappish "party." "It will be a similar minority party to the one the Finnish Swedes have, i.e. it will bring together the rich and the poor."

Samuli Aikio feels that separatist development can only be stopped by creating a proper Lappish administration. "Then the handling of political questions would move into its own chambers, its own inner circle; and the general political questions concerning also the Lapps would be taken care of in the existing general politics arena."

Dream of State Only Fantasy

There is no chance of the goals of the Nordic Lapp policies being realized and neither can these policies be pursued, regardless of approval, until the internal Lappish politics within each northern country have stabilized and the administration reached a state of development that satisfies the people. The Finnish representatives of the Lapps stress this matter to their brethren in other countries.

With this, they try to emphasize the unalterable fact that the Lappish population lives in many states which are governed by differing systems, laws, and obligations.

Recently, military and national defense elements have entered especially the Norwegian Lappish politics. They don't show in the programs of the Lapps but do have an effect on how the programs are realized.

Because of them, the already difficult northern questions become all the more complicated.



The number of Lapps in the Nordic countries varies according to the census methods used. It is estimated that about 2,000 Lapps live in the USSR, in the Kola territory.

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CSO: 3107

EC OPTS FOR STRICTER ENERGY SAVINGS MEASURES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 14 May 80 p 17

[Text] Brussels,(ANP) 14 May--In 1990 the EC must still be dependent on petroleum for 40 percent of its total energy consumption. The ministers of energy affairs of the Nine accepted that as a guiding principle yesterday in Brussels. Otherwise, the agreement is still not very binding. The EC Commission had proposed making this an "objective," but that went too far for the energy council.

The agreement also stipulates that then 70 to 75 percent of electric power production must be based on the consumption of coal or nuclear energy. In addition, in 1990 the average ratio between the increase of the GNP [Gross National Product] and the increase of the gross consumption of primary energy will have to be limited to 1 to 0.7. That means that if the GNP increases by 1 percent, energy consumption may only increase by 0.7 percent. Further, the use of "renewable energy sources," (tidal energy, wind force energy etc) must be encouraged.

At European summit conferences in July 1978 and in the spring of 1979, goals were set, which amount to a limitation--in 1985 to 50 percent--of the EC dependency on imported energy, a limitation of the ratio of increase of the GNP and the increase of energy consumption to 1 to 0.8, a limitation of petroleum consumption immediately plus a limitation of the net import of petroleum in the community to 472 million tons (the 1978 figure). Consequently, what was agreed on yesterday is the beginning of similar, firm agreements for 1990.

From figures which were laid on the table yesterday at the council, it appears that 13 percent of European petroleum consumption is used for the generation of electric power. The industrial sector uses 19 percent of the oil, transport, 28

percent, 28 percent is also used in housing and the remaining 12 percent is used for other purposes. It was pointed out that replacement of petroleum by other energy sources in the electric power generation sector appears to provide the least problem, as one, at least, wants to and can convert to nuclear power and coal.

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CSO: 3105

OIL MARKET UNSTABLE, SAYS EC ENERGY COMMISSIONER

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 14 May 80 p 17

[Text] Brussels, (ANP) 14 May--At first sight, the EC situation in the energy field is relatively satisfactory. The community has an oil consumption supply for 112 days and it appears that the EC will import 457 million tons of oil in 1980, that is 15 million tons less than the import goal. Guido Brunner, the European energy commissioner, declared that yesterday in Brussels during the European Energy Council.

But he also warned that the oil markets are "unusually unstable." He mentioned, as an example, the Rotterdam spot market, "where the prices for light home-heating oil have increased 23 percent, since the beginning of April."

The Dutch minister of economic affairs, Van Aardenne pointed out that the EC's reduced 1980 oil imports, obviously were achieved easier because there is a recession. Van Aardenne warned besides that "flexibility" in purchase and sale can be lost if governments negotiate directly with governments about oil deliveries.

The Dutch minister said that "he had no problem" with the council's statement that nuclear power plants and coal must be used much more in electric power production by 1990. According to the minister, if "broad social discussion" rejects nuclear power plants, then the matter is simple, we must use more coal.

According to Van Aardenne, it appeared in the council "the time is definitely not yet ripe" for imposing a tax on oil imports (in order to use the profits for the development of alternative energies).

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CSO: 3105

ACV CONGRESS REACTS TO GOVERNMENT'S SOCIAL POLICIES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 23 Apr 80 pp 22-23

["Interior Focus" column: "The Cautious ACV (Confederation of Christian Trade Unions) Policy Against the Crisis"; passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] The /Confederation of Christian Trade Unions/ is gathering its Flemish, Brussels and Walloon militants in the resort hotel in Den Haan on the Sea this week for a quadrennial congress. The theme was combined in a slogan-like manner into "An Economy in the Service of People and Society." In general, however, everything will come up for discussion at such a congress. An activity report has to go over the most pressing events at the national and international level and reflect the wage earners' answer. The time at which this congress takes place thus is, coincidentally, not uninteresting. The ACV has had to watch from its administrative quarters in the Wetstraat how one of the few Christian democrat prime ministers it has had was got out of the way without having been able to put through the highly necessary reform of social security and some other reforms of fundamental importance. In more general terms, this congress is also taking place at a moment that the crisis no longer leaves any doubt as to its existence, to the fact that the doomsday-like conviction of those-gold-years-will-never-return has anchored itself in peoples' minds, and one also knows that classical remedies are no longer of any use. Crisis all around.

The diligent research services of the union movement point out that actually they predicted this development already over 4 years ago. Already in 1976 it was said that the recession which little by little became tangible was not a passing phenomenon, but a tremor which was announcing a serious shift in the polity. The international monetary instability, the rapidly expanding technology, the emigration of multinationals to the third world created a climate of slower growth here, of declining purchasing power and of a swelling army of unemployed. The latter can hardly be offered any perspective at all, for the crisis which is taking place is /structural/. Estimates for the 1979-1985 period for Belgium and the EEC predict an increase in the national income of 3 percent, and likewise at least 3 percent in general productivity, but an unemployment rate of 10 to 12 percent of the active population.

The union movement moreover had to put up with the fact that attention was once again drawn to other items during the most drastic crisis which has occurred since the industrial revolution. Once again the Belgian nation became involved in community quarrels, in bidding of a national nature and in theories relating to territory, while social decay was openly taking place.

The union movement has behaved /cautiously/ in the face of this double challenge. Both the ACW [Christian Labor Movement] and the ABVV [Belgian General Federation of Labor] have always seen regionalization as a subordinate problem; the social struggle came first. To the degree that political life became more and more impossible because of the unitarian structures, they too had to become involved in the problem. Both the ACV and the ABVV wanted to get that matter over with as rapidly as possible, each in a different manner. In the CVP [(Flemish) Social Christian Party]-dominated ACV there was a tendency to let matters go their course, not to anticipate anything, not to force anything either, to follow politics. The Walloon CSC [Christian Labor Unions Confederation] comrades urged more speed and perseverance, but the genial ACV leadership let this excitement pass without much fuss. So far the ACV has tried to disregard the regionalist drive, perhaps in the ope that it would simply pass, and it conformed itself further to the regional structures which were gradually put through politically. The ABVV on the other hand was confronted with a less submissive membership. In fact, since the strike against the Unification Act of 1960, the Walloon union movement had taken up the idea that nothing could be done socially with Flanders, and that idea would only gain ground in the coming years. To the extent the prestigious Walloon industry was visibly perishing, new steel companies were established not in Wallonia, but in Zelzate and modern chemical- and automobile industries went not to Wallonia, but to Flanders; nothing could be expected any longer from Flanders and Brussels by the southern part of the country. Regionalization became condition number one here in order to get the economic piece of the cake it had a right to. Also in order to pursue a policy in Wallonia which,in all its contempt for Flanders, had to differ considerably from the paternalistic and almost corporate social model which was being developed over here [in Flanders]. Under pressure from the Walloon branch of the ABVV, regionalization became a vital problem which had to be solved as soon as possible. Thus since 1970 the ABVV has spoken in favor of three-fold regionalization, even if not entirely in agreement with the standpoints of the Flemish friends of the Socialist Party.

Realpolitik

At the ACV congress in Den Haan it will have to be proven if the Walloon militants see this slow course of events in their union as the best tactic and if they will leave the work up to politics and the socialists. Those who definitely will object, are undoubtedly the Brussels delegates. They have had to hear for many years that the ACV is behind the three-fold regionalization, according to the law and Article 107-4, while internally nothing has been done yet about the regional committee for Brussels. Similar committees do exist for Flanders and Wallonia. Thus the ACV can still go

in any direction. In theory it is behind the three-fold regionalization, in practice a two-fold regionalization was worked out. However, the tug-of-war with those who want clarity on that problem can no longer be postponed within the ACV either.

Also at the social level the ACV union movement has developed a moderate counter strategy. In the first place, in this period of crisis it is paying attention to what is called the defense of attained rights: preservation of the purchasing power, wage indexing, the social security system as it functions currently in our country. Further, to the fighting of a number of abuses, labor brokers, illegal labor, tax evasion. Further still, to a careful re-orientation of the economy. The ACV did not show any aversion to employers' proposals on part time labor and further advocated a decrease of the work week with wage preservation. A lot of attention was paid to /local/ work, in the local unions and in the company itself. Democratization of the company became the /leitmotiv/ there and therefore it is not surprising that precisely this theme will become the guiding principle of this congress. Through the organizing of company centers and syndical delegations the power structure of the company has to be shifted to the employees and collectivism. These representations must penetrate more thoroughly into the structures of the company itself and advance to "workers' self-management" via syndical control on profits, the policy and the labor process. That is something for the distant future.

This integrating tactic appears to be well based on the model of the German unions where the /mitbestimmung/ [joint decisionmaking] is seen as being the most advantageous for the wage earners' group. However, it also fits into the general manner of operation of the Christian democrats who have always seen more possibilities in a lenient policy of presence at all levels than in the stonehard stand on principles. This way of doing things was even profitable for the ACV. In last year's elections the ACV emerged for the first time from the social elections as the largest union of the country with 47 percent of the votes, as against 44 percent for the ABVV. The ACV made progress in three regions, the ABVV regressed in all three. Thus the ABVV was not rewarded for the social policy it had pursued first and foremost. Still, it was the ABVV, once again under Walloon impetus, which took the initiative for the strikes against the program act which ultimately caused the Tindemans I government to trip over the Friday strikes. It was followed in this by the ACV. Nevertheless, as ABVV leader, Georges Debunne had not only strongly urged a rapid solution for regionalization, he also continued to be a very tough partner, both with respect to the shortening of the work week, and in answering the Wynen medical syndicate. The ABVV saw everything more in a macro-economic way: the struggle against the multinationals, a drastic redistribution of the available labor, a national campaign against tax fraud. In its most recent opposition against the government's social policy, the ABVV stood alone, however. The ABVV was of the opinion that the government team, in which party friends of the SP-PS [Flemish and Francophone Socialist Party] were also seated, showed too little interest in drastic changes in face of the crisis on the long

term, and gave too much attention to small corrections on the short term. In this, sacrifices had to be made again by /everyone/, by the patient, by the unemployed, by women. The ABVV -- alone -- went on a national strike on 7 December, just as the ABVV had had to conduct the most disruptive strikes in the Flemish region, also alone, in the petroleum companies of SIBP and RBP in Antwerp. In the first case in order to defend syndical rights, in the second against the whims of a closing-happy multinational.

Thus, in general, the balance of the union movement can hardly be called /grandiose/ for the second half of the seventies. Perhaps one could call it a consolation that one has been able to limit the damage. That's all. Not one member organization in the country can point to a following like that of the union movement. The ACV at present has 1.275 million affiliated and /paying/ members; it is not much less for the ABVV. The potential to force fundamental decisions or to enter a peaceful offensive has been little used. Moreover, the inter-professional debate of employers and unions was adjourned, primarily because of the dour attitude of the employers' organizations with respect to discussing shortening of the work week. Therefore the labor movement was once again left to the right of the strongest. In flourishing sectors concessions are made to personnel, but not in other sectors. Inequality is thus increasing also in the wage earners' group. Finally in these difficult times a rift has also arisen in the /Joint Union Front/ which has been worked on so laboriously since 1960.

The ABVV and ACV each has gone its own way in reaction to the social policy of the Martens government. If this tendency should continue, not only the competitive struggle and division within the wage earners' group will have been launched again, but regional friction will no longer be avoidable either. Then Wallonia, under the ABVV dominance, will more likely follow the tactic of confrontation and syndicalist struggle, and Flanders, under the leadership of the ACV, will go the integrant way of the participation technique. In fact, the ACV judges by numerical results that its policy is finding favor with the members and that it also guarantees a broad participation in political events. In spite of the bitter treatment its prime minister has had to swallow from his own party, /realpolitik/ considerations continue to get attention in the ACV. According to this realpolitik, more fruit can be harvested from an alliance of various interest groups headed by the CVP [Social Christian Party] than from a confrontation.

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CSO: 3105

GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON WEAPONS EXPORT CRITICIZED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 23 Apr 80 pp 48-49

[Article by JS: "No One Wants To Make a Living From Death" by JS; passages in slantlines published in italics]

> [Text] From time to time one can read somewhere that Economic Affairs has delivered this or that permit for the export of Belgian arms. Strictly speaking that is not correct; that department is involved in such transactions only indirectly. As a result of the furor caused by a recent arms contract with Uruguay, it is worth while going into the Belgian administrative ways of doing things in this matter. They are undoubtedly open to improvement.

PS [Francophone Socialist Party] Minister of Foreign Affairs Henri Simonet too was mistaken when he answered CVP [Social Christian Party] Member of the Chamber Wivina de Meester on 12 March that he had no political objection to Economic Affairs granting the export permit for the military portion of that Uruguayan contract. /Not/ the department and certainly /not/ the cabinet or the minister of economic affairs should deliver such permits; that is the business of the /Central Service for Quotas and Permits/ [CDCV]. That service, which was established under Leopold III, regulates those quotas and permits on the basis of instructions given to it by various departments, depending on the subject matter. That can be /Agriculture/ as well as /Public Works/ or /Middle Classes/. Those who are interested can read in the /GOVERNMENT GAZETTE/ of 2 February 1939 that the CDCV is purely an /executive body/. In daily practice the /Service/ usually acts on decisions by the /Interministerial Economic Commission/ or the /Social Economic Central Cabinet/. For that matter, that interministerial economic commission decided on 15 September 1966 that the CDCV has to submit each request for an arms export permit to the General Policy Directive of the ministry of foreign affairs for a visa.

Above the letterhead of the CDCV are the words "Belgian-Luxembourg Administrative Commission," /not/ Economic Affairs. The current confusion arose

from the fact that the 1938 legislator was obliged to accommodate the service administratively somewhere in an existing department and that therefore it was coupled with Economic Affairs for budgetary and disciplinary reasons. The minister of economic affairs and his colleagues and civil servants are able to find out about a planned export of arms only if the companies involved request export insurance from /Delcredere/. According to the statutes, namely, Economic Affairs has a representative in the administrative council of the para-governmental Delcredere which insures payment for exports at its own risk. So do the ministries of Finance, Foreign Commerce and Cooperation for Development. SP Minister Willy Claes of Economic Affairs thus heard about the infamous traffic to Uruguay only through his Delcredere representative Peereboom when the dozen or so Belgian enterprises involved applied for that guarantee last November. The matter came up for discussion on 12 and 17 November and was finally settled on 20 December. On that date Willy Claes imposed his /veto/ and, according to regulations, /confirmed/ it with a letter directed to Delcredere Chairman Godeaux. Willy Claes didn't have to think about that very long. With one political prisoner per 450 inhabitants, the Uruguay regime surely matches Pinochet's inhumanity at this moment.

CVP Minister Marc Eyskens of Cooperation for Development just recently -- several months later -- determined and stated that there are moral limits to the arms trade; only that determination is not entirely in agreement with his action in this matter. Eyskens' representative at Delcredere is General Administrator Saintraint of the ABOS [expansion unknown]. While Willy Claes' Peereboom imposed Claes' veto against the insurance of the military portion of the Uruguayan contract, Eyskens' Saintraint merely submitted a document with certain /reservations/ in December. In other words: the CVP minister neglected to act against the challenged decision at the only Delcredere level at which he /was able/ to do that. That resulted then on 2 April in the curious exhibition of a minister of foreign affairs scolding his colleague of Cooperation for Development. In his answer on that matter to Members of the Chamber De Meester, Van Geyt and Kuypers, Henri Simonet in fact noted that he had /never/ been the recipient of any kind of reservation or resistance from his colleague, although the matter had been especially and jointly discussed with Eyskens, with PS Minister Urbain of Foreign Commerce, with the cabinet heads of those gentlemen, with the secretary general they share and with general policy director Alfred Cahen. Thus Mark Eyskens apparently resisted a little only on television. His moral objections do him much credit, but that is not always sufficient.

Sensitive

That which is of the administration goes through the world with a /memorandum/ clinging to it. Honor to those who deserve it, for the civil servants of Foreign Affairs have indisputably set the world record for administrative speed from 27 to 28 February. On that date, namely, the CDCV submitted the bundle of papers with the special /memorandum/ to

Foreign Affairs, after which it returned home already the next morning, provided with the four official signatures required. In that interim period between December and February the exporters, for that matter, had already forgone the Delcredere guarantee in view of Willy Claes' veto. They seem to be fairly sure that they will get their money anyway, since some regimes apparently always have money available for certain commodities. What commodity? Uruguay is buying, amongst other things, 66 million francs worth of munitions at the /Poudreries Reunies de Belgique/ [United Gunpowder Factories]. For that matter, it recently became apparent that those munitions were driven directly from the depot of defense in Houthulst to Zeebrugge, as happens every now and then. /Cockerill/ furnishes 80 million francs worth of guns with all accouterments, FN 32 tons of machine guns, ASCO no less than 200 million [francs of] mobile war equipment. It is well known how fast some administrations work when ASCO is involved in a deal. Altogether the Uruguayan regime is acquiring 320 million francs worth of Belgian arms, coupled with a package of 1.65 billion francs of common equipment such as telephone installations, light beacons for airports and a section of petroleum platform. Henri Simonet showed the parliament that this package supplies Belgian industry with 1.7 million work hours, or 1200 jobs on a yearly basis.

Like Coca Cola and Bata shoes Belgian arms can be found all over the world. It is obvious that the Uruguayan military do not need the ASCO tanks with the Cockerill guns against Paraguay, Chile or whatever enemy, but that this entire Belgian ingenuity serves only to keep its own population quiet. The director of general policy of Foreign Affairs keeps a strict type of roster for the export of arms, which was first drawn up by a political task force in 1966. All the countries in the world are put into six categories, from the Atlantic allies to the /sensitive/ and socialist countries, to countries with a temporary or total embargo. The arms themselves are just as inaptly subdivided into hunting- and sports arms, defense arms, war arms and a separate category for tanks. Naturally Uruguay is in the very sensitive group: all the countries in which violence has occurred in recent years. Naturally Chile comes under the total embargo, which is also in effect for civilian exports. Since Willy Claes has been at Economic Affairs, he has had to oppose -- through Delcredere which is the only level at which his opinion is asked in the matter -- /sensitive/ deliveries each and every month to Chile and Libya and to other South American and Arabic countries. With respect to Chile, he had to point out to Director Glibert of Delcredere still on 4 October of last year that insisting was of no use, that Flemish socialists and others in this country were serious. Anyone can trade with Chile, but one can get a Delcredere guarantee on export from the Belgian Government only up to 5 million francs, whithin a ceiling which may not exceed 75 million francs per year. Questioned on that, Willy Claes confirms that he knows what he's doing but that of course he doesn't dare bet that he is never outmaneuvered. There was the question of nuclear fuel for South Africa, while now there is the factor of the export of Belgian arms technology to countries with which no civilized person wants to have anything to do.

Three weeks ago the Uruguayan ship Vera Cruz left Zeebrugge with that delivery for armed forces, which Willy Claes didn't want to guarantee but in which he has nothing further to say. Those arms are now floating on the ocean. The reputation of those more than 25 Belgian factories which assemble arms no longer needs to be made. The 8 largest ones among them are already good for 13,500 jobs, while moreover they furnish a living to around 150 subcontractors. Only Member of the Chamber Willy Kuypers of the People's Union is apparently imagining that this sector can be converted in the blink of an eye. Kuypers, who doesn't neglect to interrogate the government over every little explosion he finds out about, is right however to the extent that so far no cabinet has made a start at preparations in that respect. The strongest argument Simonet and all the other pragmatists present regularly against those pacifist lamentations, is that the French, the British and even the Dutch will not neglect to ship immediately the arms which Belgium would refuse, if it were not the Czechoslovaks. The worst is that this argument is /valid/.

Possibly no one likes to make a living from death, including the directors and union leaders, neither in Herstal nor elsewhere. However, a government serves to help its people and sectors and to indicate the right way. When in July 1968 a freight plane of Sabena crashed near Lagos with 40 tons of arms in its belly destined for President Gowon, in order to break the so-called /Biafrans/, PSC [Socialist Christian Party] Minister Pierre Harmel of Foreign Affairs was caught in a shameless lie. The chambers got excited and proposed that in the future more attention should be given to "the general principles of justice and humanity which the civilized nations adhere to." One can only applaud Mark Eyskens for his statement of 3 April to the DE MORGEN daily paper: "It is unacceptable that Minister Simonet has delivered an export permit for this arms trade with Uruguay behind the backs of his colleagues. The minister of foreign affairs should have at least submitted this matter for discussion in the ministerial committee for foreign affairs."

But then why didn't he himself bring up that matter in that committee, in which he is seated also, after he learned about it in November through his role in Delcredere?

8700
CSO: 3105

COMMON COURSE CLUB WORKS TO DEFINE STAND

Cooperation With DKP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Mar 80 p 5

[Article: "The Strategy of With/Against the DKP"]

[Text] The Common Course Club and the Communist Workers Party have jointly published a little book, the main part of which is a lecture by Carl Madsen entitled, "Revolution and State Power--a Lecture on the Strategy of the DKP" [Communist Party of Denmark]. At a press conference on Friday, the joint effort was presented by Jorgen Tved of Common Course and Finn Sorensen of the Marxist-Leninist Workers Party (among friends, the KA-M-L or just the Camels.)

Jorgen Tved said that the Common Course Club is not a political party but an all-socialist organization which attempts are to find stands on which all can agree. Among other things, it has been agreed that it is important that Carl Madsen's speech be published in advance of the 26th DKP Congress so that a new discussion can be raised on the DKP's strategy.

Finn Soernsen called attention to the fact that the KM-M-L sees it as its task to recreate a revolutionary party in Denmark. In this task, however, the DKP is not perceived as the main enemy. A discussion with the DKP is desired, and there are several members of the DKP among the approximately 500 members of the Common Course Club.

The two socialists both stressed that the goal was that of unifying the leftwing through unity of action. This is also what the DKP advocates, but Jorgen Tved was not satisfied with the way it was being done in Dronningens Tvergade [street location of DKP office.] "It is as if the DKP were practicing unity of action while wearing blinders, with the one on the right toward the Social Democrats, being far the smallest, with the one on the left toward the left wing, being twice as long," said Tvedt.

The book, in addition to Carl Madsen's lecture, contains contributions by Preben Moller Hansen, FKK [Common Course Club] and Henrik Yde, KA-M-L, and costs 25 kroner.

Holds First Congress

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Apr 80 p 5

[Article: "Common Course Club Desires Unity of Action"]

[Text] The Common Course Club, Preben Moller Hansen's answer to his exclusion from the Communist Party of Denmark, has held its first congress, at the same time that the DKP is holding its congress.

The congress had 90 participants. Its theme was "Action Unity in the Working Class." The coming tasks of the Common Course Club were set down in a working resolution to include the period from April to November 1980. A new congress will be held in November.

When the Common Course Club was organized the goal was 1,000 members, purportedly as a counterpoise to the DKP. Jorgen Tved, the club's national chairman, denies, however, that a real party is being organized.

"But we are perhaps an umbrella organization for the leftwing," he said yesterday after the conclusion of the congress.

The Common Course Club has 500 registered members. When the organization was founded, the goal was 1,000 members before 1 May, and Jorgen Tved says the goal has been reached. There are locals in Arhus, Alborg, Esbjerg, Svendborg, Koge, and Helsingor, three in Copenhagen, and one is being organized in Odense.

The working resolution adopted yesterday states, among other things, that "a member responsible for educating shall be appointed in each local." Further, a study tour of the GDR is being planned.

In the resolution, four tasks are regarded as most important: 1. Strengthening the central apparatus and the locals. 2. Strengthening the finances and activities in support of DERUDA [the club's newspaper]. 3. Strengthening the club's discussions on "the goals and means, tactics and strategy of the working class." 4. Advancing realistic proposals for unity of action to all working class trade union and political organizations.

Plan to Fight NATO, Socialists

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 5-6 Apr 80 p 10

[Article by Henrik Heie: "DKP Members in Common Course Clubs"]

[Text] Both present and formers of the DKP, the SF [Socialist Peoples Party], and the VS [Leftwing Socialists] participated in the two-day congress in Copenhagen held by the Common Course Clubs. The congress came concluded on Good Friday; it had over 90 delegates from the nine locals. The clubs have over 500 members.

The chairman of the Common Course Clubs [FKK], Jorgen Tved, former member of the DKP Central Committee and former city council representative, who, together with Preben Moller Hansen, chairman of the Seamens' Union, started the FKK, told INFORMATION that 50 percent of the delegates are trade union stewards in the LO [National Federation of Trade Unions] and 85 percent are LO members.

In addition to the present nine locals, a port local in Copenhagen, among others, is being established.

The congress adopted a manifesto and a working resolution, which will be published after editing is completed in an editorial committee. A political statement was also adopted.

FKK Policy

The statement rejects income policy solutions and "so-called economic democracy."

The FKK will "fight any form of economic speculation and exploitation of the working class, for which the income policy and OD [economic democracy] are to be used," the statement says.

The statement severely attacks the leaders of the Social Democrats and the trade union movement. It demands that the trade union movement be "freed of pampers," and the union organizations are said to be "mismanaged by professional politicians who, on a pyramid of undemocratic rules, laws, and structures, use the organizations against the members themselves.

The Social Democratic Government Not Different

In the opinion of the FKK, encroachments upon living conditions and democratic rights have shown that the Social Democratic government does not significantly differ from former bourgeois governments.

"Capital is being protected at the cost of the workers. The multinationals, which underpay the workers at 39 kroner per hour, still have free play to acquire profits in the billions; housing and land speculators are protected. A tax system which favors capital and butchers of the workers, such as Jan Bonde Nielsen, have, with EC laws at their back, the green light for turning Danish jobs over to foreign capitalists."

The FKK will work for Denmark's resignation from NATO and against the construction of nuclear powerplants.

"The Common Course Club will settle accounts with the former policy and in the name of the class struggle appeal to all who are for socialism. Let the common effort be our support in the joint struggle for the working class," states the resolution.

Unity Demonstration

Jorgen Tved Told INFORMATION that the FKK will participate in the trade union unity demonstration in Copenhagen on 1 May. "Although we think the base is somewhat narrow and the backing by the trade unions surprisingly low, with fewer participants than in the foremen initiative," he says.

"But, in order to show what cannot be done in a unity demonstration, we shall arrange in advance, together with the VS and some smaller leftwing organizations, a meeting in City Hall Square and from there join the unity demonstration, where one cannot demonstrate for slogans such as 'No to OD,' and 'No to class cooperation,' for that is opposed by the DKP," says Jorgen Tved.

"We regret this, but it is, of course, a gain that a unity demonstration can be undertaken," he adds.

For the rest, he doubts information provided by the DKP to the effect that only 150 members had left the party after the expulsion of Preben Moller Hansen, and he states that 55 percent of those who attended the FKK [congress] are former DKP members and that others are waiting for the DKP congress before they take a final position on leaving the party.

11256
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PRO-DENMARK GREENLAND PARTY CHARGES MEDIA SUPPRESSION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "Political Struggle Over Control of Media"]

[Text] "Siumut is attempting to choke us by taking over the public information organs from within. Our voice is gradually being heard, though rarely and then most often distorted, by the people of Greenland. Atassut now has only one opportunity to reach the people with correct information: We must create our own newspaper."

So seriously is the passionate political struggle in Greenland described by Folketing member Otto Steenholdt, who in the Folketing election last fall made his party, Atassut (link to Denmark), the largest in Greenland. However, this does not alter the fact that the socialist party, Siumut, with a slender majority in the Landsting election, holds power in the Landsstyre [national council] and the administration.

Printing Press Ready--Funds for Operation Lacking

"Even though half of the voters of Greenland support us, our financies are small in relation to the task of publishing a newspaper in Greenland," Otto Steenholdt told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

"But we scraped the bottom of the cash box and bought an offset press. Where we are to get the money to publish and distribute the paper, I don't know. But when Siumut acts according to 'the book on revolutionary takeover,' as it does, we are forced to act fast.

"With few exceptions, we see the information, which is edited before it reaches the peole through Greenland Radio and GRONLANDSPOSTEN, distorted. Recently, there have been rumors to the effect that I am on bad terms with the government in Denmark. This is an indecent flasehood."

"Friends" Centrally Placed

In the editorial offices of the large media, we now see in central positions the personal friends from Denmark's and Greenland's political leftwing of Landsstyre member and Siumut chairman Lars Emil Johansen. Most recently,

we have seen several youths of the extreme leftwing party Inuit Ataqatagiit hired by Greenland Radio, although they have no journalistic training. If we do not act now, we shall be strangled by the consistent distortion of our message or by the outright denial of our opportunity to speak, which we see with increasing frequency. The people of Siumut know that there is no majority to prevent the exploitation of the underground resources which would create work and income for Greenland. They know there is no majority in favor of abandoning NATO and the EC. And they know that Siumut could easily lose its hold on power as long as Atassut's voice is heard. Therefore, that voice must be strangled. And Siumut has no qualms about the means to that end." concludes Otto Steenholdt.

11, 256
CSO: 3106

SURPRISE ATTACK ON SJAELLAND, SCENARIO BY WRITER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Mogens Auning: "A New 9 April?"]

[Text] The political negotiations about the coming defense arrangement, under way since New Years, have thus far dealt primarily with a percentage increase in the defense budget as of 1 April 1981. As is known, the government and the Liberals have settled upon a so-called "zero solution"--an inflation-adjusted continuation of the present defense budget of about 7 billion annually.

The bourgeois parties hold that an annual increase in the budget of 3 percent annually--as Anker Joergensen promised earlier and which is desired by NATO--must be the outcome. Otherwise, the credibility of Danish Defense will be reduced and thus our chance to receive aid from our allies.

The "zero solution" will mean, among other things, that the Sjaelland brigade must be disbanded. The chief of the defense command, Lt Gen G.K. Christensen, states unequivocally that a "zero solution" means that Sjaelland cannot be defended against an enemy attack in force.

The Norwegian defense chief, Lt Gen Sverre Hamre, has said to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that a defenseless Sjaelland would cause serious difficulties for the defense of southern Norway, because, among other things, it would seriously impair the possibility of preventing large Warsaw Pact naval forces from exiting into the Atlantic.

Sjaelland must, therefore, be regarded as an important goal of a Communist bloc attack in the event of war. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has attempted to predict what the situation would look like on the day war came to Sjaelland.

Can 9 April repeat itself? It depends to some degree upon the ongoing political negotiations on the coming defense setup. If we have a zero solution, as proposed by the government and the Liberals, it will be impossible to defend Sjaelland. This is the opinion of the chief of the defense command, Lt Gen G. K. Kristensen, and it has caused concern to our Norwegian NATO partner.

The situation can be imagined as follows:

A great political crisis between the East and the West has come to a critical stage. All negotiations have thus far proven futile, and war is feared inevitable. In preceding days there have been incidents in central and southern Europe. Among other things, the parties to the conflict have crossed onto each other's territories.

Danish territory, as well, has been violated, and large Communist bloc naval forces have passed through the Danish straits. The Danish Government has only hesitantly gone along with increasing the preparedness of the defense forces. The navy, therefore, has not carried out the planned laying of mines; and though the strength of the army has been somewhat increased, mobilization has not been brought up to the full wartime strength of about 82,000 men. Only portions of the 75,000 volunteer men and women of the home guard are "in position."

A number of sabotage actions against the communications and supply systems have been discovered. The police and the home guard have ascertained, among other things, that a number of foreign special units have been landed in the vicinity of powerplants. In recent days, leaflets have been distributed, urging Denmark to abandon NATO. In demonstrations at several places in the country the government is urged to declare Denmark neutral.

Early in the morning of D-day, an attack upon Western Europe is launched following preparatory air and missile attacks.

The Attack

At 0400 hours Sjaelland is attacked from the air. The targets are, among others, the Vaerlose air station, the missile defense batteries on Amager and in Tune near Roskilde, the army depot area in Brodeskov in northern Sjaelland, and the navy installations in Copenhagen and Korsor. Danish military forces gathered in Sjaelland are also attacked, as are a number of important road and railroad junctions.

At 0430 hours, airborne troops begin to land at various places: in the vicinity of the air force control and warning center at Vedbaek, at the Kastrup airport, at Stevns, and around Helsinge in northern Sjaelland.

Shortly afterward, forces carried by helicopters are landed in the vicinity of the powerplants in Kyndby, Stignaes, and Kalundborg.

The airborne forces in northern Sjaelland, at Steve and in Kastrup are to establish bridgeheads, in which larger forces and heavy materiel can be landed from the sea. The goals of the other forces are the control and warning center and the powerplants.

The Communist bloc countries have available in the Baltic over 100 landing craft and a force of 10,000 men especially trained in landing operations. In the first round, i.e., the first transfer from their own coast to the target coast, about 6,000 men can be landed, carrying with them armored materiel.

At 0600 hours a new airdrop begins, this time at and around the Vaerlose air station. At approximately the same time--following a bombardment by, among others, heavy Soviet cruisers and missile craft--landings are made from the sea at Stevns, around Koege at Vallenbaek, at the southern point of Amager, and on the coast around Gilleleje.

The first attack force--the marines--will, together with the airborne forces, form a bridgehead to receive the second round, which will include motorized infantry and tanks.

Thus, in the course of the early morning hours, almost all of Sjaelland has become a war zone, but the Communist general, who has been assigned the task of conquering the island, does not intend to stay in his bridgeheads. He will seek to break out as quickly as possible, his goals then being the larger harbors so that the attacking force can be reinforced by personnel, materiel and supplies transported by merchant vessels.

On D-day, the attack goals are Koge, Korsor, and Frederiksvark. At the same time, an attempt is made to reach the Storstrom bridge to make contact with a force landed at 1200 hours in Gedser.

In face of all these imagined situations stand, in the present defense arrangement, two brigades of the Danish field army. In addition, there will be a number of local defense batallions and home guard units and units of the coastal defense force and the air force.

A brigade of the Danish army numbers about 5,000 men. It is composed of personnel from all branches of the service, is highly mobile, and operates independently. The batallion strength is from 600 to 900 men.

The plan under which the defense is to be conducted is that the enemy is to be attacked with mines, torpeodes and bombs by the navy and the air force as it approaches the landing site. If he nevertheless reaches his

goal, he is to be attacked immediately at the moment of landing by the home guard and the army. This will be done by special coast defense units under the military regions, on Sjaelland Regions V and VI. The brigades are to intercept and defeat the enemy as it breaks out from the bridgeheads, if such bridgeheads have been gained.

But, as already mentioned, all this requires personnel and materiel, military planning and political courage so that the Danish forces are mobilized and ready to act, if D-day unfortunately were to come to pass. It also requires that we have available the forces and the material to be used.

If the defense negotiations end with a "zero solution" there a great reduction in the entire peacetime force will result, and with it the disbandment of one of the two Sjaelland brigades of the wartime force on the island. Even if an attempt is made to counteract some of the lacking fighting ability by means of better arming the forces to be used directly in coastal defense, it is the military experts' opinion that the land forces remaining on Sjaelland will be unable to defend the island or to create enough credibility in our ability to defend ourselves that allied reinforcements can be expected.

Postscript [a verbatim repetition of the last two paragraphs]

11,256
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FDP PROSPECTS AFTER NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA DEFEAT VIEWED

FDP-Status After Landtag Elections

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 May 80 p 3

[Article by Thomas Meyer: "The Little One's Difficulty of Survival Among the Giants"]

[Text] Bonn, 12 May--Deep depression at the end of election day, defiance the following morning: The FDP has no time for prolonged mourning after its parliamentary demise in Duesseldorf. Monday's crisis session of the party presidium in Bonn lasted 3 1/2 hours; there was no hint of uproar or panic. At Thomas Dehler House, FDP party headquarters, there was the deepest silence. No loud words emerged from the conference room, and whenever the door opened a crack, one could see serious, but composed faces. No one's hair was ruffled; nobody was tearing his hair. Even in the depths of despair, the Free Democrats have impeccable manners. Genscher turned up at the end of the proceedings. He faced the assembly and, with the sun shining brightly, even showed a trace of optimism. The FDP is not playing dead. On 5 October it plans to prove that it is still a force to be reckoned with.

Is this optimism justified, or was the Duesseldorf debacle the beginning of the end? That was the question people were asking in Bonn on Monday; the Free Democrats are considered capable of making a comeback from this, for them not unusual, situation, even though the extent of Sunday night's reverses came as a surprise. But how many times has the FDP been declared dead in the past, and how many times has it come back to life? The party itself puts its faith in the fact that the voters, thoroughly frightened at the moment, will not let it die. It is thus counting on reaping a harvest of fear.

But things could turn out differently. After Duesseldorf, the FDP is aware of this, and it wants to, and indeed must, pull the emergency brake. The elections in the biggest Land highlighted the danger of little "number three" dropping by the wayside in a confrontation of the other two. Another insight shows that voters who do not want Strauss do not automatically seek

shelter with the FDP but immediately go the whole way. This forces the FDP into a battle on two fronts. On the one hand, it must make a stand against Strauss and the CDU; on the other, it must try to grab back a good number of "coalition voters" from the SPD. This becomes a difficult tightrope act.

It becomes all the more difficult because the FDP, despite, or perhaps because of, the North Rhine-Westphalia defeat, considers its salvation for the moment to be continuing the Bonn coalition. Genscher, who is usually most careful in situations of this sort, was surprisingly unequivocal on it on Monday. He was seconded by General Secretary Verheugen: "Strauss has no chance of becoming chancellor if we are in his camp." Thus there are limits to a potential conflict with the SPD. The FDP does not wish to court a rupture.

On Monday, the FDP used the masses of statistics, data and facts to build a new strategic line of departure for itself. It is based on the finding that, all in all, the "social and liberal potential" had increased in Duesseldorf as well; the FDP would have to fight for its share of it. Thus Verheugen draws the following conclusion from the North Rhine-Westphalia disaster: "The FDP can reach the voters." It is only a matter, says Verheugen, of making them sufficiently conscious f the problems at hand. In North Rhine-Westphalia, he had "the distinct impression that the election campaign had passed us by."

In the Bundestag election campaign all this is to be different. The FDP hopes to salvage a new stimulus out of the Duesseldorf disaster: the FDP, and therefore the three-party system, as an election campaign theme. Its preferred situation would be a chance of inserting itself into the Schmidt-Strauss duel with a plea for a "three-way" consideration: save the FDP, keep Strauss from becoming chancellor, beware of an absolute majority for the Social Democrats. But not even the biggest optimists within the FDP think that this would suffice. After Stuttgart and Saarbruecken, bitter experience showed in Duesseldorf too what what happens if one's hopes are placed in good omens and to settle back and rest. Now the FDP is wide awake; it knows that it must fight, from Genscher on down to the last man. It must try to be more in evidence; it must make it mandatory for a limited, but sufficiently large clientele to vote FDP--and there is nothing easy about that. The FDP is entering the election campaign with a platform which is no less pedestrian than that of the others. There is, for instance, precious little time left for persuading young voters to vote for the FDP rather than for the Greens. A bitter lesson was learned in North Rhine-Westphalia in this department too.

Duesseldorf election results further provided a grim realization for the FDP that it did not become a catch basin for anti-Strauss voters; instead, it lost votes to all the other parties. The bottom line was that it gave up many more votes not only to the Greens and the SPD, but also to the CDU, than it took away from them. That fact, more than anything else, upset

FDP calculations. Did polarization serve to attract the "social-liberal" potential to the SPD and the "liberal-conservative" one to the CDU?

In the Bundestag elections the FDP sees itself forced primarily to remedy the loss of votes to the Union parties. In this respect, hopes are still being placed in the oft-cited "anti-Strauss effect," especially in the north. In opposing the SPD, the FDP leadership feels that the FDP portion of achievements by the coalition should be converted into votes for the FDP. But this would require primarily a mobilization of its own adherents as well as of the "swing voters," which was a failure in North Rhine-Westphalia; the cause of this will be argued about for a long time to come. One of several causes is considered to be the change in leadership from Riemer to Frau Funke and Hirsch, who did not make much of an impression. No matter how successfully the FDP can be reanimated for the Bundestag elections, the Duesseldorf disaster will remain a dark spot upon the FDP's blue and yellow waistcoat. To be ousted from the parliament of the largest Land is the most bitter defeat for the FDP for as long as anyone can remember. In Bonn there are fears that a determination of those responsible could further incite unrest in the ranks of the party. As Verheugen put it emphatically last Monday: "The responsibility belongs to us all."

Bonn Parties Look to Future

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 May 80 p 2

[Article by Thomas Meyer: "Closed Season for the FDP"]

[Text] Bonn, 13 May--The Duesseldorf upset is 2 days old now; Bonn is once again trying to regain its composure, with some difficulty; but nobody has quite recovered just yet. The FDP exhibits a forced calm. As someone put it at Thomas Dehler House on Tuesday, efforts are being made to glue the broken pieces back together. No one can tell where the scars will remain. The SPD is trying, with some difficulty, to enjoy its victories on the Rhine and the Ruhr; could this have been too much of a good thing? The CDU politicians are preparing for their new start with clenched teeth. During the announcement of their election program, the CDU and CSU projected a picture of unanimity, their eyes on the distant future. Closely around the table sat Franz Josef Strauss, Helmut Kohl, general secretaries Geissler and Stoiber, party spokesmen Henrich and Rosenberg. But their expressions were anything but joyous.

Helmut Schmidt, their opponent, also abandoned his habit of injecting a touch of humor into politics. He and his party experienced in the Bundestag the strength of the echo of Bremen and the violence seen there. Was it the fault of the SPD, did it let things get out of hand by its insufficient efforts to maintain order on the left fringe? This was where the opposition concentrated its efforts; it tried to widen the rift after Duesseldorf in the apparently overpowering column of the political adversary. In speeches at universities, Kohl accused the Social Democrats of acting like the Volksfront;

the SPD was outraged at this. Schmidt and other SPD speakers enlarged the subject of internal peace to include external peace which, they said, the opposition may be willing to preserve while being incompetent to do so. Now it was the CDU's turn to be outraged. It is a difficult question where new violence which had surfaced in Bremen would erupt next in the coming days and weeks; this is not a subject for interparty argument.

The impact of Duesseldorf was felt everywhere. CDU and CSU tried to assume a tougher stance, in compliance with Strauss' wishes expressed at the end of election day. SPD Vice Chairman Wischnewski advised Kohl to report to the chancellor canididate: Order executed. Both sides were conspicuous in their efforts to exempt the FDP from the confrontation. The Free Democrats are apparently being accorded careful treatment, at least for the time being. This is probably not the result of unselfishness on the part of both sides. It was curious that the chancellor was much gentler in addressing his opponent speaker Kohl than the other way around. Helmut Schmidt, who is in the habit of addressing him as "Delegate Kohl," used the polite phrase "Mr Leader of the Opposition." This may have had something to do with the mood of the day--or could this be a new ploy designed to nudge the CDU's top candidate into a less prominent arena?

Strauss himself later demonstrated that this was not to be the case. During the announcement of the joint election platform of the sister parties, he and his general secretary Stoiber left no doubt as to who was going to be Number One, regardless of all protestations of unity. Said Strauss: "The preamble preeminently bears my imprint." Stoiber hinted that the entire platform was to be regarded as being oriented toward Strauss, that candidate who together with Adenauer had shaped postwar democracy and, together with Erhard, the economy. Strauss absolutely rejected the notion that events such as occurred on the Rhine and in the Ruhr should have had an impact on the election campaign platform, even though sufficient time had elapsed between election day and the Berlin CDU party conference: "Not a single word needs to be changed."

Last Sunday's events seem to have had a greater impact upon the FDP: It shows less optimism. Its national leadership meets on Monday; it is going to work out the party program. The liberals' attempts to gain greater visibility will not contribute to the calm of the events in Bonn. All participants are ready to engage in a struggle, but no one is exactly certain how and against what. Thus the craving for action is disguised behind disgruntled facial expressions and everyone looks for a chink in the other's armor. Genscher sat in the Bundestag and never said one word. He sat on his government bench, like a statue.

9273
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FDP DRAWS CONCLUSIONS FROM ELECTION DEFEAT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 May 80 p 12

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Defeat Brings Movement"]

[Text] In retrospect, the FDP is trying to determine the causes of the defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia and the conclusions that should be drawn for the future--for the time being until 5 October, the day of the Bundestag election--and it has become evident that some segments of the party are voicing criticism of Party Chairman Genscher. It can be traced back to the discovery that the SPD had succeeded in giving the election new interpretation, that of a Bundestag election. In other words, the voters of the Land were quietly brought face to face with a question that concerns Bonn, whether Schmidt or Strauss should govern. In principle, this tactic would not have been wrong for the FDP either. But this time, in contrast to some earlier Landtag elections, for instance, the one in Hesse approximately 2 years ago, only the SPD and its chancellor had profited from the new interpretation of the Landtag election. During the election in North Rhine-Westphalia, the FDP had been on the sideline "unnoticed, unattacked and later mourned." The SPD turned the Landtag election into a "Schmidt election;" if the FDP on its part had wanted to benefit from the interpretation of an election having national political significance, it should have been called a "Schmidt-Genscher" election.

Theoretically, this interpretation leads to three possible conclusions. The first one might be to accuse the leadership of the Land party of carrying on an election campaign oriented too much toward Land politics. As a matter of fact, Land Chairman Hirsch, the out-going minister of the interior who returned to the Bundestag in Bonn following the election catastrophy suffered by his party, had injected into the election campaign strong components reflecting Land politics, for instance, discussions about the debt of the Land and how come that North Rhine-Westphalia's position among the Laender was worse after revenue sharing than before, circumstances that were probably of very little interest to the public. Still, there is little criticism of Hirsch. It is possible that solidarity in misfortune is playing a role and the awareness that Hirsch, who took Riemer's place a few months ago, found himself facing a dangerous task which, in addition , was in conflict with his own intentions (return to Bonn). Rather, there is criticism of the

leading candidate, Mrs Funcke, who had been called from Bonn to succeed Riemer in the Land Ministry of Economics. In the judgment of FDP supporters and politicians, Mrs Funcke was a bland figure in the election campaign.

A second conclusion, however, is evidenced in critical views of Genscher, the national chairman. Nobody disputes the fact that he was involved in the election campaign in his usual manner, energetically and sacrifically (although some express the opinion that he could have done more). But certain segments of the party feel that among the reasons why the SPD, assisted by its Chancellor Schmidt, was able to push aside the FDP by devising a Land election campaign with national political overtones, are certain incidents and peculiarities associated with Genscher's political appearances. This criticism reflects the opinion that in the world crisis Genscher was too supportive of current public opinion. The SPD and Schmidt were much more successful. They satisfied the prevailing demand by the public for peace and understood the latent dislike for too strong ties to America. The remark can be heard that the FDP--indirectly it is aimed at Genscher--left the policy of detente to the SPD and Chancellor Schmidt; after 1969, the FDP was instrumental in shaping the policy and making it possible. This criticism contains a tactical and fundamental component, and it is difficult to define the fronts and interests.

Relationship to SPD

The third conclusion from the 11 May Landtag election concerns the relationship with its coalition partner, the SPD. In principles, the wing of the FDP described here feels that there is no other choice but an alliance with the SPD. These segments of the party reject an interpretation of the 11 May election results, which indicate a continuing weakening of the "bourgeois" camp. Still, they feel that they are part of the camp in spite of considerable restrictions and facing the obligatory question as to how "bourgeois" is to be defined. A rough definition of where to draw the line is accepted by these segments of the FDP as well: a citizen who is able to make his own decisions in as many areas as possible--even the material one; "socialistic," on the other hand, means to relinquish, if in doubt, self-determination in favor of social welfare. These principally "social-liberal" FDP politicians are of the opinion that the FDP must participate in the policy of detente more openly than has been the case to date and, in this manner, avoid the possibility that the SPD will make the claim that they alone are pursuing this policy which is supported by a large segment of the public. Of late, the FDP has been pursuing a more decisive position than the CDU/CSU and Strauss, their candidate for the chancellorship. In part, this is due to the fact that Chairman Genscher is representing the office of the minister of foreign affairs. Even Land Chairman Hirsch, although on domestic policies he is a left-wing liberal, is among those within the FDP who represent a firm position toward the Soviet Union.

Now that the Bundestag election campaign is about to begin, there is a general opinion within the FDP that the party should make a stronger attempt than it did in the past to uncover limited conflicts with the SPD. Even

those within the FDP who see no other alternative but an alliance with the SPD want to present the party as a "brake" in the econopolitical field, in contrast to the tendency within the SPD favoring planned and government-regulated economic policies--in this respect it has become annoying, according to a widely held opinion, that Chancellor Schmidt has already put on the brakes. On the other hand, it is considered a necessity that the FDP assume a "progressive" position in contrast to the "conservative" leadership of the SPD in the areas of environmental and data protection, also with regard to criminal laws and energy policies. It is not particularly original: Even to date there has been within the FDP a double strategy, which may, perhaps, be expressed in the names of Lambsdorff and Baum and which--although at the present time both sides feel forced to cooperate--some day could become an open competition not only for the leadership position within the party but also for establishing the contents in politics.

It is noteworthy that since 11 May even the "social-liberals" within the FDP are showing signs of concern for the future of the Union--definitely motivated by self-interest. Although a coalition with the Union is certainly not acceptable (Strauss is giving only a simple reason, refusing further explanations), there is just as much sentiment in favor of a Union that is strong enough to present opportunities for the FDP to occasionally scare the SPD a little. To be sure, even in this respect the party is indulging in the widespread consolation that following the warning sign from Duesseldorf, voters would not let the FDP go under, but they realize that the SDP might take advantage of the favorable hour and the events of 11 May and attempt to gain an absolute majority. If this were to happen--the decision-making process within the SPD has not yet been concluded--the hopes of the FDP, on the left and on the right, would come to naught and there would be no "votes on loan" for the SPD to preserve the coalition, as was the case in 1972. To be sure, the FDP is counting on the fact that such circumstances would bring them votes from the CDU; people, for instance, who do not agree with Strauss, who are expecting a humiliating defeat for their party and thus recognize the FDP as the party of their second choice. But it is also known that such a shift, leading to a more expanded "bourgeois" camp, would not benefit the FDP sufficiently if the SPD should receive an absolute majority. To avoid this, the FDP needs a relatively strong Union, which explains the strange manifestations of sympathy for the Union, particularly on the part of left-wing liberals.

Indispensable Genscher

For the reasons mentioned, this wing of the FDP is even concerned about a split of the Union following an election defeat on 5 October: It could reduce the CDU to a 30 percent party, whereas the CSU would become a right-wing party which would be beyond calculations. The fact that this segment of the FDP would not even consider an alliance with the Union has been confirmed by low-key accusations against Genscher for expressing his sympathy for the coalition between the FDP and the CDU, an experiment limited to Saarland; it made the "social-liberal" voters insecure and made it easier for them to find a direct way to the SPD.

Nevertheless, even the FDP wing described here knows that the present time Genscher is indispensable. They know Genscher's firmness toward the Soviet Union, based on direct experiences of the reality of the Soviet Zone after 1945 and his conviction that there are limits to every policy of detente when it meets with a realistic assessment of Soviet imperialism. For all of these reasons, the prospects are not very good that Genscher will adopt a more flexible position in matters concerning the "policy of detente," a position that would bring him closer to the SPD, reminiscent of the good old days of Brandt and Scheel. They would like to present the FDP as a more versatile party during the coming election campaign, a continuing spreading of the wings, a wider selection in the political offerings of the party: Firmly tied to the SPD, and yet (a difficult feat) recognizable as a competitor. Thus, the wings within the FDP will become stronger and, inevitably, the chairman will become a little weaker. The consequences will lead to more worries, after the election.

8991
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FDP PONDERS ELECTION DISASTER

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 May 80 p 10

[Article by Thomas Meyer: "Now Comes Pity: How, After the Disaster in Duesseldorf, the FDP Wants To Get Back on Its Feet Again"]

[Text] Bonn, May--In the FDP central office in Bonn, incoming mail increased after 11 May. The drift of the letters and telegrams is: This we did not want. The manifestations of regret from North Rhine-Westphalia's so-called social-liberal electorate suggest that in the desire to strengthen Chancellor Schmidt, the FDP was accidentally ejected from the Landtag of the largest Federal Land. Is this greatest defeat of the Free Democrats in the postwar era indeed due to a mistake? Should the intention to correct the mistake last till 5 October and the lesson from the debacle moreover strengthen the will to save the FDP beyond the borders of North Rhine-Westphalia, then the party would not need to worry all that much about the Bundestag elections. This is however not a security guarantee, but rather a hope.

Self-aid is still the best cure. The FDP can only count on a recovery if, in the 4 1/2 months remaining until the Bundestag election, it succeeds in instilling firmly in the conscience of the voters its offer regarding individuals and policies. But first comes the analysis of the failure in North Rhine-Westphalia. General Secretary Verheugen gave three causes for it: The voters did not realize that their votes could have bolstered Genscher; they overlooked the fact that a vote for the FDP would have meant a vote for the policy of detente, "won in struggle by the FDP"; it did not register "that a vote for the FDP is at the same time also a vote against Franz Josef Strauss." In this "scolding of voters," by the FDP general secretary there is a trace of self-pity, but it also shows the lines of combat for the forthcoming altercations. According to the party's official wishes, the person of the chairman is to be the center of the election campaign and of the rescue action; even more than before, Genscher is praised as the symbol of continuity and stability. At the same time, the FDP, in order not to be "forgotten" again, feels forced into a confrontation with the two big ones. The fight against Strauss is to bring it merit points.

The result of North Rhine-Westphalia convinced the FDP that success in October can be achieved only if no doubts whatever arise as to the party's loyalty to the Bonn coalition. True, the talk about self-reliance continues, but now it means primarily pointing out the accomplishments of the FDP within the coalition. This is supposed to convey to the voters the impression that the most significant of these accomplishments is the fact that the FDP alone made it possible for Helmut Schmidt to remain chancellor and relieved him of the necessity of submitting his government to the pressures of the SPD's left wing. This construction, at the same time, permits the FDP to prove its "chancellor-loyalty" and to fight against an absolute SPD majority.

As absurd as it may sound, with these viewpoints, last Sunday's overwhelming SPD victory has also given the FDP hope for the fall. The view prevails that the SPD's high point and the FDP's low came precisely one election too soon: The greediness to achieve once more as high an election result as possible will in the end predominate and even those Social Democrats who really want the FDP as support for the chancellor in governing will not be able to escape from the undertow. A secondary and loan vote action, as happened 8 years ago, seems impossible.

In the final analysis, the FDP has to turn the page by its own efforts. But this is more easily said than done. The election program and with it the declaration of intentions have been decided on. Apart from minor corrections and tightening up, not much can be changed anymore. The general slogan with which the Free Democrats are presenting themselves this year is: Courage for freedom--courage for responsibility. North Rhine-Westphalia appears to have shown itself as not easily graspable, but the FDP cannot now simply let go of it again. They are looking for catchy and lively "secondary slogans." These should as much as possible promote the anti-Strauss-effect. But what the FDP would like best is a formula that would read something like: Without Genscher, Schmidt cannot be chancellor.

However, the FDP's greatest difficulty lies in its condition. The party is badly battered. If one adds lower Saxony, the FDP must now, counted by area, manage at the Land level without parliamentary representation in close to half of the Federal Republic. This alone is a great deficit. To this must be added that there are organizational constraints to the urgently necessary mobilization. In an election campaign, from Flensburg to Passau, the comparatively small apparatus in the Thomas-Dehler-House in Bonn can only offer limited impetus.

As regards individuals and the political tenor they stand for, the FDP has its troubles. Genscher cannot be multiplied. The Bonn FDP ministries radiate only limited solicitation effectiveness, and even the Bundestag fraction, apart from representative Hoppe's zeal and Muellemann's over-great zeal, is also not super-duper in its presentation to the general public. The packet of issues does not carry too much weight at this time either. In legal policy, and here especially with the plan to rescind in part the anti-terrorist legislation, the FDP had only moderate success. Capital formation has been put in cold storage; in environmental policy it can only be

maneuvered laboriously. True, the FDP "stands firm" on the tax package, but in light of the general political situation, its implementation is in question.

At this time, the FDP is having a particularly difficult time with young people. The North Rhine-Westphalia elections showed that the other parties, above all the Greens, had considerably greater attraction for the first-time voters. The party is at a loss as to how to regain ground, how to win minorities over to its side without becoming a decidedly peripheral-groups party. This is just what the FDP cannot afford. To exist in the long run, it needs a potential in almost all strata of the population and in all regions of the Federal Republic.

Thus, in spite of the hoped for aboutface, or pity effect, the FDP's prospects are not particularly favorable. Too many balances have to be struck within the shortest time. Hopes are focused today on quite a motley thrown-together clientele of changeover voters. As long as the FDP is not able to square the circle, that is present in a clear and attractive way what liberalism means today and how a party can adopt the concept--so long must the FDP operate pragmatically. Here, once again, it is above all Genscher who is to guard and increase the capital stock of a responsible, continuously working government party, which at the same time is open to innovations. He himself needs success for his position: as party leader and within the cabinet. For this, an extremely thin 5 percent result is not enough.

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PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING IRAN BOYCOTT NOTED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 May 80 p 26

[Article: "One Step Behind"]

[Text] To date, since the passage of the trade embargo, only one consequence can be predicted for sure: There will be ample work for the bureaucracy.

During the cabinet round on Wednesday before Pentecost, the FDP chairman praised a party friend. Hans-Dietrich Genscher applauded the manner in which Otto Graf Lambsdorff appealed to the conscience of German managers: "It was well received."

On the eve before the annual meeting of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) [Federation of German Industries], the minister for economics had appealed to industry to take seriously the trade embargo against Iran. It was not decent to look for loopholes for illegal exports.

The cabinet was equally consistent. In keeping with the EC agreement, Bonn decided to join the announced boycott against Tehran. Only food and medicine may still be sold to the Persians.

Yet in the beginning the EC embargo resolutions only presented Bonn bureaucrats with riddles. Whereas the British, to the dismay of their partners, paid little attention to the agreed-upon start of the boycott, the Germans were struggling with the details.

Accordingly, all business transactions that had been concluded before 4 November 1979, the day the hostages were seized in Tehran, are to proceed without restriction. Transactions agreed upon between 4 November and 23 May 1980 are to be treated differently: Shipments resulting from these sales contracts have to be approved by the Eschborn Federal Office for Trade and Industry.

Nevertheless, the minister of economics was in no position to disclose--neither to his colleagues in the cabinet nor to export managers--which of these agreements will receive the official stamp of approval and which ones will be disallowed. On this point, negotiations with the EC partners were still in progress.

It is certain that a compromise will be worked out permitting many different interpretations. In other words: Senior inspectors from the federal office will interpret the ordinance and decide which goods may embark on their trip to Iran.

Since the officials at the federal office will certainly feel that they are not equipped to handle large business deals, many of the decisions will probably end up with the Federal Government. The Bonn bureaucracy will be stuck with additional work.

BDI President Rolf Rodenstock estimates that the orders at stake in Iran could affect German industry to the tune of "between DM 1 and 1.5 billion." Hardest hit are medium-size producers of spare parts for machinery and industrial equipment, as well as several steel producers.

Enterprises like Salzgitter, that had planned to deliver to the Persians large quantities of structural steel, are now facing drastic cuts. In the past, the Salzgitter concern and a few competitors on the Saar had shipped almost 30 percent of several kinds of steel to Tehran.

Other exporters are not paying much attention to the boycott ordered by Bonn. This concerns, above all, industries involved in the construction of machinery and equipment which only 2 years ago were the Persians' most important suppliers.

Heinrich Weiss, manager of the Schloemann-Siemag equipment builder in Duesseldorf, admitted: "Our business with them is practically dead." His last big order from Iran has been stored in his warehouses for months--parts for a rolling mill, ordered by the shah regime, priced at approximately DM 100 million. The Oberhausen major stockholder of Schloemann-Siemag, Gutehoffnungshuette (GHH), a machine construction trust, has been doing very little business with the Persians, and it has been that way for a long time, even before the embargo. Many weeks ago, GHH manager Manfred Lennings complained: "Orders from Iran are almost nonexistent." The last ones amounted to the modest sum of DM 20 million.

As recent as 1978, however, the GHH transported to prerevolutionary Persia machinery and equipment valued at approximately half a billion German marks.

If the Iranians stop their payments because of the boycott, Bonn will have to step in because it guarantees Hermes bonds for exports. This year, almost DM 900 million will come due for good delivered a long time ago.

In the meantime, foreign competitors are trying to exploit the EC boycott for their own business. Poland has already offered steel to take the place of German shipments that did not materialize. Warsaw exporters also want to exchange machinery and spare parts for Iranian oil.

Nevertheless, many German firms will not give in without a fight, but they will try to bypass the export ban. For instance, the controlling authorities are powerless when enterprises continue their shipments to Iran by way of their foreign subsidiaries. Even exports destined for friendly foreign nations--for instance, Austria or Turkey--that are subsequently sold to the Persians, cannot be stopped easily.

Otto Graf Lambsdorff was realistic and admitted that "the legislator is always one step behind ingenious exporters."

8991
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JOURNAL NOTES STATUS, NEED FOR MORE CIVIL DEFENSE

Plea for Civil Defense

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 16 May 80 pp 9-11

[Lecture by Carl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker, director, Max Planck Institute, Starnberg, to the Technical Supervisory Association, Munich: "If War Should Break Out After All"]

[Text] Urgently needed at the present time is a change in public consciousness with regard to the issue of civil defense. It is a matter of making good that which has been neglected for many years, and to do so quickly, sensibly, resolutely and without panic. The reasoning is entirely humanitarian. People must be protected: We, our families, our children and grandchildren, our friends and fellow citizens. Limited acts of war in our country are possible, and it does not depend on us alone whether they may happen, possibly in just a few years time.

It has always been a mistake to assume that peace is secure. Equally erroneous is the opinion that a possible war would assume such dimensions that there can be no possible protection. It will make a difference whether or not we do something about civil defense.

1. The Basic Pros and Cons

The protection of the noncombatant population from the warriors has been an age old concern of mankind. Here and there in our forests we come across ruined ramparts of prehistoric refuges. The oldest known civilizations used city walls to defend the endangered structure of their civic life, that is their ability to survive as a culture. The modern international law of warfare attempted to humanize warfare by offering legal protection to noncombatants. The technical resources of our century, though, have progressively rebarbarized war.

Civil defense in the modern meaning of the term was a reaction to the invention of the bomber aircraft. Those among us who lived through World War II, especially the civilians, recall nights spent in bomb shelters, the smoking

ruins of our cities. And here we have the paradox: This image, burnt indelibly into our memories, is apparently one of the chief rationales for our --so far--unshakeable emotional refusal once and again--and seriously-- to think of civil defense.

Let us tackle the rational analysis of the problem arising for the project of civil defense in the age of the atomic bomb. The emotional resistance to civil defense hides a kernel of world historic common sense. For mankind as a whole Hiroshima has served as a symbol of the necessity for ending the era of wars, which has lasted for thousands of years. In the light of this necessity the effort of surviving a possible nuclear war may be felt to be not merely meaningless but actually immoral. If we were to learn how to survive such a war, would we not then be tempted to conduct it?

I am convinced that, in the long term, the changed human attitude to war (emerging from this question) is entirely justified. It is in fact an absolute necessity to abolish the institution of war. Evidently, though, this appreciation does not absolve us from the human duty of caring for the victims of non-nuclear wars such as are constantly occurring. We must also learn to understand that it does not release us from the need to investigate whether it is possible to take some precautions for the potential nuclear war which might be fought in our country.

We must therefore review the two opposing opinions liable to be hazarded against civil defense: "There is no defense against nuclear war" and "defensive preparations make nuclear war more likely."

Each one of these propositions assumes a different shape according to the country to be protected. The two superpowers have giant territories, are far removed from one another and--from the political aspect--hold decision making powers on war and peace. For them, at any rate, the technical feasibility of an effective civil defense cannot be rejected out of hand. That is precisely the reason why it is to some extent plausible to argue that a well organized civil defense system might one day make it easier for them to decide upon war. In fact the Soviet Union does have a civil defense program in the shape of extensive printed instructions. Emergency stocks for the population are being assembled, shelters built for workers in vital defense industries, protective drills held for the civilian population. In the United States the issue has been debated for years.

In Germany--and that applies to both German states--the situation is exactly the other way round. Let us here discuss only the Federal Republic, where it is up to us to decide our course of action. Our country is small. Its geographical location is close to the only possible opponent, and it lacks the military power as well as the political scope to begin a war against him.

It is an absurdity from the military aspect to imagine that the limited civil defense measures we might adopt would amount to the preparation of offensive war against the Warsaw Pact. What we must consider from this aspect is

only this: Whether the Soviet leadership might take our adoption of civil defense preparations as an indication that we are prepared to offer serious resistance to a possible military threat from the USSR. That is a delicate political question. For us, though, the real issue is that of finding out whether an effective defense of our country is even conceivable.

It is easy to give a general reply to this question: The potential defensive effect will depend on the dimension of the weaponry used. Here we see two extremes for which any defensive preparations are irrelevant and--in between --a broad spectrum of possible warlike actions when the survival of many, if not the entire people may depend on the presence or absence of defensive preparations.

-- The one extreme is represented by the instance when any defensive precautions are superfluous. That does not only include the most desirable of all situations--the unlimited duration of the current peace. Another possibility is immediate capitulation; military occupation without military resistance, such as Czechoslovakia in 1968.

-- The other extreme is the--technically feasible--total destruction of our country by nuclear weapons equipped with megaton warheads and radioactive after effects. The medium-range rockets which the Soviet Union emplaced against Western Europe in the 1960's would suffice to do so. Against these no technologically, financially and politically feasible shelter construction could protect us.

However, neither of the two extremes are likely to happen--at least as far as we can judge at this time--from the military aspect. The permanence of peace is not a matter of course. In any case, since Adenauer's rearmament decision of 1954 our democratically elected governments have been able to rely on a popular majority for a policy which seeks to guarantee the maintenance of peace in freedom by a combat-ready Bundeswehr within the scope of the NATO alliance. This policy must prepare the effective use of the Bundeswehr, in the hope never to have to undertake it just because it would be effective. Consequently this policy may never assume that the only two possibilities are the permanence of peace or immediate capitulation. Deterrence cannot be credible and therefore not effective if it is a foregone conclusion that the readiness to combat is lacking. That is the military argument for civil defense which, from this aspect, is designated civil defense within the scope of overall defense.

I must emphasize, though, that my argument is quite independent of this defense or deterrent consideration. I assume that war is possible in the world, even in Europe, and that it might involve our country, even if we decided not to defend ourselves against invasion. One glance at our geographical location suffices to let us appreciate this possibility. Sweden and Switzerland, both neutrals, are the two European countries which have implemeneted careful civil defense programs for many years. Admittedly they both have a tradition also of willingness to defend themselves. Yet they are quite aware that, in the worst case, they would be unable to prevent the passage of radioactive clouds or possible battles between the two allied

armies on their territory--without or without their own military defense. In view of our geographic situation the same applies to us to an even greater extent. Even if we were to leave NATO and declare ourselves neutral, our country would quickly become a battlefield in the case of a European war.

On the other hand the extreme of total annihilation is not the most probable alternative. In wartime that enemy is likely to be annihilated, who is utterly feared or hated and believed to be unsuitable for either total subjugation or reconciliation. The reasonable vital interest of the Soviet Union is not the destruction of Western Europe but the exploitation of West European economic strength. Moreover, the Soviet Union would have to assume the possibility of a counterattack with almost the same destructive consequences for its territory. In any case, consonant with its doctrine of flexible reaction, NATO is preparing for conceivable warlike actions at all possible levels of escalation, beginning with conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, and ending with medium range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Civil defense planning must, therefore, take into account the range of possible limited weapons use. Probably one of the reasons why so little has been done for civil defense in our country was our awareness that the presumption of some abstract "image of war" must necessarily be unrealistic. The approval of important financial allocations or the implementation of the duty to build shelters--decided in 1965 but subsequently suspended--would have produced a public debate which would have spread disquiet without providing precise information. The consciousness of neither the public nor the politicians was ripe for this debate.

II. The Current World Situation

Last winter the state of foreign political consciousness in our country and the entire Western world underwent a profound change. We talk of the possibility of war between the superpowers; a war which would involve us too. The outlook is uncertain. I am therefore bound to confess to the subjectivity, a lack of evidence buttressing my own appraisal of the world situation. At the same time, unless I am completely deceived, the more possibility that this appraisal might be correct makes inevitable new measures regarding civil defense. The changed state of public consciousness actually allows for deciding on such measures.

Four events characterize the deterioration in the world political atmosphere: The temporary failure of SALT II ratification in the U.S. Senate, the NATO rearmament decision, the seizure of hostages in Tehran, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Each one of these events could have been avoided if those who desired and accomplished them had been so minded. The actors involved, however, were in each case convinced that they were doing the right, even the necessary thing. It seems to me that these events were not the cause by the symptom of a world situation which had already changed. A

crisis for mankind has long been in the making. Though I am aware that my arguments lack proper documentation I have long expected the 1980's to be the first profoundly dangerous period. They are now beginning to reveal the pent-up crisis potential in rather surprising ways.

In my judgment the designation of the 1980's as the time of crisis is primarily due to the situation of the Soviet Union, which has become rather precarious. The economy of the Soviet Bloc is in evident stagnation, it may even be in a decline related to the system and therefore incurable. The technological lead of the West has proved to be unbeatable. The ideological suasion of "real socialism" in the Soviet version has sunk to a nadir worldwide. Those seeking alliances and aid from the Soviet Union are interested only in the support of Soviet military might. Compared to the world as a whole this military might may have passed its zenith in the 1980's.

From the purely military aspect all of Asia is now open to Soviet tanks. In conventional weapons the Soviet Union is far superior to the Western alliance at this time, in tactical nuclear weapons slightly inferior, in strategic weapons equal; it is present on all the oceans of the world. These arms have been purposefully amassed in the course of many years.

For 30 years the United States believed that it and the free world were secure thanks to U.S.nuclear superiority. Just now it has reacted to the appreciation of the unstoppable Soviet rearmament by a turnaround in public opinion from soft to hard line and the decision to further rearmament, a decision which is probably irreversible. Involved here is not the military undesirable establishment of major strategic "overkill" capacities but the provision of various--including nuclear--weapons for specialized limited use. For its part the Soviet Union is unable either technologically or economically to sustain a long qualitative arms race with the United States. This means that Soviet policy must soon gather any fruit which may be harvested by bringing military force to bear.

Where are such fruit ripening? The precipitation of a world war would be just as absurd, just as suicidal for the Soviet Union as for America. To conquer and rule Asian nations would nowadays be more of a calamity than a gain; Afghan resistance offers a textbook example. Plausible goals are the shoring up of "friendly" regimes, "punitive expeditions" (even against future chief rival China) and the gain of the right to dispose of Persian Gulf oil. At the same time, from the political standpoint, the Soviet Union's relations with Europe is bound to be crucial. Only close cooperation with the west European economy offers any prospect of help for the distressed economy of the Soviet Bloc. Yet, from the Soviet standpoint, this must not be allowed to assume the nature of political capitulation to capitalism; in fact it must occur due to the Soviet Union's preponderant political influence on Western Europe. From the Soviet angle, the actual decay of NATO would be the prerequisite for this course of events. We must therefore expect a Soviet offensive in this direction, coupling enticements and threats.

This situation does not necessarily have to produce a world or European war. Still, it embroils Western Europe in a political chess game which cannot be won if Western Europe is basically disunited in the realm of politics and/or liable to be blackmailed from the military aspect. That is why the technically probably consequences of a possible war in our countries represent a factor of our political future even if such a war eventually fails to materialize.

It is not my intention today to discuss our foreign policy in this situation. Let me say only that detente continues to be vital in the only meaning it could ever have: The constantly repeated pragmatic balancing of the interests of the powers--in theory irreconcilable--, so that the slide toward a potentially fatal war may be avoided. That amounts to a gain in time for the change in consciousness which is progressing among all mankind. Much would be achieved if we were able to weather the coming crisis without a major war.

III. Practical Steps

The humanitarian reasoning in favor of civil defense sets itself a limited but indispensable task. It asks what would happen if a war in our country did not merely threaten but were actually fought. In the present world situation who is bold enough to say that this could not occur? We must ask ourselves what would happen to the people of our country in and after a war. Who will survive and in what kind of physical state? What living conditions will the survivors find? How will they cope?

Anyone seriously reflecting about the consequences of war will be greatly tempted to throw up his hands, take flight in longing for death. Many years ago we were told that nuclear warfare might not destroy mankind but that the survivors would envy the dead. And yet it is imperative with the utmost resolution to resist such resignation.

The civil defense planner is here in the same situation as the physician who is bound by the hippocratic oath. As long as I have the means to render aid, it is not up to me to withhold it from my fellow human who might be helped by it. In this context I do not mean to advocate a purely formal application of this principle in a technologically extended agony. I mean assistance to people whose lives may yet offer the possibility of a real future, even if the way to this future must be a via dolorosa. This would presumably be the situation of mankind after a war.

Initially we must outline the image of that war for which alone defensive preparations make sense. Such a war would be limited as to the use of weapons but possibly worldwide in extent.

-- Limited as to the use of weapons: Our analysis of the world situation does not produce a plausible motive for any power to attack us for the purpose of our annihilation. Warfare would, however, be likely to proceed with

the tactical use of nuclear weapons. True, in view of its tank superiority the Soviet Union has no reason to introduce nuclear weapons at the start. It is in the diplomatically favorable situation of being able to shift the odium onto NATO. Given the present ratio of military strength, only by using nuclear combat weapons would NATO be able to withstand an attack by the Warsaw Pact using its full conventional powers. (However, see H. Afheldt's book "Verteidigung und Frieden" [Defense and Peace], Hanser 1977, and a study now in preparation by the Starnberg Institute on antitank defense by accurate conventional weapons to be used by the infantry; this latter, though, implies a long-term program of change in armaments.) For the 1980's we must expect nuclear weapons to be used in the case of a limited war in Western Europe, in other words the dissemination of radioactivity. Moreover, this danger might increase substantially if, for any reason whatsoever, nuclear plants were to become targets of attack.

The destructive effect of warfare so limited will depend largely on its duration, even more on the observance of a low level of escalation in the choice of the weapons used. Medium range rockets are likely to offer the greatest threat to the civilian population. As I mentioned earlier, the older Soviet rockets (SS-4 and SS-5) could potentially wipe out our country. Their modern successor, the SS-20, is much more accurate, that is useable for limited military use with smaller warheads, something which makes the use of this weapon more likely. The Pershing-2 and cruise missiles now decided upon for NATO rearmament are the first to threaten Soviet territory from European soil. This is intended to reinforce the deterrent but, if the worst were to happen, might invite the enemy to undertake a preventive attack. Disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reciprocal diminution or at least an initial halt to the emplacement of these weapons may possibly be the most important military element of detente in the present-day situation.

-- Worldwide in the geographical meaning. Why has war, since 1945, erupted in nearly all regions of the world except Europe? For the United States Europe was politically too important to abandon, for the Soviet Union militarily too close to its most vulnerable regions to risk war there. These conditions will prevail in the 1980's also. That is the reason why we have an opportunity to continue avoiding war in Europe. A worldwide chain of conflicts might eventually involve Europe in war also. But there have always been wars somewhere in the world, and there will be some in the 1980's also. Provided my earlier analysis of the world situation is correct, war might engulf the world, beginning in Asia and on the oceans. In other words: Should a European war happen, it will very likely be part of a worldwide war. Even then the use of weapons might be limited and actual warfare in Europe of short duration. Nobody can be certain about any of this, though.

What are the conclusions to be arrived at about possible practical steps? I will begin with that aspect of the issue which has been little considered in earlier discussions of civil defense: The worldwide involvement. This would signify at least the temporary breakdown of world trade. Except for Japan

hardly any region is so dependent on world trade for its supplies as is Central Europe. I therefore arrive at a first conclusion:

One of the most important steps for civil defense is the provision of the necessary minimum of supplies for a considerable length of time. This may be done by stockpiling and making the domestic economy at least in part self-sufficient.

The very first step toward the formulation of practical consequences returns us to the temptation of resigning ourselves to our fate. The loss of oil, the total or at least partial breakdown of energy distribution, the loss of all food imports. And all that when ours is an industry which specializes in exports, an agriculture turned away from elementary needs. Crop culture without gasoline. After World War II the situation was much easier. At that time decentralized power plants and bakeries were still operating. World trade had not collapsed, and we soon regained our foothold in it. Still, we must resist resignation. Should the situation here described ever come to pass, the survival of those left, their entire prospects for a new future, would depend on the precautions we adopt now.

Once we have noted what might be required after a war, let us turn to the immediate effects of warfare. Radioactivity is particularly significant here. In a relatively wide range the likely dose of radioactivity received will not kill the organism but radically weaken it for years, if not for ever. And yet the physical health of the workers is one of the most important prerequisites for making a new start after the war. Much of the radioactivity caused by weapons is short lived and declines after a few days. People should be able to protect themselves for that time. Second conclusion:

It is crucial to provide the largest possible number of shelters offering protection from radioactivity.

Here we come to an issue which allows for precise answers, the question of technical and financial potential. This, however, would require another lecture, and I am not an expert in this field. I will therefore conclude by offering approximate appraisals:

We may roughly distinguish three steps of possible defense measures involving building construction:

1. Minor measures capable of improvisation in existing buildings or yards.

2. So-called basic defense, that is protection from falling masonry, fire and radioactivity as well as bacterial and chemical warfare agents.

3. Shelters which also withstand certain explosive effects.

Among these steps the first is vital and doubtlessly feasible. The second can nowadays be realized to a limited extent only but, in my opinion, deserves every promotion. The third step is to be considered only in exceptional circumstances, especially with regard to central supply facilities. Hereafter I will quickly discuss the three steps in somewhat greater detail and in reverse order.

Hindsight has shown us that it was a mistake for the Federal Government in 1961 to propose a perfectionist shelter construction system which, rightly, was withdrawn after a 1964 Bundestag hearing. The program would have been far too expensive to carry out while at the same time failing to offer protection from all possible types of warfare. Moreover, due to its excessive dimensions, the East European nations might have mistakenly interpreted it as a revanchist preparation for war. This program will certainly not be reinstated.

In recent years Switzerland and Sweden have made available shelters in the meaning of basic defense for more than 70 percent of their population. If we still had a great deal of time, we could achieve the same. I would estimate the per capita cost of basic defense offered so far at about DM2,000. DM2,000 for 60 million people total DM120 billion. Distributed over 20 years this would amount to DM6 billion per annum, that is DM100 per capita and year. The 1980 federal budget appropriates DM38.4 billion to military defense, DM740 million to civil defense, including DM45 million to shelter construction; the largest share of the remainder, amounting to some DM300 million, is allocated to aid and assistance for disaster protection. DM100 per capita is less than present average alcohol consumption.

Evidently the costs of such a shelter program would be shouldered by the public even individually, provided the people of our country could be persuaded that the money was spent wisely. In such a case also approval of the respective finances in the Land budgets would not involve any difficulties. I will leave the discussion of details to the experts and, in order to challenge such a discussion, pronounce my third conclusion:

A tenfold increase in current annual expenditures for civil defense is possible and necessary.

This program also is too long-term to meet acute dangers. However, any greater increase would--like all sudden measures--encounter major technical and organizational difficulties. Moreover, it would give the impression of being inspired by panic and therefore liable to arouse just such panic at home and, abroad, the dangerous suspicions of our Eastern neighbors. Fourth conclusion:

Priority must be given measures capable of improvization.

To be listed here are: Insulation of existing basements or shelters excavated in the open, furnishing such rooms for a stay of a few days; in addition

the stockpiling of food in private households to last for months, the storage of potable water, medical supplies and first aid training. With sensible instruction this can be realized in a household within a few weeks, all over the country within a few years.

The following proposals, among others, are available for possible government adoption: The creation of shelters in the course of construction of all subways, underground garages, schools, government office buildings; the development of standardized procedures which can be carried out by building owners as simple self-help measures (reinforcement of basement ceilings, simple filters against fall-out and gas); a change in the building code to enable subsequent utilization for basic defense.

Everything that makes sense from the technical aspect can be done provided we, the residents of this country, consider it a wise precaution; nothing that makes sense will happen without such an appreciation. I will close with the sentence which began this lecture--the fifth conclusion:

Urgently needed at the present time is a change in public consciousness with regard to the issue of civil defense.

What is the Cost of a Place in the Shelter?

The cost of basic protection according to the data provided by the Federal Office for Civil Defense:

I. 1. Computed was the additional expenditure needed for basic protection (cost status early 1980).

-- DM2,000 per place in a 7-person shelter,

-- DM1,000 per place in a 25-person shelter,

-- DM800 per place in a 50-person shelter.

2. For large-scale shelters (underground garage or subway) DM800-1,150 per place.

II. Total construction costs of outside shelters (for example in courtyards or gardens) amount to

-- DM2,000 per place in a 25-person shelter,

-- DM1,500 per place in a 50-person shelter.

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 16 May 80 p 10

[Report by Michael Naumann: "No Room in the Shelter"]

[Text] In times of peace it might serve as a "disco bar"--that is the "radiation shelter" S2, suitable for 10 people seeking protection. The ball-shaped concrete shelter may be sunk in the garden--or so claim its producers, the Kelkheimer Betonwerk GmbH--freedom from anxiety in the nuclear age at the price of DM38,900. Last year the firm supplied 15 shelters to private purchasers.

According to the statistics only 1.8 million of the 61 million Germans are provided with shelter places. Interior Minister Baum, in charge of the program, views the shortage of shelters with much concern; he is thinking in strategic terms and says: "An unprotected population means a diminution of deterrence." Not only of deterrence: In contrast to the expectation of life of our well protected neighbors in Switzerland and Scandinavia (where 40-70 percent have shelter places) our national chance for survival would be greatly reduced in the case of nuclear warfare.

In Munich, for example, three large modern shelters offer refuge to 11,000 people; the remaining 1.3 million Munich residents would have to compete for the 16,000 old places left in the 25 above-ground and underground bunkers built in 1940-1945.

The Hamburg authorities have room in concrete shelters for only 1 in 39 residents. Hamburg citizens will have to bring their own food. Though "complete nuclear defense is not possible" (Interior Minister Baum), civil defense in the Federal Republic is not even prepared for conventional modern warfare. In World War I every 20th person killed was a civilian; in World War II every 2d person. In Vietnam 12 civilians died for every soldier killed. The radical use of "normal" and bacteriological or chemical weapons would further worsen the ratio at the expense of the civilian population. The frontline offers the greatest security.

Reasonably well protected in Germany are only the residents of Bremen: 23.6 percent of them could "save" themselves in shelters in times of war. Not so the Bavarians: Here an average of 142 Land residents would have to "compete for one place, because shelter places are available for only 0.7 percent of the population of the largest (in size) Land.

If, in case the worst happens, the 61,000 sirens in the country should announce the approach of enemy bombers and rockets, the struggle for existence is likely to take a new turn: The massive assault on basements, underground garages, reinforced subway stations and old bunkers of the Third Reich would bear a fatal resemblance to the search for a parking spot in any major German city: A hopeless quest.

So far the Federal Government has spent only one sixtieth of the annual defense budget on civil and disaster defense, instead of the one twentieth recommended by NATO. Since 1949 only DM683 million have been spent on the provision of new shelters. The various Federal Governments involved always justified their parsimoniousness by pointing to the emotions of German citizens: "Terrible memories of World War II" are cited, for example, in the 1972 "Weissbuch der Zivilen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik" [White Book of FRG Civil Defense], and "overemphasis on nuclear warfare images as well as the considerable cost of precautions for civilian defense have caused large groups of the Federal Republic's population to be either indifferent or hostile to civil defense."

Eight years later Interior Minister Baum hopes for a miracle of private initiative. He believes that "a broad effect in the construction of shelters can be achieved only if government measures coincide with the readiness of citizens themselves to take precautions in view of a possible crisis situation."

German survival precautions by private shelter construction? The expensive venture poses some ethical problems: He who has paid for his bell-shaped shelter is entitled to be protected in an emergency. In the 1960's an American Jesuit created an uproar by suggesting that the private shelter owner had the right--with a machine gun at the shelter entrance--to defend his chance of survival against the unprotected neighbor family.

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CSO: 3103

GOVERNMENT PRESENTS YEAR'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Apr 80 p 9

[Article: "Supplementary Budget Expenditures 1.6 Billion"]

[Text] On Tuesday the government presented the first supplementary budget proposal for the current year to the Diet. A full 1.6 billion markka increase to state expenditures is proposed.

The additional expenditures are primarily the result of maintaining employment, the agricultural income solution in the spring, and the increase in world market prices for oil products as well as the increased need for reserves.

The supplementary budget proposal did not come about in the government without discordant notes since the SDP's four ministers as well as the three-member ministerial group of the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] officially registered their own positions in the report of the proceedings of the Council of State.

Both groups consider that the supplementary budget does not give sufficient consideration to halting inflationary development.

In order to fund the expenditures of the supplementary budget the government is proposing, among other things, that the manufacturing tax on liquid fuels be increased. Increases of 3-4 pennies on a liter or a kilo will bring the the state approximately 200 million markkas this year. It has been proposed that this sum be turned over to the import trade fund. Also it is proposed that the preparation tax on coal be increased.

A proposal was presented in the Diet a couple of weeks ago already for increasing payments for the stockpiling of liquid fuels. It is calculated that this will produce 70 million markkas.

Increases of 70 Million on Capital Stock

The supplementary budget contains an employment package amounting to approximately 600 million markkas. The first additional work program in the spring

and the additional work program in the fall will receive 300 million markkas.

The government is proposing an increase of 70 million markkas in the supplementary for capital stock in state majority owned corporations.

According to the proposal the Enso-Gutzeit Corporation would receive an increase of 30 million to its capital stock, Kemira 25 million, Valvilla 10 million, and Televa 5 million.

The purpose behind increasing capital stocks is to ensure the realization of corporate investment programs and to improve their financial position.

It was also proposed that the capital stocks of Finnair and the Ajokki Corporation be increased by a total of 7 million markkas.

The granting of aid for the purpose of supporting production activities in developing areas will be increased by 100 million markkas and a loan of 50 million markkas to the Fund for Developing Areas is proposed.

A 30-million markka addition in the supplementary budget is proposed for the state shares of municipalities for the purpose of constructing health centers.

More Than 400 Million for Farm Solution

Also an attempt is being made to increase investments for the purpose of promoting the use of domestic fuels. It is proposed that 25 million markkas be included in the supplementary budget for providing assistance.

Additional funds of 200 million markkas are proposed for supporting the farm price policy. The need for this is a result of the farm income solution in the spring.

It is proposed that 44 million be used for renewing the annual vacation system for farmers, 20 million in payment for eliminating milk cows, and a 45-million markka increase for other expenditures caused by the farm income solution.

It is proposed that 100 million markkas be transferred to the fund for developing the farm economy in such a way that 70 million will be used for sister share loans and additional purchases of land and 30 million for construction loans in the provinces of Lapland, Oulu, and Pohjois-Karjala.

The total amount of expenditures connected with the farm income solution in the supplementary budget will be more than 400 million markkas.

In order to make sea rescue more effective it is proposed that the border patrol service be provided with three new medium sized helicopters. A sum of 13.4 million markkas is proposed for ordering the first helicopter. An

11-million markka increase is also being proposed for the basic purchases of the defense forces for the purpose of improving surveillance and sea rescue.

A 42-million markka increase is being proposed for the use and maintenance expenditures of the defense forces, which is a result of the increase in expenditures for fuel, the growing need for maintenance, and the rental of means of transportation.

It is proposed that 15 million be transferred to the state investment fund for granting loans for the purpose of funding industrial investments.

A 33-million markka increase is proposed for interest support and state guarantees for student loans.

The supplementary budget contains a full 10-million markka compensation to Imatra Power to cover losses sustained in foreign currency exchanges in the years 1977-79 in connection with a loan obtained from the Soviet Union for the company's nuclear power project.

SDP: Additional Estimated Tax for Enterprises

Finance Minister Pirkko Tyolajarvi (Social Democrat) appended to the supplementary budget a statement in which all SDP ministers except for Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto concurred.

In the statement it is considered, among other things, that in evaluating the basis for income the degree of inflation included in this year's graduated adjustments should be taken into consideration at a lower level. In the opinion of the SDP ministers a greater inflation rate than what was predicted should be taken into consideration in the taxation of next year's incomes as adjustments in the graduated scale and wage reductions.

In the opinion of the SDP ministers the increase in the inflation rate and economic developments also bring about a situation in which the estimated taxes paid by enterprises are too small and, therefore, they are demanding additional estimated taxes for enterprises.

In addition, the SDP ministeres believe that the transfer of certain funds should have been deliberated at a later time so that there would be a 300-500 million markka economic reserve.

SKDL: Again a Loan Tax on Large Incomes

The three-member SKDL ministerial group -- Arvo Aalto, Veikko Saarto, Kalevi Kivisto -- for their part consider in differing degrees of opinion that the supplementary budget proposal does not meet the needs which are now required by the government for fighting inflation.

According to the SKDL ministers the inflation caused by import and export prices could be slowed down more effectively by a revaluation of the markka.

In the opinion of the group export fees should be collected from the forest industry, and the temporary sales tax alleviations granted to industry should be eliminated.

Because of income distribution and economic policy reasons, it would in the opinion of the SKDL ministers be justified to collect a loan tax from large incomes and properties during an economic boom.

This tax would be collected beginning with a taxable income of 92,000 markkas. Loan taxes would also be collected from taxable property worth 350,000 markkas.

The loan tax on large incomes and properties proposed by the SKDL was tried during Miettunen's emergency government.

10576
CSO: 3107

AGREEMENT TO INCREASE EXPORTS TO USSR SIGNED

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 30 Apr 80 p 15

[Article: "Additional Exports Defined, 600 Million Markkas' Worth of Machinery to Soviet Union"]

[Text] Finland and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on a 3-billion markka package for increasing exports and balancing the trade. The agreement, which was endorsed by correspondence between Foreign Trade Minister Esko Rekola and Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Patolichev, will mean additional exports of commodities worth a total value of 1.8 billion markkas to the Soviet Union. In addition to this, agreement was also reached on payments connected with joint ventures and deliveries exceeding the export quotas for ships and equipment as defined in the agreement for the years 1981-85. These trade agreements will be concluded this year.

The total value of the exchange of commodities between Finland and the Soviet Union will increase to more than 20 billion markkas this year when one takes into consideration the additional exports of 3 billion.

The additional exports are essentially based on traditional areas of exports directed toward the Soviet Union. The proportion of these additional exports belonging to machinery and equipment is approximately one-third or nearly 600 million markkas.

The total value of forest industry products included in this group of additional exports is more than 400 million markkas.

The total value of additional exports in consumer goods and foodstuffs is approximately 360 million markkas. The largest single quotas concern leather footwear and other leather products amounting to a value of 120 million markkas. Ready-made clothing 70 million markkas, and foodstuffs 60 million markkas.

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CSO: 3107

SOVIET OIL PURCHASES CAUSED 600 MILLION 1979 TRADE DEFICIT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 May 80 p 24

[Article: "Oil Product Imports from Soviet Union Disturbed Balance, a Deficit of 600 Million Markkas"]

[Text] Last year the import trade fund had a deficit of 600 million markkas. This loss is primarily the result of ready-made petroleum products imported from the Soviet Union. The share that sugar played in this loss was only a few million markkas.

In recent years the closing of the books by the import trade fund has generally shown a profit. If in some years a deficit was shown, it was possible to cover the 10-20 million markka losses in the following year.

Now the import trade fund must pump money into its chests from Neste as well as the state. The situation with respect to Neste is exceptional since last year the corporation had to pay the import trade fund 280 million markkas for price increases in oil trade caused by another company.

Of the petroleum products it imports Neste brings in four-fifths as crude oil, which is processed further at the company's refinery. On the other hand, the petroleum products imported from the Soviet Union by Suomen Petrooli are ready-made products refined from heavy and light fuel oil. Their share of Finland's oil imports is one-fifth.

One-Fifth Purchased on the Spot Price Market

Products imported from the Soviet Union are tied to the 1974 Rotterdam price quotations, in which there occurred a sudden price rise toward the end of last year. In order that these fluctuations would not affect the country's internal pricing, a price equalization system was put into use in Finland.

Since the import price of ready-to-use fuel oil brought into Finland is higher than the basic level corresponding to the refinery price, the difference is paid to the importer from the import trade fund. Inasmuch as the price is less, the difference is debited to the import trade fund.

Last year the price development in the Rotterdam markets favored Soyuznefte-Export, which is the supplier of Suomen Petrooli. The Rotterdam price quotations for completed products were at times more than double that of the level 2 years ago.

Sometimes there were artificial rises in the price level when reserves were filled to overflowing. Thus the spot market, which was conducted over and above long-term agreements, increased to 10 percent of the whole oil trade while previously it amounted to only a couple percentage points of the market.

This year it has been difficult to obtain a true picture of the level of spot-prices, since there have been very few such transactions. Those stockpiling oil have not wanted to dispose of their products purchased at a high price and demand has not been great since there is currently an overproduction of oil.

This week light fuel oil could be purchased from the spot-markets for 1,200 markkas per ton. In April the cost of light fuel oil in the markets in Holland was 150 markkas more per ton.

This week it is possible to purchase heavy fuel oil from the international markets at a cost of 614 markkas per ton. This price is 169 markkas less per ton than the selling price in Finland.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry believes that the import trade fund will return to the level of normal years this year. It is expected that the decreasing trend in spot-prices will reduce the loss. Last year the 600-million markka loss is partially the result of the fact that the effects of price development on the fund is not felt until after several months.

The decreasing prices in the crude oil market have not had much effect on the total picture. Emergency consignments have been sold for the same price as what Iran has asked for its oil. Spot-prices have dropped one-fourth since last year's highest quotations.

Spot-prices for crude oil do not affect Finland's oil economy. Finland purchases its crude oil by long-term agreements and we succeeded in purchasing half of the year's quota from Iran, for example, before it raised its prices in the spring. Thus, for example, the 250,000-ton consignment now arriving in Finland was purchased at the old price.

The price development of ready-made oil products on the free market is felt more clearly in Finland than, for example, in Sweden. Sweden purchases 40 percent of its oil according to spot-prices. The country's oil bill is affected, for example, by President Carter's attempt to free the hostages, which temporarily raised prices on the spot-markets.

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ELECTRICITY BOARD REPORTS 7.5 PERCENT CONSUMPTION RISE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Apr 80 p 41

[Article: "Industrial Boom Increased Electric Consumption"]

[Text] The consumption of electricity increased 7.5 percent or 1.4 billion kilowatt hours last year in Finland. Total consumption amounted to 35.6 billion kilowatt hours. This information came from last year's operations report compiled by the Finnish Association of Electric Power Plants.

The increase in the consumption of electricity was accelerated most of all by industry, whose consumption increased 10 percent. The increase in consumption by other consumer groups was only 5 percent. Industry uses two-thirds of all the electricity produced, households one-fifth, and services a little less than one-tenth. The public sector uses 6 percent and agriculture 5 percent.

In 1979 the growth rate of consumption was slightly slower than in the previous year, but faster than the average for the 1970's.

When the second nuclear power plant was put into operation, the share of nuclear power in the production of electricity increased to 6 percent. One-third of the electricity is obtained by hydropower. The proportion of counterpressure production and thermal power production was one-fourth each.

Last year the net production of electricity decreased because of increased imports of electricity.

According to the Association of Electric Power Plants tariffs for electricity have remained stable. This year tariffs were raised, but the increase agreed upon last year was put into effect by only half of the member plants. The Association of Electric Power Plants includes 163 plants in its membership, which deliver electricity to nearly all consumers.

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CSO: 3107

FOREST INDUSTRY REPORTS FULL PRODUCTIVITY CAPACITY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Apr 80 p 25

[Article: "Forest Industry Believes It Can Maintain Last Year's Rate, Capacity in Full Use"]

[Text] The forest industry expects that economically the current year will progress at the same rate as last year. It is predicted that exports will increase by 1 percent and export incomes will increase by 14 percent to 21 billion markkas.

"It cannot be sworn that this will happen. Many enterprise directors consider this estimate to be too positive," states Managing Director Matti Pekkanen of the Forest Industry Association. In the same breath he points out that predicting this year's economic developmentais extremely difficult. "In the USA signs of a worsening economic condition are already visible, in Western Europe these signs cannot yet be seen."

Last year was the best for the forest industry, which is climbing out of a recession, since 1974. The export group recorded record achievements in production and exports, demand was good, and capacity was more or less in full use.

"The recovery period for our forest industry is too short in order to sufficiently strengthen its lasting capacity before the forthcoming recession," stated Pekkanen.

"When talking about the forest industry's excess profits it should be remembered that the income for 1979 is not exceptionally good, but the years before have been exceptionally bad," explained Pekkanen.

According to the profitability study done by the association the incomes of the forest products company cover all current expenditures, including interest. There is still not enough, however, to cover compensation for capital and depreciation for wear on production machinery.

Profitability Requirements Too Low

According to the calculation in question the profitability of the whole forest industry is still on the minus side, but the dispersion between various companies is significant. The weaker ones bring down the average.

In Pekkanen's opinion the reason for talk about excess profits can be found in excessively low profitability requirements. We are using indexes which have been thrown into the garbage can in Sweden and North America.

"Detrimental expenditures must be stopped. One should dare to say straight out that such a result is not good even though the direction is good. An enterprise should in addition to depreciation be able to produce a reasonable compensation to cover the capital invested in it," demands Pekkanen.

As an example he mentioned interest expenditures, which make up 7-10 percent of the turnover in Finland. Corresponding values in Sweden are 3-4 percent, and in the USA 2-3 percent. "We must concentrate on increasing productivity -- not just the productivity of labor, but the whole chain," stated Pekkanen.

The most definite change in the market has occurred in lumber. The rise in prices has reached the limit that the market can bear. It is predicted that exports will drop off by 2 percent this year, but the price increase at the end of the year will still be 18 percent.

Just as much cellulose as last year is being exported and 18 percent more money will be received from it. Exports of paper and cardboard will increase by 2 percent, incomes will increase by 11 percent.

Managing Director Pekkanen stated that revaluation and the interest solution as well as price increases for energy, chemicals, and commodities will mean an additional burden of more than 2 billion markkas for the forest industry in the last half of the year. Wage- and raw material expenditures will increase this burden to more than 3 billion markkas. The increase in the value of forest products has already been eaten up, lamented Pekkanen.

Pekkanen announced that the forest industry has included itself in the common front to fight inflation, but did not make any new contributions to this joint effort. "Perhaps the nestegg we have there is sufficient," he stated in making reference to the revaluation.

"One Device and One Area"

Pekkanen is not enchanted with the use of the currency policy in the fight against inflation.

"One device and one area of industry was its objective. Why don't other countries use revaluation if it is such a wonderful thing. Even they are not fools," asks Pekkanen and urged that the front against inflation be extended also to include the consumer.

"Now there is reason to reduce consumption and investment demand in the private sector as well as the public sector.

"Economic policy must in the future also anchor itself in the profitability of industry," emphasized Pekkanen.

The investments of the forest industry are now at an annual level of 3 billion markkas.



Key:

1. Profitability of forest industry
2. Percentage of the sales value
3. Sales value in billions of markkas
4. Interest paid
5. Calculated depreciation
6. Interest on ones own capital

"The amount if not startling, but is quite normal. On the other hand, there can be room for criticism with respect to its direction," stated Pekkanen in making reference to the freezing of proposed sawmills.

"Curtailment of Sales Tax Reduction Would Result in Overheating"

The elimination of the sales tax relief on investments would in Pekkanen's opinion be an exceptionally detrimental action. According to him it would by the end of the year cause a real rush to invest and would result in overheating.

"The tax relief should be continued and preferably increased. In this way new undertakings could be left until 1981 and at the same time market fluctuations would level out," stated Pekkanen.

Throughout most of the country the trade in wood has progressed according to preliminary plans. In western Finland there is a shortage of logs and the sawmills will have to reduce their production in the fall.

10576
CSO: 3107

DEFENSE CHOICES FACING GISCARD DISCUSSED

Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 pp 72-73

[Article by Dominique de Montvalon: "Defense--Three Schools of Thought"]

[Text] France will be committed, far beyond the next generation, by Giscard's military choices this summer. Three schools of thought are competing. But the president, alone, will decide.

Nothing is more fragile than a consensus. A few months ago, after years of fervent battles between "atlantists" and "Gaullians," a consensus seemed to have been reached finally in support of a national deterrent strategy. From Giscard to the communists, nobody--almost--was publicly opposed to it anymore. Even the Left could be seen among the strict defenders of the general's ideas; the same people who had for so long lampooned the "baby-bomb!"

However, in the last weeks, this--really equivocal--consensus has exploded. First, as the starter of this explosion, there is the abrupt falling-out in international relations: the erratic American policies; the Soviet clamp down in Kabul; the Soviet military power frighten; while new nations of the Third World are emerging, as could be expected somewhat in disorder. The majority of the French people is desperately searching for the key elements which will help make sense of this evolution. But, in the mean time, they worry even more because technological advances are at last sapping the accepted truths. In no way today, can the soothing effects of yesterday strategic discourses be maintained. With the apparition of the neutron bomb and other miniaturized atomic weapons, together with the Soviet threat of using their atomic tactical weapons at once, should there be a conflict in Europe, all of this is compelling military planners to add, at least, to their schemes, if not to revise them completely.

Faced with this situation, VGE remains silent--at least until now. He has only indicated that he will make basic decisions this next summer, which will commit the country future for the next century. Certainly, Yvon Bourges has indicated clearly the "continuity" from General de Gaulle to Giscard in the French defense posture, as he was presiding, last Saturday, at the ceremonies for the first sailing of the fifth French missile-launching nuclear submarine

"Tonnant." But will this remain true tomorrow? Whether it is based on pure illusion or sure hope, there are people who expect the president to bend. They are pushing toward this evolution. This creates a wide debate.

Surely, this debate is complex and involved. But let's try to reduce it to its essential elements. Three major schools of thought have appeared:

--The first one is oriented toward the Atlantic, in a classical way. It has regained a degree of actuality, if you read the UDF (French Democratic Union) draft report. The supporters of the Atlantic alliance--who can be characterized by their desire to strengthen by priority the French relations with the rest of the alliance, and in particular with the United States--have seen the events of the recent months as a confirmation of their lifelong analysis: in fact, in their opinion, the major outstanding fact is the return to a confrontation between blocks, between the United States and the Soviet Union. But, basically different from the fifties: this time, the Soviet Union is in a position of strength. Certainly they are not blind to potential maneuvers to encircle Europe indirectly; but their deep-seated fear is reflected in some recent essays in politic-fiction: a surging Red Army breaking all over Europe. In this emergency, they are arguing, France--armed with numerous tactical nuclear weapons--should join with no hesitation in an eventual "forward battle" in Europe. The current French defense tenets--which retain a national freedom of choice--do consider this only as a simple hypothesis among others.

--In opposition to this 1980 version of the Atlantic posture, the Gaullians--who are strongly entrenched in the Defence Ministry--are convinced they perceive in the current situation a triumphant confirmation of General de Gaulle's analysis: we are now witnessing with our own eyes the apparition of a polycentric world (cf Paul Granet's interview). They add that Soviet pressure cannot be denied, but to be obsessed into detecting Moscow's hand in every event is the worst misinterpretation. These Gaullians obviously hope for a strengthening of the French strategic armament; but precisely because the future world will be polycentric, they simultaneously favor a more diversified armament of France. The major threat, think the Gaullians, is not an hypothetical Russian invasion; rather it could be an indirect blockade, against which France should protect itself by acquiring miniaturized atomic weapons, or at least some of them.

--In this debate, the third school of thoughts--which is traditionally well represented in the Giscardian ranks--is formed by Europe supporters. They note the American retreat, frequently with deep misgivings. And they want to draw conclusions from it. Therefore, they feel that the most urgent task is to build, at last, the "European leg"--really European--of the Atlantic alliance. In principle, no one among them dreams of reviving the defunct CED (European Defense Community): too many bad memories remain attached to this frustrated project! However, in a covert way, a few still think of it anyway. Others, less ambitious, do want to see cooperation among Europeans to show at least a new momentum.

Two motivations can be clearly detected here. On one hand, a more or less deep scepticism in French capacity to face alone the threatening future. Is it not possible to see the strategic deterrent force bypassed? Can we without help build an effective intervention force, which could, for instance, protect our access to vital raw materials from any attempt to block it?

But a second motivation--deep-seated--is also present: a fear of reconciliation between Germany and Soviet Union: with the Germans "buying" peace in exchange for their Finlandization. On this specific point in fact, VGE has not hesitated at raising questions publicly in the Cabinet meeting of Wednesday 30 April. Not that the proposed trip of Helmut Schmidt to Moscow could, in the president's reasonings, bring the Federal Republic to switch alliance abruptly. But it is in France interest to consider every possibility. Faced with this situation, some people are wondering: as the Germans are so obsessed by the fear of war, because of their geographical location in the first lines of an eventual conflict in Europe, should not France be ready to offer them some projects, which would reassure them by securing their future?

Truthfully, the renewed international tension has drastically modified the elements of the military debate. Today, it is not discussed anymore on the basis of theoretical schemes, but in term of hypothesis which can decide of a nation destiny--in the strict sense of the term. Such choices--political and economical--will in the end be made only by the president. But they will commit France far beyond the next generation.

9627
CSO: 3100

FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS TOWARD U.S., USSR

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Apr 80 p 14

[Article by Socialist Party National Secretariat Member Jean Poperen*: "The Responsibilities of the European Left"]

[Text] American leaders have always sought to reconcile foreign affairs with sentiment. Nixon made few concessions to sentiment: Kissinger's realpolitik included the organization of foreign affairs under the shelter of a system of division of zones of influence with the Soviet Union. Rapprochement with China had almost no other function than to discourage the Soviets from questioning this parceling out of the world. Carter has tried to reconcile foreign affairs with sentiment within the context of the defense of the rights of man. It is not certain whether this reconciliation is possible; but it is certain that this international action for the rights of man has upset the cold division of the realpolitik.

The Soviets consider it as interference in their sphere of influence. Because to the Soviets, the cult of non-interference which is celebrated in Soviet writings means that every superpower is free to act as it pleases within its own sphere of influence. Any violation of this rule justifies a counterstroke.

However, Carter is offering the Soviets this justification for a counterstroke at a time when they believe themselves to be in a position to inflict such a stroke without loss. An evaluation of the balance of power is a difficult thing, especially in this day and age when the terrifying machinery of modern governments combines many factors, of which military weapons are only one among many. Therefore, it is not certain that the Soviet Union is now in a position of superiority, although the diversity of opinion among experts leads, on the whole, to an estimate of a military advantage by the USSR, which is real at the present, and which will probably increase within a short time. But what counts is that the Soviets think that they are in a position of superiority, and they believe that this superiority has every chance of becoming more pronounced. And this

* Member of National PS Secretariat, Rhone deputy

is not due especially to the comparison of opposing military forces, of which, it should be added, the Soviet leaders have little to say, even though they think about them a great deal; it is principally due to their conviction that the great capitalist nations have entered a period of irremediable crisis, and that this time it is not only an economic crisis, but also a social, moral and psychological crisis, a total crisis. They believe that the real severity of this crisis will deepen the conflicts between the Western nations, and will prevent these nations from achieving even the slightest political unity and cohesion.

Two Irons in the Fire

On 12 February in Warsaw, Souslov spoke of "the sudden intensification of contradictions inherent in the capitalist regime, in the imperialist policy."

It is due to a similar evaluation, and in the face of the "provocations" of Carter's "rights of man" policy, that the Soviet Union has effected a turnabout in its international policy.

Not that the Soviet leaders have abruptly and finally broken with the policy of detente; but like all great policies, the policy of the Soviet leaders always has two irons in the fire. There are two sides to the speeches of the Soviet leaders, but the accent is changing. Their policy operates two levers which they maneuver turn and turn about. Even during the best moments of peaceful coexistence, the Soviets have never failed to insist on both the strength of their military forces and the necessity for continuing the class struggle, but they put the accent on "detente". Today, they have not stopped talking about detente, but they are emphasizing the fact that we are in a phase of great "progress" in the struggle of nations.

Soviet leaders have always been for "peaceful coexistence," even under Stalin, at the worst period of the cold war; but depending on the moment, they have given two different, in fact opposite, versions of peaceful coexistence, sometimes the version which favors detente, and sometimes that which facilitates their offensive. And it is the latter version which predominates today.

In criticizing the partisans of the "Euro-left", Georges Marchais explains: "In their eyes, the corollary of peaceful coexistence is to prohibit nations from achieving the social regime of their choice. According to them, we should refuse to grant our solidarity to all struggling nations, including those which are victims of imperialist intervention." (27 March) It is in the name of that solidarity that Soviet tanks are in Afghanistan.

Many commentators, and many of those responsible for policy are committing the error of looking for hidden explanations of the turnaround in Soviet and French Communist policy. As a matter of fact, the Soviets usually state very clearly what they are doing or are going to do, but in most

cases, no one pays attention to them until "afterwards." In 1939, Stalin and Molotov gave proof in advance of the turning point of the German-Soviet pact. Today, Soviet and French Communist leaders are crudely demonstrating that the USSR is going to push its advantage in all directions because it believes itself to be the strongest.

"The complexity of the international situation cannot hide the main point, which is the feasibility of developing the struggle at the international level in view of moving toward new advances." (The PCF Politburo, 25 October.)

We should note in passing that this analysis provides one of the keys to the turning point of the French communists in internal policy and in breaking the leftist union: through [illegible] it can be seen that the issue is serious, broad in scope, and not simple tactical.

The international scope of the turning point of the Soviet policy is even more extensive, but it has not been perceived until recently, even though its beginnings actually go back several years; and, naturally, reaction has been particularly strong in the United States.

American Nationalism

For several years the United States has been badly troubled by Vietnam and Watergate; however, within a few weeks, the hostages in Teheran and the tanks in Kabul have cured them.

All public opinion, all responsible Americans must bring to bear a unilateral judgment on the vicissitudes of the international policy which is in danger of causing the world to relapse into the cold war.

There are in the United States important forces who, like ourselves, desire to strengthen the peace without sacrificing the rights of man, and who also know, as we do, that peace cannot endure for long if we submit to the sacrifice of the rights of man, no matter where it may be, in Chile or in Czechoslovakia, in Vietnam or in Afghanistan, in Gorki or in Pretoria. We can help these forces to become reoriented, to rediscover the way to become effective, if we establish contact with them, if they know that they can count on the powerful assistance which exists in Europe. They cannot save themselves without us, but we Europeans cannot save ourselves without the forces of democracy which exist in the United States.

For the time being, we agree that, from this standpoint, the future is rather dark. Within a few months, a powerful nationalist wave has risen there. And European opinion, especially democratic opinion, would be wrong to underestimate the breadth of that movement. It would be wrong not to understand that the measures taken by Carter--including boycotting the Olympic Games--are very much less than what the majority of Americans undoubtedly would like. The rise of the ghost of Hollywood, Reagan,

illustrates this state of mind; and his victory next November, which was unthinkable 6 months ago, is today still an improbable hypothesis, but it is no longer an absurdity. He was applauded when he said that he would send the paratroopers to Iran!

And herein lies the real responsibility of the European governments, especially the French government. The president of the Republic, who is the unofficial chief of the French diplomatic corps, is playing at independence. But independence does not consist of setting everyone against one another, under any circumstances; and at this juncture, it might be worthwhile for the French left to note it. The French left should rid itself of this sort of complex which pushes it to pursue "symmetry" at any price, and under any circumstances. We said this when the American policy endangered detente, and we bluntly opposed that policy. Today, it is the Soviet initiatives which are endangering detente. They must be stopped if we wish the Soviets to abandon the roads to Kabul and to rediscover the path to detente. This means that we must investigate with other nations, and especially with our allies, suitable measures for creating the conditions for international negotiation, which will take into account the changes which have occurred in the world during the last few years. Any step in that direction, however modest, such as the avowed common will of the Italian communists and the French socialists, is encouraging. The guiding principle of French diplomacy seems to be not to establish the conditions for such negotiation in which France, and more generally Europe, would take part, but to indicate on principle their disagreement, or at least their remoteness from all of the American initiatives. It seems as though they wish at any price to demonstrate that they are midway between the two "superpowers."

This policy has been given the veneer of independence. It is in danger of leading us in the opposite direction, toward appeasement of the leadership of the two "superpowers." Because European behavior, and especially current French behavior, far from facilitating the course of the two "superpowers" toward international negotiation for actual progress in disarmament and redistribution of the relations with the Third World, is hardening the attitudes of both the USSR and the United States.

It is obvious that French diplomatic initiatives are encouraging the continuing Soviet hope for a breakdown in Western solidarity. Among the many miscalculations of their Afghan adventure, this is the only satisfaction of the Soviet leaders, but it is enough. At the same time, it establishes firmly in the minds of the American public the idea that the United States has only itself to count on.

It would be dangerous for the left in Europe, and especially in France, to underestimate this current direction of American opinion, including liberal opinion. The Americans undoubtedly view the faux pas of the Carter administration in a very harsh light; and they admit that Europe is right in making it very clear that she has no taste for the status of a protectorate. However, the least prejudiced against France will be

faced with the following dilemma: essentially they say that either, Giscard's initiatives are "gratuitous audacity," and in the final analysis if things go badly, we will always be there: this is "neutrality" under the American umbrella. Or, following a trend which was formerly observed under other circumstances in your history, your leaders are already resigned to a breakdown in the balance of power, which, little by little, will cause Europe to slip into the sphere of influence of the Soviet system, without any military conflict.

The Lesser Evil

It is of less importance here to know whether the American fears are founded, but rather, since these fears exist, to measure the consequences which may result from them. The new "me-first" American is not headed toward neo-isolationism which would make no sense today. He is pushing the United States toward dealing with the USSR alone, which is probably what the Soviet leaders still wish today. This leaves the Europeans no other perspectives than that of the tete-a-tete of the two "superpowers," for the worst or the lesser evil.

The worst, according to the old adage, "isn't always certain." Is it altogether impossible? And even if there is only one insignificant risk, can we contribute to increasing that risk when we know it is apocalyptic? Those who, for a long time, maintain a policy of walking on the edge of an abyss, end up by falling in.

The lesser evil is the more probable one. This would be, at the end of a dangerous test of international strength, a new worldwide bargaining between the two "superpowers."

Thus, more than ever, the anxieties of the moment bring us back to Europe, whatever the difficulties and disappointments may be. The European nations will have no chance of forestalling the alternative of the worst or lesser evil unless they are capable of a minimum of cohesion, and are firm in their common action toward peace, which, in the immediate future, means being firm with respect to those who endanger them.

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CSO: 3100

NEW USES FOR OTOMAT ANTISHIP MISSILE OUTLINED

Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French May 80 pp 13-17

[Article by G. Turbe]

[Text] If ever a weapon was an instant and universally recognized success, it is the antiship missile.

1967: All it took was for the Israeli destroyer Eilat (of WWII vintage and lacking any modern equipment) to be sunk by three Styx missiles fired from Egyptian vedette-boats of Soviet origin, and the West discovered with a certain amount of apprehension (the Soviet Union had around 150 surface-surface missile carriers SS-N-1 Scrubber and SS-N-2 Styx at the time) just how destructive this missile could be.

However, the Styx was neither very sophisticated nor well-known by NATO navies; ironically, these navies were more concerned with the open sea and thought of the sea-sea missiles as a very secondary threat having only limited influence on operations. How many ships at the time were really trained and capable of reacting efficiently when faced with such an attack?

It was a brutal awakening, but the General-Staff and Western shipbuilders reacted immediately and forcefully. Their efforts were directed both toward the realization of comparable offensive systems--several shipbuilders in France, Israel and Norway had undertaken preliminary studies--and the research of parries (different caliber automatic cannons, antimissile missiles, decoys, counterattack systems).

During the Indo-Pakistani conflict in December 1971, the Styx confirmed its effectiveness by destroying the 3,360-ton destroyer Khaibar (an ex-British Cadiz) and by damaging the 22,380-ton supply ship Dacca (an ex-USN AO 132 Mission Santa Clara) of the Pakistan Navy, the first systems were already out and, less than 2 years later, one of the representatives of the new generation of Western missiles (le Gabriel) eclipsed the reputation of the Soviet weapon, which was much older.

At first, the missiles were especially designed for lightweight ships--vedette-boats, patrol boats, helicopter ships--well adapted to today's potential clients: countries trying to develop a powerful navy quickly and with whatever funds available, and naval forces which are called upon to operate principally in relatively small maritime zones (the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Adriatic, the Baltic...). Then, because they were not cumbersome, it was decided to use them on larger and larger type platform boats (frigates, cruisers, aircraft carriers) and more varied kinds of platform vehicles (airplanes, submarines, road vehicles).

In this beginning of the 80's, the balance-sheet is pretty spectacular since thousands of ships in service throughout the world have antiship missiles, and more than 300 others are currently under construction or on order.

Essentially, there are eight types of different new generation missiles:

--the American HARPOON
--the French EXOCET
--the Franco-Italian OTOMAT
--the Israeli GABRIEL
--the Italian SEA KILLER
--the Norwegian PENGUIN
--the Soviet SS-N-9 and SS-N-12.

The Long-Range OTOMAT System

The OTOMAT program, led jointly by the MATRA and OTO MELARA corporations, dates from 1969 and, the following year, when testing began. Mass produced as of 1975-76, the system has been a real success, since eight countries have already ordered it to arm hundreds of combat vessels and for coastal defense.

Going from front to back, the missile consists of the following parts:

--the active homing head, which guarantees constant accuracy (from launch to the target) which is unchanged by heavy seas;

--the 210 kg semiperforating military warhead, which has a great destructive effect due to the penetration and explosion inside the target;

--the equipment section which contains the altimeter (with antennas behind the homing head and the gyroscopic platform), the gyroscopic platform, the junction box, the inverter, the computer and the autopilot power supply;

--the kerosene tank with, perpendicular to it, the two 1 stage powder boosters (sea-sea and land-sea versions) and the four cruciform wings;

--the oil tank;

--the activators, mounted externally on the aerodynamic rudders;

--the TURBOMECA turbojet engine.

Outside the factory or plant, the missile is always kept in a specially adapted firing container.

Thanks to its particular turbojet engine propulsion, the OTOMAT can reach targets way beyond the radar's scope, without a negative influence on the total weight of the missile or on the warhead (an example is the EXOCET MM-38, which has a range of 38 km, weighs a total of 735 kg and carries a 165 kg warhead).



Coastal OTOMAT Beyond the Horizon Operation

Key:

1. The helicopter conducts its radar search
2. Being itself tracked by the ground surveillance radar
3. The helicopter gets in contact with the enemy
4. The helicopter transmits the relative target data to the control cabin
5. The officer in tactical command assigns the target, transmits to the selected firing vehicle the direct target data and the order "sequence start"
6. In-flight telecommand signal for over-the-horizon firing at ranges up to 160 km
7. Terminal phase

Over-the-Horizon Firing Sequence of Naval Surface-to-Surface Missile



Key:

1. The helicopter conducts its radar search. Being itself tracked by the firing ship
2. The helicopter gets in contact with the enemy
3. The helicopter transmits the relative target data to the firing ship
4. The firing ship computes the direct target data, selects the missile to be fired, and starts the sequence.
5. Running of sequence and missile departure
6. New detection and computation cycle, in-flight updating message to missile
7. Missile's response
8. Terminal phase



Long-Range Antiship Missile

For the sea-sea, land-sea versions, the problem of target designation and firing beyond the radar's scope was solved simply by using an air carried radar, usually carried by helicopter. The sequence of fire beyond the scope is carried out as follows: The search helicopter receives the coordinates and the distance of the surface target by means of its radar. It sends this information to the firing ship or site by the "data link" which links them together. Meanwhile, the firing ship or site gets the position of the apparatus and calculates the new coordinates of the target relative to it. The missile is then fired and keeps a certain altitude (maximum 900 meters) so that it stays in the firing sights. Midway, new complete detection and calculation processes begin, and a correction order is sent to the missile by telecommand. The missile, having received the message, descends to cruising altitude (about 20 meters) and the trajectory continues to the target like a direct fire, the homing head radar activating itself when the missile is about a dozen meters from the target.

When the OTO'MAT is fired in closer combat, the incendiary effect of the kerosene remaining in the tank at the time of impact adds to the destructive power of the warhead.

The Clio Weapon System on Board

The basic installation anticipated for setting up four missiles on a ship consists essentially of the following:

--an operating rack grouping together the various circuits;
--two power supply units;
--two junction boxes;
--a telecommand transmitter.

When in use, the operating rack is connected to the center of the radar signal processing.



The CLIO Weapon System on Board

Key:

1. Junction box
2. Power supply unit
3. Operating rack
4. Telecommand transmitter
5. Missile containers
6. Radio E/R UHF
7. Radar
8. Telecommand transmitter
9. Radar signal processing

The OTOMAT System for Coastal Defense

The first system to have been ordered, the OTOMAT for coastal defense consists of one command group and 2-4 firing groups in its mobile version.

The command group is made up of a light command vehicle, a truck which transports the control cabin and a truck which transports the ground surveillance radar, THOMSON CSF TRS 3410, as well as a power generator and, on occasion, a maintenance vehicle.

Each firing group consists of a firing truck with two missiles, a north cap searcher and the optical system in the cabin, and a back-up truck carrying a crane and two spare missiles.

In the proposed base version, the trucks are GBD 6x6 Renault Industrial Vehicles.

In combat of a closer range, the deployment of the system is facilitated by the range scope which allows for the positioning of vehicles inland. The total gyrodeviation makes the firing possible in case of enemy camouflage (islands 111).

in combat which is further removed, the interface is assured by radar detection (coastal station on cliffs, air or helicopter carried radars, naval platforms).

The Air-Sea OTOMAT System

Contrary to the other versions, the air-sea missile is not kept in a launch container and it does not have a powder booster, but its characteristics (range, accuracy, power) are the same as the sea-sea OTOMAT.

The system is employed from helicopter or naval patrol airplanes. It should also be noted that the means of firing assures that during the flight of the missile, the rocket has complete freedom.

In close range combat, the aerodynamics of the OTOMAT allows for firing at very low altitudes. Thus, the rocket can stay under enemy radar detection lines.

In long range combat, the missile can make attacks while remaining outside the range of enemy sea-air weapons.

As we have indicated, many small combat units use the OTOMAT system. However, in spite of all the advantages one might expect would be possible with it, especially in theaters of operation where there is relatively little naval activity, it is nonetheless undeniable that the greatest exploitation of the missile's long range is with the air and ground versions of the system, as well as those designed for ships which can use helicopters.

Thus, it is not out of the question to think that the antiship missile in general and the long range missiles in particular will be used more and more, and that they will play a more important role in small as well as large navies.

Characteristics of the OTOMAT

Builders: Matra (France)
Oto Melara (Italy)
Length: 4.46 m
Diameter: 0.46 m (rear), 0.40 m (front)
Span: 1.35 m
Launch weight: 700 kg
Warhead weight: 210 kg
Charge: semiperforating
Speed: Mach 0.9
Range: 6 km minimum
100 km with a simple target designation at departure
160 km by telecommand during flight

Flight altitude: 20 m cruising
900 m at mid-course correction (launch beyond the radar's horizon)
Final attack profile: grazing or dive, this is up to the firing officer
Propulsion: two 1 stage powder boosters dropped after combustion (only on sea-sea and land-sea versions)
Departure lift: 379 kgp
A TURBOMECA turbojet engine
Guiding: inertial preguiding and active autodirection radar
Equipment: computer
gyroscopic platform
radio-altimeter

Versions:

Sea-to-sea (vedette-boats, patrol boats, corvettes, frigates, cruisers, helicopter boats); already in service.

Land-to-sea for close in and far away coastal defense (mobile batteries on all-terrain vehicles, semimobile and fixed); in mass production.

Air-to-sea (from helicopters type SUPER FRELON or SEA KING; from maritime patrol airplanes, type SUPER ETENDARD), feasibility study done.

9572
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SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN BRITTANY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 May 80 pp 144-154

[Text] Tanker oil lapping the granite rocks and white beaches; nuclear power plants set down at the coast; a dearth of jobs, hardly any industry, much bitterness: France's westernmost province feels deserted in its struggle against environmental perils and slighted in its desire for cultural autonomy. French soldiers are scraping the tanker oil off the beachers while policemen lash out at nuclear protesters.

In Tregastel, 2,000 residents, 14 hotels, mayor Rene Martin sniffs the wind: "The wind is in the wrong direction, that is for us."

Ending up at Tregastel, a fishing and vacation resort in Brittany, 300 km west of Le Havre, was something intended for the Italian port city of Civitavecchia: The load of the 27,000-ton tanker "Tanio" which broke in half on 7 March last, 50 km off Batz Island. The forepart and about 10,000 tons of oil sank 87 meters to the bottom of the sea.

Another 5,000 tons of oil spilled 120 km along Brittany's Channel coast, most of it on about 20 km of the beaches around Tregastel and neighboring Ploumanach. The so-called "coast of pink granite" shone as if painted by a giant brush dripping tar.

The tourist brochures lauding the 12 beaches of Tregastel boast that vacationers will "breathe in health and revive." At this point in time, however, Tregastel has a new attraction to offer: Instead of sea air the tourist may breathe in gas station fumes, admire tank cars and oil puddles. Bulldozers push the oily sludge around. Soldiers, occasionally encouraged on by a visiting general, fill the sludge into plastic bags and buckets.

The owner of the "Seven Isles Bar" stuck into his window an oil industry advertisement torn from the newspaper: "In France we do more than have ideas, we also search for oil."

Tourists with field glasses stand on the boardwalk and watch white-feathered birds plummet to the water, emerge covered in oil, try to beat their wings and sink.

For 6 weeks 7 tons of oil per day leaked from the wreck of the "Tanio," until--at the end of April--it appeared that the hole had finally been plugged. Nobody knows where the oil is flowing to, but all coastal cities fear that it is floating toward their ports, poisoning their oysters, driving away their tourists. "It only needs the wind to turn," says deputy mayor of Portsall, Jules Legendre, "and then it would be our turn again." In March 1978 the "Amoco Cadiz," carrying 223,131 tons of oil, broke up outside Portsall harbor and covered 400 km of the Brittany coast with oily sludge.

The Bretons at the coast fear most for the image of their province, a quaint land peopled by determined and tough folk. The type of tourist vacationing here does not display the artificial high spirits of visitors to Deauville or Saint-Tropez.

It is a rough coastline with little in the way of gentle beauty: Small colorful fishing boats, white houses with gray roofs, restaurants specializing in crepes, red spiny lobsters, wind surfers, here and there a tractor and trailer carrying cauliflower, sailors, a fisher holding up a lobster and allowing himself to be photographed by tourists.

The calm, though, is deceptive.

Just as, elsewhere, football fans recite the names of the players on their teams, the Bretons tick off the names of those tankers which have shed their loads in the vicinity of the Brittany coast: "Torrey Canyon," "Olympic Bravery," "Boehlen," "Amoco Cadiz," "Gino," "Tanio." In the past 5 years a total of 28 ships ran aground, capsized and foundered at the Brittany coast; 13 collisions occurred.

According to Tregastel's mayor Martin any additional drop of oil on the coast may well be the 'final straw. One more such event, and I could not guarantee anything anymore."

Martin is sure that the Bretons have taken all they are willing to take. After the "Tanio" tragedy fish merchants and fishermen in Paimpol assembled for a protest demonstration. The French flag was taken down altogether, Brittany's black-and-white flag lowered to half-staff. In front of the Elysee Palace in Paris Bretons emptied six buckets of oily sludge, and at the President's door deposited six birds with had suffocated in the oil.

A special train carried 500 mayors and municipal councilors to Paris for a protest meeting. They hoped to be received by the head of state and offered tea and cookies. Instead the Bretons were met by baton charges of the CRS, the infamous hard-line riot police.

Tregastel's vice-mayor, in private life landlord of summer cabins, brought back two mementoes: A CRS officer's baton "intended to land on my head," and the appreciation that "Paris simply refuses to take us seriously." A Breton parliamentary deputy noted that the protesters had gone to Paris as Frenchmen and returned as Bretons.

Only when the Bishop of Saint-Brieuc also warned that "enough was enough" did head of state Valery Giscard d'Estaing declare his readiness to receive a delegation from Brittany: Portall's Legendre speculates why Giscard had second thoughts: "In this struggle parties have ceased to exist; now we're all just Bretons."

Minorities at the periphery of the French unitary state are everywhere protesting either neglect or undue interference by the Paris central government; next to Corsica the protest is strongest in Brittany. The Bretons feel that Paris fails to do enough to protect them from the tanker oil, and as to nuclear power, the substitute energy source, Paris favors the province against its will.

For more than a month CRS forces were drawn up in Plogoff, on the west coast of the province, to ensure the orderly completion of a hearing on the planned construction of a nuclear power plant.

Plogoff versus Paris: That means the farmer struggling with anonymous technocrats, like Tregastel and Ploumanach fighting the sinister power of the oil corporations and large shipowners.

People in Plogoff and Tregastel are firmly convinced that they have "every reason to feel deserted and betrayed," says socialist deputy Louis Le Pensec.

Jean-Marie Kerloch, 69, mayor of Plogoff, also notes that "Paris is not really interested in what we think or want." The construction of the nuclear power plant which is to cost Fr7 billion and begin in 1983 seems to him "already settled, the hearings no more than eyewash."

Kerloch accordingly barred the hearing from his office; only 12 of the 2,359 Plogoff residents visited the two box cars brought in to substitute for city hall and said their say. Another two residents gave their opinions in writing. Kerloch's comment: "This way the government may see what we want and what we don't want."

France's communists also took note: When communist party chief Georges Marchais adopted a public stand in favor of the nuclear power plant in Brittany,"the communists here tore up their party cards" (Kerloch).

In some respects the construction of the nuclear power plant may well benefit Brittany's economic development: The construction work at Plogoff would take more than 12 years and employ 3,000 people on the giant site. The

small city would grow by 8,000 residents, and the Plogoff fast breeder-reactor could produce all the electricity required by Brittany in 1990.

Alain Chenard, mayor of Nantes, a large city, believes that "the Harrisburg accident has scared the public and made them aware of the dangers."

Building walls, street signs and water towers, even the roofs of the trading stalls at the "Pointe du Raz"--a rocky vista point visited annually by 500,000 tourists--carry painted slogans such as "Plogoff fights for life." Forty thousand people assembled for a protest meeting; according to Kerloch fistfights with the police are a nightly occurrence: A temper "never before experienced in Plogoff."

A Plogoff defense committee intends to send delegates to the Federal Republic also, so that nuclear power plant opponents there "may be informed of our struggle"; a pictorial strip about the battles at Plogoff will be published.

The government introduced an old and tested sweetened: In future communities in the immediate vicinity of nuclear power plants are to get their electricity supplied at a 17 percent discount. Kerloch warns, though, that "they will not get around us with such methods. We are tough."

The Bretons, now 2.6 million strong, have never quite gotten rid of the feeling of being outsiders, useful to stepmother France mainly as crop farmers and animal husbandmen.

They supply 80 percent of all cauliflower, 72 percent of potatoes, 40 percent of fish. And, they ask themselves, what does Paris do for us?

Motorways run from Paris to Lille, Metz, Marseille and Poitiers--but none as yet to Brest, Nantes or Rennes, Brittany's major cities.

For many years Bretons used to rise at dawn, load their few belongings on a handcart so that the neighbors might not witness their departure, and go to distant Paris to find work.

For thousands of them a train station symbolized the dream of a better life: Montparnasse, the Paris terminal where the trains from Brittany arrive. In the past 30 years the district where Plogoff is located lost 20 percent of its population. The young, especially, departed; the old people stayed behind.

Jobs are hard to come by. In Redon, for example, there is one unemployed for every five in work. Since January 1974 unemployment in Brittany has risen from 23,032 to about 75,000. Canning factories used to be among the busiest industries. They and fishing businesses in Douarnenez and Concarneau, the traditional ports for large-scale fishing, have closed down.

Brittany is not the only province suffering from the effects of the economic crisis. Lorraine and the Cote d'Azur are also affected. However, in Brittany the misery is increased by oil pollution, the planned nuclear power plant and--above all--the fear of Bretons that their culture "is about to be submerged" (as noted by Breton poet Pierre Helias, alias Per Jakez, author of the memoir "The Horse of Pride"). He also wrote: "Nobody should be surprised by the convulsions accompanying its decline."

The Bretons are part of that Celtic family of peoples whose remnants in Great Britain are also defending themselves against alien intrusion (Cornwall and Wales). By now only about 1 million people speak the Breton language. Regional television transmits 28 minutes per week in the local language, two radio newscasts daily are read in Breton, and the total of Breton programs amounts to 5 hours per week.

Young radicals thus see only one way out of the cultural and economic crisis in their homeland: Secession from France. According to socialist Le Pensec's estimates 5 percent of the Breton population want independence. The deputy considers that a great deal of progress would be made if "we were allowed a regional parliament, elected by Bretons." Paris, though, is not so minded at all.

Not even the moderate autonomists know how many members the radical organizations "Breton National Resistance" and Brittany Liberation Front" actually have, whether several hundred or only a few dozen.

For their protest bombings the terrorists selected television relay stations, electricity plants and tax offices. In addition they attacked some more illustrious targets such as the Palace of Versailles. Currently 11 Breton radicals are in jail, convicted by the Paris State Security Court; another 11 activists are awaiting trial.

The moderate left autonomist party "Breton Democratic Union" has about 2,000 members. It is acknowledged the third party of the left in 11 Breton cities with more than 30,000 residents; one of their leaders is deputy mayor of Brest.

Instead of the tricolor peaceful protesters like to fly the black-and-white striped flag of Brittany, which displays the ermine, the heraldic animal of the Dukes of Brittany. When confronted with approaching police even distinguished deputies tend to spontaneously break into the Breton hymn "The Ancient Land of Our Fathers."

Thousands of Bretons join in traditional song and dance evenings in their villages, so-called festive evenings when collections are taken up for the jailed separatists and pamphlets offered such as "The Breton People" and "Brittany." Socialist Le Pensec says: "There really is a Breton people."

This year some 250 children will be taught in the Breton language in 13 preschools of the province. The Breton name for these schools means "seed."

Members of school associations are providing the Fr1.2 million needed to maintain these schools. Bretons conscious of their traditions affix stickers of their cars reading, for example "BZH" (which stands for Brittany) or "I am a Breton and proud of it."

Paris is now trying to pacify the autonomy movement by doing something about the constant danger of oil pollution, though it is still too little. The French chartered three tugs in Sweden, which are to be stationed in Brest, Le Havre and Toulon with the sole purpose of waiting for accidents at the French coast. They will receive Fr57 million per annum from the French Government. Hamburg's Bugsier shipping company which, before the "Amoco Cadiz" tragedy, occasionally lay at anchor at the Brittany coast and is considered one of the guilty parties in the tragedy, "now avoids these waters" (quoting a manager of the Bugsier shipping firm).

In the meantime the Dunkirk shipyard "France Dunquerque" has been negotiating with the French Government regarding the development of large ships which would be able to operate something like vacuum cleaners to deal with oil, even in heavy seas. Should Paris give the go ahead, the shipyard claims that the first such ships could be launched in about 18 months.

The use of pilots is under discussion, and so is the establishment of a coastguard on the U.S.model. In a volume running to more than 94 pages an investigatory committee submitted suggestions for coastal defense to the National Assembly.

Already loaded tankers are compelled to keep at least 27 sea miles away from the French coast. However, the Union of French Ship Captains holds that in this area traffic "is even more dangerous and anarchic than before."

French coastal radar is inadequate, the coastguard personnel "does not know enough English," and "experience of commercial shipping is nonexistent."

The Bretons are now waiting to see what compensation they will be awarded in the case of the "Amoco Cadiz." The ship, its bow initially towering from the water by the rock of Portsall--like a whale hit by a harpoon--has now sunk. Yet preparations have only just begun for the trial which is to decide whether the Italian captain is to blame, or the American shipping company, the Spanish shipyard or the German Bugsier shipping company, whether one or all of them, possibly even the French who are accused by the "Amoco Cadiz" attorneys of neglect of the coastal defenses.

Eighty communities have joined in the complaint, also hotel owners and oyster traders, restaurant proprietors and fishermen. Even inland communities feel affected by the oily sludge because tourists used to pass through and take gas at their service stations.

Moreover, asks Portsall's vice-mayor, how is the damage to nature to be made good?

The "Amoco Cadiz" owners immediately transferred Fr80 million to France. Without even going to court the insurers of the "Tanio," sunk last March, are prepared to pay Fr11.8 million. The International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage is prepared to come up with up to Fr200 million in compensation.

To begin in mid-June is the work of pumping out the oil still in the hold of the "Tanio." It is possible, though, that the wreck may break up earlier, discharging some 10,000 tons of oil on the coast--precisely at the start of the summer season in Brittany.

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AFRICA TO GET PRIORITY FRENCH AID

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 7 Apr 80 pp 25-26

[Article by Martine Royo: "French Aid: Priority to Africa"]

[Text] Thousands of dead, wounded, and refugees, a hospital evacuated, houses sieved with bullets, the high school in flames: civil war ravages Chad. The same week two African chiefs of state visit President Giscard d'Estaing: Hassan II, king of Morocco, after a sharp defeat of his army in the Sahara, comes to ask for weapons, President Dacko, reinstalled in Bangui in September, reports on his performance and asks for additional aid. "Central Africa is reviving, we will support it to the hilt," confesses a high French official without mincing words.

Three countries on the brink of the drain which are also three proteges of France. Is this a condemnation of our aid to Africa? Probably not. King Hassan II will not necessarily lose his throne in the war against the POLISARIO. Central Africa, bled by Bokassa, can revive and even prosper if France pays the price there (it is not exorbitant: the budget of this country does not exceed 440 million francs per year. This is the figure for the turnover of the Galeries Lafayette of Maine-Montparnasse--income per inhabitant: $140 in 1978).

The future of Chad is more uncertain. At the crossroads of white and black Africa, an unpredictable battle is under way--stirred up by Colonel Qadhdhafi--in which France says it will no longer be involved. But there are still French soldiers on the spot--1,200, compared with 2,000 in 1978. They are supposed to be guarding the military based to which the French Embassy has withdrawn. As for nonmilitary aid, it collapsed a year ago for the lack of a government with which to negotiate and also, as an aid technician remarked upon his return from Ndjamena, because "there is no cooperation without political stability." In 1978, France had made a great military effort and nonmilitary aid had remained quite stable--120 to 130 million francs. In 1979, it had reached 40 million francs. Paris had, nevertheless, planned urgent aid of 60 million francs in January--only 20 million was expended to pay Chadian officials.

While France seems to be throwing up its hands in Chad, it is omnipresent in Central Africa. More than 400 aid technicians are working to get the economy moving again.

The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE), which had ceased all involvement since 1972, has been financing the repair of the cotton plantation roads since the beginning of the year. A profitless task? This is not the view of the experts in charge of getting the house in order. The Central African Republic does not lack riches and Chad cost far more, with the well-known result.... To say nothing of Morocco, the spoiled child of France in the Maghreb. Primarily nonmilitary aid, at almost 500 million francs per year, 4,600 aid technicians, and the treasury's largest bundle of loans: 330 million in the 1978 protocol and 260 million in that signed last 29 November. But also military: 200 French officers and noncommissioned officers under the heading of technical assistance to the Moroccan army. In exchange for this, Rabat buys primarily from us (but also from the Americans) when it needs arms. Morocco has just given France an order for 100 light AMX-10 RC armored vehicles. But there are also healthy beneficiaries of French aid. Cameroon, politically stable, has been witnessing steady development, helped by recent petroleum discoveries. Or the Ivory Coast, the favorite child of the CCCE, which is seeking profitable investments. Mr Houphouet-Boigny repays 83 percent of French assistance. There are examples which inspire Paris to reorient its aid, which is concentrated to an exaggerated extent in the Maghreb and French-speaking Africa.

"Development is slow" they deplore in the Committee for Development Aid (CAD), where they judge by the facts, that is, money effectively spent. But the latest figures furnished by the Treasury are eloquent: $2.7 billion in aid, 51 percent of which for the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories], 30 percent for Africa south of the Sahara and 10 percent for the Maghreb. The total enables France to look like one of the good boys of the CAD, which public aid equivalent to 0.60 percent of the gross national product, year in, year out.

This percentage may well not be maintained next year, for 1980 will be the lean year: "We are going to pare all expenses. So there will be no increase in aid to the Third World" (in volume), foresees the minister of economics. But Mr Rene Monory is counting on making up for it by borrowing money from the oil-producing countries at 8 percent, a portion of French aid financing the difference, in order to relend it to the Africans at 1 percent."

For whatever happens, there can be no question of letting Africa down, since more than ever it is one of the priorities of French foriegn policy. Especially if, as is whispered in government circles, about 10 of these countries are threatening to go under a year or a year and a half from now.

This no doubt explains why the military credits of the Cooperation Ministry rose by 20 percent in the 1980 budget. The "financial contributions" are also rising sharply; this stop-gap aid both serves to service the debts and to pay officials.

With one danger, however: the beneficiary gets in the habit of living beyond his means "since Paris is paying...." But in serious cases, budgetary aid makes it possible to keep the administration and a minimum of the political apparatus afloat. "If Mali is on the brink of bankruptcy and you propose to finance a large agricultural or industrial project, it is not that which will save it," notes Mr Robert Galley. This type of aid is obviously destined for the poorest countries. But they are more and more numerous, unable to make ends meet since the increase in the price of petroleum--in 1973, the oil bill of the countries south of the Sahara amounted to 600 million francs (50 percent of French aid); today, it stands at 6 billion francs (3 times our aid).

(Box)

The Main Beneficiaries in 1978
(in millions of francs)

	Nonmilitary Aid	Military aid
Cameroon	609	26
Morocco	473	n.c.
Senegal	467	63
Ivory Coast	413.5	32.5
Algeria	297	n.c.
Tunisia	287	n.c.
Chad	210	204
Mauritania	251.4	13.6
Madagascar	234.7	9.3
Gabon	196	40

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PVDA'S VAN DEN BERG INTERVIEWED ON NEW PARTY PLANS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 26 Apr 80 pp 27-31

[Report by Frank Laforet: "Labor's New Plan Runs on Natural Gas"; passages in slantlines published in italics.]

[Text] PvdA [Labor Party] Chairman Max van den Berg, re-incarnation of Troelstra.

Don't they know? Persecuted by this agonizing question, the taxed PvdA started figuring in order to offer an alternative in 1980 to "a failing government policy." But critics mopped the floor with the new Labor Plan; the financial foundation was indeed very unstable. PvdA Chairman Max van den Berg meanwhile discovered a new milch cow for the government: the retirement- and insurance premiums. With those the new salvation plan of the socialists can be propped up.

The old socialist adage /"Perish, old forms and thoughts,"/ never has lost any force with current PvdA Chairman Max van den Berg. This sociologist who, as he himself adds sarcastically, "remained a socialist," has been trying feverishly for several weeks to present the PvdA's alternative versus the confessional-liberal cabinet policy. A 1980 alternative which, for that matter, is made up of old bicycle parts. That can't be avoided says Van den Berg, because without these elements, one would "pedal in a vacuum."

The new tandem on which Messrs Van den Berg and Den Uyl have placed themselves after a harsh family dispute has to see to it that the largest political party doesn't topple into powerlessness. The new socialist salvation plan /"The PvdA is Working on it"/ was born partly for fear of ending up in a power vacuum ("black hole") in order to show the adherents that there are indeed alternatives to what PvdA circles call "the failing government policy." The core of this new "Labor Plan" is preservation of the purchasing power up to modal [income] and 25,000 additional jobs. Those have to be financed by a far-reaching leveling of incomes of over one and a half to twice the modal (50,000 to 70,000 guilders), a greater domestic use of

natural gas, creaming off of the so-called super profits, etc.

With this "alternative," new blood was injected into the battle-tired socialist party cadres which had started to show signs of discouragement. The fact that things were at their blackest with the socialists was admitted by PvdA agent Hans Kombrink, in remarking that the new policy plan "made an end to the increasing doubt of whether the PvdA indeed did have an alternative." In the latter's wake, PvdA Member of the Chamber Van der Doef stated that "momentarily it even looked as if the PvdA would again degenerate into the historic error of the socialist movement"; creating big internal disputes on the opposition policy to be pursued, so that nothing would come of really carrying out opposition.

The PvdA leadership also got a clear signal of dissatisfaction from the electorate. In opinion polls the socialists show heavy losses. It appears from the "polls" that the alternative of parties such as the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and D'66 [Democrats '66] exert a greater appeal for former socialist voters. The PvdA chairman does have an explanation for this decline. Van den Berg says that the true question of power has not come up yet: "People don't understand it; is it a matter of government policy or opposition policy? There is great uncertainty and confusion. A true picture of our following -- as also became obvious in the election triumph in 1976 -- only develops in the last months before the elections. For that matter, there has been a new trend in the figures of the opinion polls since the publication of our alternative. From that it is evident that the PvdA is again clearly present among the voters. Although we declined from 32 percent to 28 percent, there is now an upward trend. This is evident from the latest surveys.

The life-sized frustrations of carrying out opposition, which is often unworkable, are another handicap which is currently playing nasty tricks on the PvdA. According to Van den Berg it is difficult to present a cohesive policy vis-a-vis the cabinet policy if one is not in the government oneself. All of this is against a background of a deteriorating economy: "Attention is paid primarily to government actions. The role of the opposition thus is of secondary importance. The only thing we can and must do is to project a recognizable different picture vis-a-vis the government policy. Then the people know that there are various possibilities."

The PvdA's alternative policy plan has been created for this purpose. What are lacking, however, are the means of projection. That is clear from Van den Berg's words. Also from another PvdA corner come sounds which show the frustrations and powerlessness of the socialists. Thus Van der Doef points out that the PvdA has not started its own /information campaign/ for nothing: "It is necessary because the interest in government parties is so great that we can barely get through." Therefore the members of the chamber and Van den Berg himself travel through the entire country in order to explain the "recognizable clear picture" to party friends, not forgetting to put some heart into them. Van den Berg: "Our alternative projects a certain

enthusiasm after the adherents had had the feeling of: /when will they come, where are they, don't we know either, perhaps?/ What also could have a paralyzing effect is that the alternative policy is only two degrees different from a government policy."

The mirror which Van den Berg therefore holds up to his party associates is that the socialists, to the extent the economic crisis and international problems increase, can unfold a policy which, if they are honest, is very close to their own points of departure. It is also a policy from which one doesn't flee because of painful choices and in which, says Van den Berg, "the PvdA doesn't merely shout for more things. If we can pay those from the economic growth, that is interesting, but there are no real choices. If there is less money, then one has to choose between highways or public transportation, social house construction or the free sector.

"When someone works long hours and earns a lot, then it is a question of whether it is not more appealing to have more free time and be satisfied with a little less income. Then you can do more socially, you have more time for your family and you have a less hurried existence. Hence I see the trend: need for individual freedom. Naturally there must be mechanisms for redistributing incomes, but the basic idea that people have the need to choose for themselves is emphatically included in this.

"My position is: in the economic perspective people have the feeling that more and more choices are being taken away from them. At the political level: that no way out is left with respect to society. In private life: the uncertainty over the job they can choose or lose. /Youth unemployment, for example, is plunging an entire generation into cynicism./ A society in which a young generation is alienated or is guided through a very narrow path in order to /arrive/ quickly is not a fascinating, strong or creative society. The plan we have now submitted and which we hope will have a magnetic effect, is trying to give an answer to this. And as a semi-OPEC country we should be able to succeed in that."

Whether the PvdA magnet is strong enough is doubted by critics. They say that the new plan emanates from many presuppositions. Van den Berg won't hear of criticism of the PvdA alternative. According to him that is unfair. "Anyone who knows a little about economic calculating knows that the government plans contain considerably less calculating." In addition, says Van den Berg, the PvdA plan is not an opportunistic alternative because it will have "ripple effects" on the election platform of the socialists which will be presented in June. One of those effects, in Van den Berg's words, is "the fundamental insight that through a redistribution of incomes it will be possible to retain the purchasing power for a large part of the population./Hence our proposition strikes hard in the higher income groups."/

A clear choice, which forms one of the legs under the financial strength of the PvdA alternative. The other pillars, such as the greater natural gas input, have been labeled as "built on quicksand"by critics.

Hence the PvdA must diligently search for other income in order to create the additional flow of jobs (25,000 jobs). Van den Berg: "We must strive toward a socially more sensible spending of all those premiums for insurance and retirements. /I think this will become a decisive point./ For this is an important source of financing. The core of the argument is that something meaningful is happening with retirement funds in the eyes of the people, thus no investments in little houses abroad. We don't need that. Another argument: until now we have always talked of economically stable retirements, even if things aren't going well from an economic viewpoint. I myself am an advocate of economically stable retirement, propagated amongst others by Amsterdam Alderman Schaefer, because it starts out much more from honest sharing. The government then should guarantee that it wants these retirements, if necessary at a lower level socially. But this still has to be discussed; the experts are not yet agreed on that."

One of the largest institutional investors, the General Civilian Retirement Fund [ABP] indeed wants to invest abroad. The recently retired director of the ABP, Dr Wiarda, himself a socialist, was an advocate of this. Van den Berg: "I believe it is necessary for the government to regulate, that part of the insurance- and retirement funds be available to it to be used for programs approved by parliament which are considered useful to society: urban renewal, education, prosperity, construction. This is a social problem which will cost 30 billion guilders in the next 10 years, but will indeed provide meaningful work. However, financing for it then has to be raised." Partly because of that the PvdA is casting a longing eye on the financial proceeds of our natural gas. Van den Berg himself advocates a 100 percent profit tax on natural gas (already over 95 percent goes to the government now - ed.) By increasing domestic natural gas sales additional income is generated with which the socialists can then do nice little things. Experts have harshly condemned this method and it appears that the PvdA is giving some thought to their criticism. Van den Berg: "It is plainly wasteful to use the gas proceeds more rapidly. That is, if they are not used for energy-saving measures or for strengthening of the economic structure. Even more important however is finding a higher export price for our natural gas. That must be done first through negotiations, but later it could also be forced.

All those flows of money must, according to the PvdA, ultimately be used for the creation of new jobs in the government. Van den Berg calculates for us: there are 230,000 unemployed, about 0,5 million WAO [Law on Labor Disabilities] beneficiaries, while each year another 56,000 work-seekers report. One solution, says Van den Berg, would be the idea of Rotterdam Professor Wolfsson (PvdA), who strives for an increased working period of 10 hours. Van den Berg: "Imagine what all you could do with that as a government. Where a person now works 8 hours, 2 people could work 5 hours. Expensive machines, for example those in the tax department, could be used more intensively. Services will be improved. Sometimes I say mockingly: /"to the extent more money is put into the collective sector, services appear to decrease."/

Have the PvdA closed ranks behind this new plan? Van den Berg: "I don't consider that a useful term for this subject. Politically we have a plan for the eighties on which we agree among ourselves. In a large party which finds it necessary to continue to think about it, that should not be done in the form of an obsession, but in the form of concrete ideas." The PvdA alternative, if it were carried out in total -- indeed it primarily creates jobs in the government sector -- would help the bureaucratization considerably. The Amsterdam Free University professor Dr J. van Putten has given his opinion on this last week in HAAGSE MACHTEN. His conclusion was clear: politicians can talk forever; the civil servants govern. Surely that must have caused Van den Berg to start thinking. In this context the PvdA chairman refers to his own election campaign in which a role was played by the thesis that political decision-making is too much directed toward The Hague.

Van den Berg's answer to bureaucratic challenge is simple: decentralization. "Van Putten simply has made this clear: if we do not decentralize then we're all getting excited about nothing on one political level. Actually there is one constant factor, the fourth power, which sails on."

Thus one has to continue to tinker with this apparatus, says Van den Berg. One of the first steps would be the shoving off or transferring of many administrative tasks to the community. Further, the so-called /bazaar tendencies/ of the departments must be broken up: each sector fights for itself while a cohesive government policy is lacking. This calls for a firm political policy. /"Unfortunately,"/ notes Van den Berg, /"political reforms are no longer very popular. D'66 has dropped that a little bit./ The PvdA has to get back onto this track again. We have the know-how in the person of Van Thijn. Then support will come from D'66 again, no doubt."

The democrats, for that matter, can certainly expect an invitation from Van den Berg and Den Uyl to take part in a so-called "progressive cabinet." Indeed, the illustrious PvdA duo has repeatedly expressed a preference in this direction. The CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy], according to Van den Berg, are pursuing a policy opposite to what is needed. "They are our political opponents. The CDA, for example, has simply positioned itself on the right of the political stage and with this it took the responsibility for numerous cabinet decisions. It does however create a clear situation, and we will present a good alternative vis-a-vis that."

It is an alternative which can be realized in Van den Berg's philosophy with the aid of D'66, PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and PPR [Political Party of Radicals]. The CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] is not very interesting to him: "I don't believe that the CPN is playing a role here. It is a matter of votes which they would not withhold from us in Chamber elections."

Van den Berg himself is clear. Once in power, the PvdA has to stick to it. The reform proposals will have to succeed each other very rapidly. In the past Van den Berg, to the horror of the PvdA chamber group, sometimes spoke of the /"ramming through of some bills."/ Van den Berg: "Of course we first want to give priority to settling a number of things, things which have been waiting for discussion for a long time, for example the Postal Bank. No one in the PvdA has forgotten that during the 3rd and 4th years of the Den Uyl cabinet, when we wanted to win, the CDA clearly applied the brakes and finally threw us out. We don't want to experience that again."

8700
CSO: 3105

MODERATE LEFT PREVENTS SOLUTION OF CRUCIAL DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 12 May 80 p 7

[Article by A.P. van Walsum: "Moderate Progressives Must Now Really Choose"]

[Text] People seeking housing are shown much more government concern in the Netherlands than elsewhere, much more discussion preceded the NATO decision of December 1979 here than in our neighboring countries and in the field of nuclear energy, Dutch policy is paralyzed while awaiting broad social discussion. In spite of this, the housing shortage, nuclear armament and peaceful nuclear energy lead very easily, precisely in the Netherlands, to violence. To whom do we have that to thank?

Inasmuch as in the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands], PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party], PPR [Political Party of Radicals] and the PvdA [Labor Party] left wing show the most sympathy for people who take to the street out of indignation about these three subjects, it is tempting to also hold these parties responsible for all the violence which occurs for this reason. That is all the more true when one hears the demonstrators involved publicly declare their contempt for making democratic decisions, for example, in a demonstration "possibly legal, but if it has to be, illegal," to announce or cry out slogans such as "Borssele must simply be closed down."

Still the fault does not lie with the group, which we, for the sake of convenience, will just describe as "extreme left." Extreme left is a constant in every western democracy, which remains today precisely the same as 10 years ago. The solution for our social and economic problems which it has to offer have not changed since: abolition of the capitalist system, introduction of a distribution system based on need, government intervention in almost every area, active struggle against every form of inequality etc. However strange it sounds, the extreme left is an element of stability in our society.

Middle Group

That is precisely not the case with the moderate progressive middle group, which consists of the ARP [Antirevolutionary Party], D'66 [Democrats '66], half of the KVP [Catholic People's Party] and the rest of the PvdA, which have concentrated for over 10 years on making uncommital progressive noises.

Against the background of this verbal progressiveness, approximately since the occupation of the Maagdenhuis, a whole generation has grown up with the firm conviction thatall traditional truths (such as the truism that prosperity must be earned and freedom defended) had lost their validity in the Netherlands and that our society only had one thing to do: improve the distribution of income, possessions, power and knowledge.

As opposed to the extreme left, this leftist oriented middle group has certainly brought about substantially important changes in the Netherlands. The general rivalry to be as progressive as possible in the seventies led to a radical shifting in national priorities. Business and the military received orders to lay low while the politicians were always urging the creation of new responsibilities in the social sphere. The Netherlands was the only country where everything was possible, everything was allowed and nothing more was needed.

Suddenly that was all over, but not with the CPN, PSP, PPR and the PvdA left wing. They certainly do not see any reason to switch back (or to deviate) and they think precisely that a vigorous pressing forward towards a socialist or radical society is now more imperative than ever. But the entire, uncommital, progressive middle group must suddenly retreat before the results which it sees loom up as the Netherlands continues to deny the existing realities and to attempt to please the extreme left: an isolated Netherlands, outside NATO, outside the EEC, without a diversified economy, without energy, without military forces and at the mercy of foreign influences where it no longer has any control of itself. From one day to another, the middle group appears to have realized that the extreme left cannot be kept quiet forever with uncommital, progressive talk and that a point is reached when a decision must be made.

How the overwhelming majority of moderate progressive Dutchmen will make their choice has already been clear for a long time. Practically the only model where the principles of the extreme left have ever been put in practice is found in Eastern Europe.

The only thing that one can conclude from this is that surrender of individual freedom has provided those peoples with next to nothing: not only a standard of living as in a period of occupation, but also income differences such as have been inconceivable with us for years.

Still the progressive noises are made because this has become second nature for most Dutchmen. However, behind this verbal smoke screen, Dutch politics is experiencing a mass return to reality. The entire middle group immediately appears to again understand that the government money, which one knew so well how to spend all those years must be earned once more and that businesses which suffered losses year in and year out cannot be kept operating by government for many years to come.

It is as if everyone has suddenly discovered again that the Netherlands is part of western Europe and consequently has accepted that our side must also give an answer about the 200 SS-20s which Russia is ready to aim at western Europe, that without nuclear energy, we will become sooner or later, the only country in Europe without electric power, and that in our case, "affordable housing" cannot fall like manna from heaven.

This return to reality is naturally being felt by us much harder than in the western European countries which have escaped from reality less with heart and soul in recent years. The people among us who take to the street do that, because they feel so unrestrained, because of a society which has appeared for 10 years to be more progressive than any other in the West and now is returning unblushingly to a reality, which people in our country had fancied for a long time no longer applied.

It is this return which has all bitterness on its conscience and the personification of this bitterness is, in many people's opinion, Prime Minister Van Agt. When the latter appeared on the scene in 1971 as minister of justice, he did not hide the fact at any time that he really would have preferred to govern with the PvdA. As professor of criminal law at Nijmegen and chairman of the KVP Center for Political Education, he had developed a moderate progressive reputation and as informateur [the person who provides the information for cabinet formation], he was directly responsible for the creation of the Den Uyl cabinet.

As deputy premier and minister of justice in that cabinet, he was coresponsible for the progressive confession of faith of the decade, the government declaration of May 1973, in which

it expressed concern about the increase of the especially dangerous forms of criminality, but immediately after this it expressed the hope that the prevention of crime could be encouraged by improving welfare benefits.

Several years later, the same Van Agt was at least coresponsible for the fall of the first and the failure of the formation of the second Den Uyl cabinet, and several years later--1980--we hear him make realistic statements, one after the other, which would have made him a normal man in any other country, but which have earned for him the label "Rightist" here at home.

This metamorphisis makes him naturally the target of the bitterness and anger of many Dutchmen who feel betrayed by the uncommital progressiveness of the previous years and opposition leader Den Uyl would not be any politician if he did not gratefully take advantage of that.

In connection with this, part of Den Uyl's gratitude will definitely go to his own party, which in 1977 saved him from a second term as prime minister. For with the narrowed policy margins of the moment, Den Uyl would not be able to avoid a return to reality, if he was premier now. And because he aroused many more expectations in 1973 as the great healing savior than Van Agt, the blow would have been even worse under him.

8490
CSO: 3105

NIPO PUBLISHES RESULTS OF OPINION POLL

Labor Party Loses Seats

The Hague ANP in English 19 May 80 p 3

[Text] Hilversum, May 19--The Labour Party would have lost ten seats in the Second Chamber if elections had been held in the second half of April, according to the results of an opinion poll published last Saturday.

The poll, conducted by the Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion (NIPO) for the Socialist Vara broadcasting corporation between April 14 and 28, showed that the Labour Party would have returned with 43 seats (53 at present) in Parliament.

On the other hand Prime Minister Dries van Agt's CDA party would have emerged as the biggest party with 50 (now 49) seats.

The poll further indicated that the growth of the D'66 party, which would have returned with 20 (now 8) seats, had stabilised.

The present government parties, CDA and Liberal VVD, would jointly have gained 72 (now 77) seats, while the leftist bloc would have got 73 seats. This showed that the stalemate between these two combinations was continuing, according to NIPO official Maurice de Hond.

Other Parties

Mr De Hond further commented that the position of the Liberal VVD party appeared to change little. This party was losing voters to the CDA while the number of former VVD voters who did not yet know which party they should support continued to be relatively large.

The poll also showed a rising tendency to vote for the small leftist parties, he said.

The Communist Party would have doubled its number of seats from two to four and the Pacifist Socialists would have gained three seats instead of two at the moment.

The positions of the Radical PPR Party (3 seats at present), Protest SGP (3), Protestant GPV (one) and DS'70 (one) would have remained unchanged. But the farmers' party would have lost its only Chamber seat.

CDA Not Surprised

The Hague ANP in English 19 May 80 p 4

[Text] Hilversum, May 19--CDA party chairman Professor Piet Steenkamp said here last Saturday he was not surprised that the latest NIPO public opinion poll showed increased support for his party.

He disclosed that the CDA had booked 7,500 new members of late.

Commenting on the loss of ten seats which the Labour Party would have suffered according to the poll, Mr Steenkamp said this was due to the fact that the Socialists were too much engaged in 'day-dreaming of a leftist majority.'

He warned the Labour Party against making itself impossible as a coalition partner for the CDA by drastic statements at its election congress, just as it did four years ago.

Mr Steenkamp said the CDA should insist that the biggest party emerging from next year's election should provide the Prime Minister for the new Cabinet.

He rejected the view expressed by Labour Party chairman Max van den Berg in a comment on the poll's results that the premier should be nominated by the largest cooperating grouping such as, possibly, the Labour and D'66 parties.

The CDA chairman added that an interesting possibility for a new coalition could be a combination of the CDA, Liberal and D'66 parties.

He noted that according to the NIPO poll such a coalition would have a large majority in the Second Chamber with 92 out of the 150 seats.

Dissidents Suffer Setback

The Hague ANP in English 20 May 80 pp 4,5

[Text] The Hague, May 19--The most reluctant supporters of the centre-right coalition Government of Prime Minister Dries van Agt when it was formed in 1977 suffered a major political echec in partly elections published today. [as published]

The group of so-called Christian Democratic dissidents, who merely tolerated the coalition with the Liberals at the time, came out well down on the list of candidates with which the Anti-Revolutionary Party wants to enter the general elections next year.

Their spiritual father, Professor B. Goudzwaard, drawing the consequences of the vote by 1,113 members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party's electoral colleges, immediately announced his resignation from a key CDA Commission.

Professor Goudzwaard said his decision to quit the commission which is drawing up the CDA's programme of principles and election platform did not yet mean that he was resigning from the CDA 'as yet.'

But he indicated that he felt a close affinity with the group of Christian radicals, many of whom have joined the small Radical Political Party (PPR) which has only three members in the Second Chamber.

ARP List

Development Cooperation Minister Jan de Koning tops the list of ARP candidates for the elections, followed by Justice Minister Jacob de [illegible] and the State Secretary for Culture, Recreation and Social Welfare Mrs Jeltje Kraaijeveldt, in third place.

The ARP executive had advised the electoral colleges to enter the elections with Mr Hans de Boer, a prominent CDA dissident, heading the ARP list but he now comes fourth.

The ARP lists is to be integrated with lists being prepared by the Catholic People's Party (KVP) and the Christian Historical Union (CHU) to form a single CDA list. The three parties are scheduled to merge into a single party on November 11.

Others on the voted list are Mr L. de Graaf 5 (8th on the recommended list and Mr Gerrit C. van Dam 7 (11). Professor Goudzwaards is listed eight but has meanwhile asked to be removed from the list. The executive had asked the electoral colleges to place him fifth.

Ninth on the elected list is Mr Marten Beinema (10) and tenth Mr Jan van Houwelingen (6th).

Nuclear Arms

The voted list further included Mr H.C. Couprie 15, Mr Jan Nico Scholten 16, Mr Jan Buikema 17 and Mrs F.J. Laning 18.

Former CDA floor leader Wim Aantjes who did not win a place on the recommended list won a 35th place on the electoral colleges' list.

The final list of ARP candidates is to be adopted by the party's council on June 7 but council can change the list only if the daily executive proposes such a change.

The Anti-Revolutionary Party said in a press release that Professor Goudzwaard had decided to quit the programme commission because he expected the wordings of the nuclear arms paragraph in the CDA programme of principles and elective platform to be unacceptable.

He also did not consider continuation of the present government coalition, in conjunction with the choice of the man who is to head the CDA into the elections, to be in the interest of the country.

In a comment the ARP presidium said it regretted Dr Goudzwaard's step describing it as unjustified because both the ARP and CDA still have to take a decision on the programme and platform.

It also indicated that it was not a foregone conclusion that Premier Dries van Agt would head the CDA into the elections.

The presidium nominated Prof. A.J. Vermaat as successor to Dr Goudzwaard in the party's programme commission.

CSO: 3120

GOVERNMENT ROUNDS OFF ECONOMIES PLAN

The Hague ANP in English 16 May 80 p 1

[Text] The Hague, May 16--Finance Minister Pons van der Stee has informed Parliament that the Government has failed to find ways of permanently curbing expenditures to reach the three billion guilders' extra economies needed for this year.

In a letter to the Second Chamber the Minister said that in addition to earlier proposed curbs to an amount of 1.5 billion guilders, the Government intended to save the other 1.5 billion guilders by deferring expenditures budgeted for 1980.

In addition it proposed to raise revenue by increasing the admission of casinos and the fees payable on passports.

He said most of the economies would be found in postponing purchases and repairs, deferring payments and keeping vacancies among civil servants open for some time.

These expenditures will be deferred to the years to come, Mr Van der Stee said, adding that the Cabinet had decided it would seek permanent economies when preparing the budget for 1981.

The Government had announced three billion guilders' extra economies at the beginning of this year in order to keep the financing deficit below six per cent of net national income.

It announced 1.5 billion guilders of intended economies shortly afterwards and promised it would advise Parliament about the remainder in the beginning of April.

In his letter this week Mr Van der Stee said it had taken longer for the Government to settle the matter in view of the little flexibility of government expenditures.

He said the Ministries of Education and Transport would contribute 339 million and 268 million guilders respectively to the economies.

The Ministers' letter has run into criticism from all parties except the Christian Democrat CDA.

CSO: 3120

MILD SENTENCES GIVEN AMSTERDAM RIOTERS

The Hague ANP in English 22 May 80 p 2

[Text] Amsterdam, May 22--Thirteen people, found guilty of rioting during the investiture of Queen Beatrix in Amsterdam on April 30, were today given markedly milder sentences than had been demanded by the prosecution. Three were acquitted.

When the 16 stood trial in the Amsterdam police magistrate's court two weeks ago, the public prosecutor demanded sentences ranging between four weeks' and six months' imprisonment.

Today, however, police magistrate Mrs G van Erp Taalman acquitted three and sentenced the 13 others to terms ranging between ten days and two months. In addition she imposed suspended sentences ranging between 20 days and two months, which need not be served unless the offenders are again convicted on a similar offence later, and fines.

She sharply condemned the collective violence in which the defendants had been engaged, but added that under Dutch law sentencing was according to individual responsibility.

She said the seven who were given ten days' jail, which is the time they had spent in preliminary detention, were first offenders and had been punished to some extent by the rough handling they had undergone when arrested by the mobile police units.

CSO: 3120

COUNTRY'S TWO COMMUNIST PARTIES WEIGH POST N-VOTE POLICIES

VPK: Fight Continues

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 26-27 Mar 80 p 1

[Article: "Disappointment? - No Thanks! - The Fight Continues - Now It's a Question of Alternatives"]

[Text] "The public campaign against nuclear power has registered an extraordinary success by forcing the politicians in favor of nuclear power to take a stand officially for discontinuing nuclear power and to express their support for investing in alternate sources of energy."

"Now it is up to the public campaign to see to it that these promises are kept. Do not let the old nuclear power hawks, Olof Palme and Ingvar Carlsson, for one moment forget that they have stated their support for the alternatives." This is what NY DAG writes in its first editorial after the nuclear power referendum.

It is already clear that the People's Campaign will continue and begin to work intensely to phase out nuclear power. On Monday, the board for the People's Campaign met and drew up new battle lines.

NY DAG asked activists all over the country to comment on the referendum. They all agree that the battle will continue and remind us that it concerns a maximum of 12 reactors for a maximum of 25 years. Now we must work to see that nuclear power is phased out faster than 25 years. The reason Alternative Two received so many votes was because it claims to be an alternative to phase out nuclear power.

"A great victory for Alternative Three, especially considering the strong forces we have had to contend with." These are the words of VPK's chairman, Lars Werner, in regard to the results of the referendum. He feels that it is an important success for the opponents of nuclear power to force the "yes"-parties to discuss and present a plan for phasing out nuclear power.

'People's Campaign' Chief's Pledge

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 26-27 Mar 80 p 3

[Article: "The Campaign Continues"]

[Text] The work for the "People's Campaign" continues. On 26-27 April there will be a large conference, including all local campaign groups. Decisions will be made at that time about future activities and the form of the organization.

This was decided at a meeting by the board of the People's Campaign. "Our work will go on as before until the time of the conference," says chairman Lennart Daleus. "We will now concentrate on careful monitoring of what is happening to energy problems in parliament and in the government."

The board of the People's Campaign made the following statement at the meeting, here published by NY DAG:

"The results of the referendum clearly show that public opinion against nuclear power is very strong in Sweden. Today, there are hundreds of thousands of active opponents of nuclear power and even many more sympathizers. The strength of the antinuclear movement is manifest through its knowledge, involvement and marked readiness to fight.

"Even if support for Alternative Three was less than 50 percent in the referendum, it is only a question of time before the opposition against nuclear power becomes so strong that it will be politically impossible to avoid phasing out nuclear power. This opinion is manifested within the strong antinuclear movement as well as within the political parties.

"The People's Campaign for a referendum has to be considered a success for the antinuclear movement, even if the 'yes' side received the majority of votes this time. We, who are against nuclear power, will do our utmost to limit this pronuclear expression to as short a period as possible.

"The safety risks connected with nuclear power are no less now, after the referendum, than they were before. Several of the nuclear plants have serious flaws. Therefore, an immediate safety study must be undertaken to provide a basis for judging the safety of Swedish reactors and the consequences should their operation be halted. With the present facts at hand, the People's Campaign insists on discontinuing the operation of the reactors at Barseback as quickly as possible.

"There must be a readiness preparation plan based on the study made by the Institute of Radiation Protection, as reported in its publication 'More Effective Readiness.' Additional reactors must not be allowed to become operational until such plans have been worked out and approved by responsible authorities.

"The two 'yes' parties' ballots stated that, at most, 12 reactors will be charged. In this connection, it is important to point out that operation of the nuclear plants 11 and 12 (Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3) cannot be defended on an economic basis.

"We find it unacceptable that the economic margin for wage increases and higher standards for those poorest in society are devoured by further investments in nuclear powerplants, which are only of hypothetical value in providing energy.

"In a harsh economic situation, one must also ask whether available economic resources should be used for a continued expansion of nuclear power before implementing necessary safety standards for existing nuclear plants.

"Opposition to nuclear power is not an isolated Swedish phenomenon. Opposition against nuclear power is increasing throughout the world. The risks from the various stages in the nuclear fuel cycle are becoming more obvious to more and more people. Therefore, the opposition against nuclear power in Sweden will continue until the last reactor has been shut down."

VPK Analyzes SDP Role

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Editorial: "SAP's Important Choice of Direction"]

[Text] Opponents of nuclear power have rightfully maintained that Alternative Two to the 12 reactors does not constitute an alternative for phasing out nuclear power. This is so, despite assurances that the 12 reactors will only continue in operation for the duration of their technical life span, and that the nuclear power era after that would terminate as far as Sweden is concerned.

We do not wish to reiterate all the arguments which reveal the deception of Alternative Two and its attempt to pretend to be an alternative for phasing out nuclear power. But now, after the referendum, one of these arguments ought to be particularly emphasized. That is that the 12-reactor proponents are not able to guarantee that future politicians will keep the promise of discontinuing operation in 25-30 years.

Waste

The longer the debate for the referendum went on, the more often proponents of Alternative Two were forced to insist that they were in favor of shutdowns. At that time, we wrote that only Alternative Three provided safe conditions for phasing out. It stipulated that phasing out would begin immediately and be completed in 10 years, which gave today's voters and politicians control over when it actually would take effect.

Now the 12-reactor proponents of Alternative Two were the winners, and what does that mean for the opponents of nuclear power? Reasonably speaking, the promise to discontinue operation will continue to be a central theme in the political debate on energy. And there must be a demand that measures will be taken which make it possible to finally shut down the nuclear powerplants.

All this is in addition to all the concrete problems already debated today: the unsolved waste disposal, the lack of safety, the location of Barseback, the economic waste in the construction of reactors 11 and 12, etc.

Broad Base

There seems to be broad support for such a line these days. To begin with, it is reasonable to assume that a large number of those who voted for Alternative Two did so in the conviction that it really stood for a phasing out development.

Second, more Social Democrats and Liberals turned out to vote for Alternative Three or did not vote at all.

Special Congress

Several Social Democratic groups already have drawn conclusions from this. Some Social Democratic newspapers urge the party leadership to proceed carefully in dealing with the question of nuclear power.

The well-known Social Democrat, Agne Gustafsson in Lund, demands that a special congress be convened to fortify the decisions to immediately phase out nuclear power.

Compromise

Even those who actively work for Alternative Two, like the seven prominent Social Democrats who spoke out in DN on Wednesday, urge the party leadership to compromise:

"We do not find it reasonable to interpret the outcome of the vote as a clear-cut decision favoring 12 reactors for the next 25 years. What we do know is that the phasing out proposal has very strong support among the Swedish people. Alternative One, which has left the door open for continued expansion, lost ground during the election campaign. As regards the time frame, we feel that the Social Democratic Party should take the initiative for a compromise which can enlist as broad support as possible from those who have supported Alternatives Two and Three."

Which Way?

The authors feel that the Social Democrats face a serious choice of direction. Either the party rallies along the line on the energy policy which is really serious about phasing out, even if this would be at a slower rate than proposed in Alternative Three, or the 12 reactor line will be implemented by the capitalists and the Moderates with the ongoing risks for expansion and related matters. And, one could add, also with the risks that this would entail for the SDP.

We know that there are nuclear power hawks and insensitive politicians in the Social Democratic leadership, but is that all that can be found?

APK Attacks VPK, Center

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 25 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "Yes-Vote for Public Ownership of Nuclear Power"]

[Text] Two opportunist parties forced the referendum on nuclear power. At that time the VPK leadership and the Center Party line was that "the people must be allowed to decide." Once a clear majority had spoken in favor of public ownership and the 12-reactor program, long debated, the disappointed campaign generals of the "no"-side began to question whether the will of the people should prevail.

When the spokesmen for Alternative Three thought the "race was over" and the "no" proposition would win, they said that this alternative must be carried out exactly. Then there was no room for compromise in their thinking. Now you hear that consideration must be given to the minority opinion. Would that have happened if Alternative Three had received 59 percent of the vote? The proponents of Alternative Three have already given their answer.

Until the last moment, C. H. Hermansson tied his comments closely to his conviction that Alternative Three would become the winner. Now not even that limited objective became a reality. C. H. Hermansson's promise that the alternative with the greatest number of votes also should be considered the winner now has a boomerang effect. The former chairman of the VPK shows his disdain for the results of the referendum in a manner only matched by that of his worthy companion, another political opportunist, i.e. Torbjorn Falldin.

On election night Torbjorn Falldin declared that he would do his utmost to prevent the 12-reactor alternative from becoming a reality. Thus, he has made it clear that he now intends to sabotage the clear decision given by the referendum and that he has no thought of resigning. And that despite the fact that the Swedish people have rejected his proposals in two elections. The most natural and honest step would have been for him

to announce his resignation as prime minister immediately after the election results were known.

Alternative Two drew the largest vote and the 12-reactor alternative clearly won, but it should still be noted that Alternative Three attracted 1.8 million voters. This came about despite a deafening propaganda effort by the mass media to make nuclear power into the symbol of all evil. Alternative Three became the symbol of capitalist exploitation of the people and environment, of evil power, police state and nuclear war. Too many were taken in by these cheap tricks, demagoguery and the cynical play on emotions, ignorance and fear. The widespread involvement of Alternative Three was worthy of a better fate than to be victimized by those endeavoring to embark on a backward journey.

The result of the election means that Alternative Two's 12-reactor program will be carried out and that the Social Democracy now cannot ignore the central demand that the energy sector be transferred to public ownership and democratic control. Anything else would be a violation of the clear result given by the referendum.

APK Policy Statement

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 26 Mar 80 p 3

[Article: "We Will Work for Continued Development of Nuclear Power"]

[Text] The Communist Workers' Party supported Alternative Two and actively contributed to making this alternative the largest one, the party's working committee says in a statement released on Tuesday.

The party's decision was in part based on the fact that this alternative was the only one which demanded public ownership of that part of nuclear power and other energy resources which are not yet publicly owned, and in part by the fact that this alternative was supported by the entire labor movement.

The APK will continue to work for a rational energy policy with continued development of nuclear power and with strict consideration of safety, worker protection, and protection of the environment in regard to all sources of energy, the party says in its policy statement.

APK Chief: Party Will Grow

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Mar 80 p 7

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "VPK Believes Voter Support Will Increase"]

[Text] The Swedish Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) had a honeymoon with the Center Party and expects the polls to reflect favorably on it in the

immediate future. Above all, it expects to have gained sympathizers among many of the Social Democrats who voted for Alternative Three.

There has been some uncertainty this last week following the referendum as to the party's direction at this time. Torbjorn Falldin has not been heard from, and on Sunday the VPK decided to issue a call for unity among all opponents of nuclear power--until the last reactor is shut down!

The leader of the party, Lars Werner, also pointed out to the press that the appeal to continue the struggle for a different society was particularly directed to all those who oppose nuclear power and who had politically identified with Alternative Three.

Exploitation

The appeal urges all opponents of nuclear power to continue the struggle to phase out nuclear power; find ways to meet the energy needs; continue the fight against mismanagement, exploitation, unemployment and social deprivation.

The appeal was the result of weekend deliberations among all the party's representatives and leadership--a meeting which over several days analyzed the results of the referendum and the conditions for continuing the work.

The position of the party in regard to the People's Campaign was not clearly defined. At the press conference, Lars Werner stated that as yet the form has not been decided upon.

Lars Werner, as all other party leaders, stated that the result of the referendum must be respected.

But if it were to be, as he says, "Carl Tham's energy policy" which will determine future energy policy in parliament, then the party will not remain silent. Carl Tham was the minister of energy in the Liberal government who proposed the 12 reactors plan.

Impressions

"It would be absurd for the present government to completely ignore the protest expressed by more than 2 million voters in the referendum. This protest must be considered in the energy proposal which the government now will put together on the basis of the results of the referendum," says Werner.

He does, however, point out that he has not spoken with Falldin since the referendum. He also adds, somewhat surly, that "Falldin seems to have been busy talking to Olof Palme about the wage negotiations."

In a joint statement on Sunday, the VPK leadership stated that it has chosen to interpret the "yes"-vote's wording of "a maximum of 12 reactors" as a lifesaver. The Center leader, Torbjorn Falldin, followed the same line when he consoled his party workers after the defeat in the referendum.

Maximum of 12

"It states that a maximum of 12 reactors will be used, i.e. 12 or less than 12," VPK points out.

The party leadership also states that the fact that Alternative Three failed to get a majority in the referendum means that parliament would not be bound to carry out its proposal to phase out within 10 years.

"But the results from the referendum cannot be interpreted as an obstruction for an equally rapid or even more rapid development," it was noted.

It was pointed out that "an upper limit has been set for the use of nuclear power, but that no lower limit has been established."

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CSO: 3109

VPK WON FAVOR IN NUCLEAR-REFERENDUM; FUTURE GROWTH IN DOUBT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Ever since the election last fall VPK [Left Party Communists] leader Lars Werner's comb has been growing. Naturally the big Conservative election victory was painful for the communists. But it was a consolation for them that VPK did a little better in the election than the Social Democrats. And in the latest SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] survey in SVENSKA DAGBLADET VPK actually surpassed the Liberal Party.

"It's no great feat to be larger than today's Liberal Party," Werner said in a statement.

Of course a difference of half a percentage point in a SIFO poll is no guarantee that one party is bigger than another. But at the same time it is dangerous to minimize the progress made by the communists. It is by no means the result of the Liberal Party's weakness but is due mainly to the failure of the Social Democrats to attack VPK for such a long period of time.

As one of the major groups backing Line 3 in the referendum VPK appeared to many people to be a party just like any other parliamentary group. By leaving VPK in peace for almost a decade--in hopes that VPK would function as a passive government support system--the Social Democrats also helped to change the picture presented by Werner's party.

But now Werner is facing harder times. The Conservatives and Liberals are--as the VPK leader put it--"becoming increasingly desperate in their attacks." And he added that the Social Democratic tone had also changed.

That observation is correct. The question is whether the Social Democrats can really oppose the communists and at the same time convince party friends who supported Line 3 to return to the family.

Werner really isn't satisfied. He is deeply worried about Conservative gains. According to Werner this provides increased opportunities to pursue a reactionary policy directed against the nation's wage earners, pension recipients and families with children.

That sounds good! There seem to be many reactionary people in this country--one in four in the nation as a whole, one in three in the big cities! But it's not that easy to shuffle the deck. No matter how few in number the communists have always had a unique ability to present themselves as the interpreters for the broad masses.

What upsets Werner of course is that the almost four times larger Conservative Party truly represents broad groups of people in an entirely different way than his own communist party.

On reflection this may cause Lars Werner's comb to droop a little.

6578
CSO: 3109

PARTIES END POLICY OF IGNORING VPK; BEGIN ATTACKING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 9 Apr 80 p 4

[Article by Claes-Goran Kjellander]

[Text] After having been left in peace for several years the Left Party Communists [VPK] are experiencing hard times again. VPK is being attacked from four angles.

"We intend to expose VPK's irresponsible overbidding policy," said Leif Gustafsson of the Social Democratic secretariat.

All the other parties in parliament are suddenly interested in attacking VPK. After the honeymoon in the Popular Movement the Center Party must make a vigorous effort to see whether the Center Party or VPK will pick up disaffected voters following the nuclear power debate. The Liberal Party needs to shoot past VPK in the opinion polls, especially for psychological reasons. For ideological reasons the Conservatives are concerned about the ability of a communist party to gain a real foothold in Sweden.

Social Democrats Very Concerned

But probably the Social Democrats are the most concerned. Various opinion polls suggest that the Social Democratic Party is losing voters to the left. Each new percentage point for VPK increases the opportunities of the nonsocialist parties to scare marginal voters into thinking that Palme would sit in Werner's lap if the Social Democrats got another chance to form a government.

The Social Democrats are not planning any special campaign against VPK. But the party is making an effort to inform its voters about VPK activity in parliament. The Social Democratic secretariat made a big comparison report which concluded that the country would be plunged into total economic chaos if all VPK bills were enacted.

Ideological Debate

The Social Democrats also want to intensify the ideological debate with VPK. The lack of an ideological debate in Swedish politics is mentioned as one of the explanations for the strong VPK gains in addition to the nuclear power issue which made VPK "housebroken" in the eyes of many Social Democrats.

During the general political debate in parliament in January Olof Palme spoke of the enormous gap between socialism and communism viewed in an international perspective. This debate will continue and spread all across the country. Along with reports on VPK proposals for increased state spending and decreased state revenues the international perspective in the debate is intended to stop the westward migration of the voters.

Not Negative for VPK

"It's good to have them talking about us," said Kenneth Kvist of the VPK parliamentary secretariat.

He does not think it is negative for VPK to receive more critical attention. It is much more dangerous if no one cares what the party says or does.

This attitude surfaces in various sections of the VPK leadership. They don't believe Swedish voters can be scared any more by descriptions of what is happening in the eastern communist nations.

That type of argument had great force before the Vietnam war. The younger generation in Sweden has renewed its acquaintance with imperialism in all its disguises.

"On the other hand," said Per Francke of the VPK secretariat, "our party has many young members. They were not with us during the Cold War period and they have never run into the line of argument that is based on casting suspicions on us by using examples from other countries.

Hard to Cast Suspicion

"Thus it is hard to know how they would react. But the cooperation in the Popular Movement has probably increased stability in the electorate and enhanced susceptibility to VPK arguments.

"Many people met and associated with living communists for the first time. That has made it even more difficult for our opponents to cast suspicion on us," said Per Francke.

VPK Resumes Paired Voting

The VPK parliamentary group decided to return to the so-called paired voting system.

This means it will be easier to pair absent members within the various political blocs with each other.

The decision was made by the VPK parliamentary group on Tuesday.

"We abandoned the paired voting system last fall in protest against being excluded from parliamentary committees," the statement released after the meeting read. "We expected the Social Democratic group to do the same, as some signals from the group indicated. If that had happened the nonsocialist parties could never have been sure of receiving a majority.

"But since the Social Democrats remained within the paired voting system it created complications whenever one or more VPK members could not attend due to illness. Even if some nonsocialist members abstain from voting on an issue or vote against the government the nonsocialist bloc can still win.

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YOUNG PEOPLE FROM SOCIALIST PARTY DESERT TO VPK

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] More than anyone else Olof Palme has reason to think seriously now about what is happening to the left of the Social Democratic Party--or more precisely to the Social Democratic left wing.

The increased voter support for VPK [Left Party Communists] registered by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] and other opinion surveys comes almost entirely from Social Democrats who have left Olof Palme for Lars Werner's party.

When we include voters who have gone the other way around 1 percent of the total electorate has taken this step. This is shown by the SIFO analyses of party shifts.

The worst part of it from the Social Democratic viewpoint is that the defections are occurring primarily among young voters under 40.

This also means that the well-known VPK party profile of old, a large ratio of young voters, is being strengthened while the Social Democrats' problems among young voters are being underlined even more.

Two out of three VPK voters today are under 40. The Social Democratic midpoint lies perceptibly above the 40-year-old mark.

Most of the VPK voter gains have been made among male voters when gains between the last quarter of 1979 and the first quarter of 1980 are broken down by sex.

Despite the fact that according to SIFO VPK is now larger than the Liberal Party, the Liberals still have more women voters than the communist party does.

The Social Democrats are losing more young voters than they did in the past. VPK is also starting to make gains among younger LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] members.

According to SIFO about one LO member in ten now sympathizes with VPK. But the second largest workers' party--after the Social Democratic Party--is still the Center Party.

On the salaried employees' side the situation seems to be that active communists are vocal at meetings and in the general debate. But they have no sizable following--the proportion of VPK sympathizers among salaried employees seems to be 5-8 percent.

On a regional basis VPK seems to be doing well in the Stockholm and Goteborg areas, especially on the west coast.

The Center losses in Goteborg are connected with VPK gains there. Perhaps the nuclear power issue had a partisan influence on the party shifts that it did not have in other parts of the country.

The likelihood that VPK sympathizers will vote is high according to SIFO, between 85 and 88 percent.

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PRESTRIKE POLL SHOWS INCREASE IN SOCIALIST, CP SUPPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Apr 80 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Shifts in party sympathy have been small but the socialist bloc has strengthened its popular opinion lead. This is shown by the latest IMU [Institute for Market Research] voter survey made before and after the nuclear power referendum. The socialist bloc received 50.5 percent of voter support and the nonsocialist government parties received 47.0 percent.

The IMU survey was conducted between 10 March and 2 April and included 831 interviews. Half of the survey was made during the last week of the referendum campaign, the other half was made in the week after the referendum.

All the changes in party sympathy lie within the margin of error. This suggests that the nuclear power vote will not have any longlasting or far-reaching effects on the balance of party forces.

The two parties that backed Line 2--the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party--noted increases while the Center Party, the major force behind Line 3, declined somewhat.

IMU has conducted three voter surveys for DAGENS NYHETER to date. In the last survey the Conservative support was 21.5 percent, a decline of 1 percent compared with the two previous surveys. In the fall election the Conservatives got 20.3 percent of the vote.

In its voter surveys SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] showed a climb to 26 percent in polls concluded before the referendum. Nothing in the IMU material suggests such a strong upturn for the Conservatives.



Changes in Voter Sympathies Since the Election Last September

Key:

1. Social Democrats
2. Conservatives
3. Center Party
4. Liberals
5. Left Party Communists
6. Nonsocialist bloc
7. Socialist bloc

Conservatives Not Underrated

In the IMU surveys on nuclear power high support was noted for Line 1, advocated by the Conservative Party. This tends to indicate that IMU has not underrated the party's standing among the electorate.

In the March survey the Liberals received 8.5 percent of the votes, an increase of 1 percent compared with the last survey and a decline of half a percentage point compared with the first survey. In the election the Liberal Party received 10.6 percent of the votes.

The IMU figures indicate that the Liberal Party is several percentage points below the election results and that the SIFO figure of 6.5 percent was a chance variation.

The Center Party received 17 percent compared with 18.5 and 17 in the two earlier surveys and 18.1 percent in the election. All surveys indicate that the Center Party is stabilized around 17-18 percent.

The Social Democrats received 44.5 percent compared with 44 percent in the previous surveys and 43.2 percent in the election.

Nuclear Power No Problem

This figure is relatively high. The latest SIFO figure was 42.5 percent. The IMU figure suggests that nuclear power will not give Palme the problems many people said it would.

For VPK [Left Party Communists] IMU noted 6 percent of voter support compared with 5.5 percent in previous surveys and 5.6 percent in the election. According to SIFO the VPK figure is 7 percent but IMU did not confirm such an increase.

Social Democrats Down in Cities

A breakdown of the results shows that the Conservative Party is primarily an urban party. In the three largest cities 32 percent voted for the Conservatives compared with the average vote of 21.5 percent.

The Social Democrats are underrepresented in the cities with 37 percent of voter support compared with a nationwide average of 44.5 percent and VPK is overrepresented with 11 percent compared with an average of 6 percent. The urban figures for the Liberal and Center parties were 9 and 7 percent respectively.

In population centers with populations from 20,000 to 200,000 the Social Democrats received 47 percent of voter support, the Conservatives 25 percent, the Liberals 10 percent, the Center Party 11 percent and VPK 3 percent.

In rural areas the Center Party is overrepresented with 25 percent of voter support compared with an average of 17 percent. The Social Democrats also have a plus with 48 percent. The Conservatives, the Liberals and VPK are all below their national averages.

IMU also asked about second choice parties. Here the Liberal Party is the clear leader with 25 percent of the voters--one person in four--giving the Liberal Party as their second choice. The Center Party was named by 20 percent, the Social Democrats by 13 percent, the Conservative Party by 11 percent and VPK by 9 percent. There are few changes here compared with the last survey.

IMU/DAGENS NYHETER Voter Opinion Survey

	Survey Period 1. 22 Oct-12 Dec 1979	2. 26 Jan-20 Feb 1980	3. 10 Mar-2 Apr 1980
Number registered voters interviewed with party sympathies (= basis of percentages)	1701	803	831
Percentages naming as "best party"			
Conservatives	22.5	22.5	21.5
Liberals	9.0	7.5	8.5
Center Party	17.0	18.5	17.0
Christian Democratic Union	1.0	1.5	1.5
Social Democrats	44.0	44.0	44.5
Left Party Communists	5.5	5.5	6.0
Other parties	1.0	1.0	1.0
	100	100	100
Percentage of registered voters who could not or would not name the "best Party"	3.0	4.0	3.0

To date there have been three surveys of party sympathies. No changes can be noted that do not lie within the margin of error.

A nationally representative selection of Swedish citizens from 18 to 74 years of age was surveyed. Interviews were made during home visits. They were asked: "Which party do you consider best?" An election was simulated; party preferences were expressed with the help of "sealed ballots."

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PRO-MOSCOW APK HOLDS CONGRESS, ELECTS NEW PARTY SECRETARY

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 21 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Arne Soderquist]

[Text] Stockholm--In connection with the 26th congress of the Workers' Communist Party [APK] Ingvar Loov of Eskilstuna was elected party secretary to succeed Harry Hagberg who was forced to leave this post due to illness. It was natural for NORRSKENSFLAMMAN to take Ingvar Loov's pulse concerning his evaluation of the party congress that has just ended and what he regards as his most important tasks in his new official role.

But first of all perhaps we should note that Ingvar Loov is a very well-known name among active communists in our country.

Experienced

As a party official for a'most 30 years and with a very active background in municipal and county politics he has acquired experience that will fit well into his new job. And the fact that he represents continuity in the communist party in our country is also a plus.

When he evaluates the congress he can do so with understanding of the political milestones we have passed as well as in light of future perspectives:

Good Foundation

"I regard the congress as very positive," said Ingvar Loov, "and that opinion is probably shared by all who had a chance to be there. There was great unity, showing that the foundation we laid at the 25th congress was a good one.

"But there is a lot left to do and now we must follow up the lines of action that were decided on.

"The main thing here is to anchor our party even more solidly in the labor environment. This is and will remain the lifeblood of the party.

Union Debate

"The labor debate at the congress also showed that we are on the right track. It was especially positive that so many young delegates reported on their job sites and described the mood prevailing there."

The struggle for working-class interests also ran like a red thread through documents and major speeches at the congress:

"At the same time one of our top organizational priorities is to further enlarge the party," Ingvar Loov stressed. "We must create new organizations where we still have white spaces on our organizational map, we must strengthen our organization in areas where we are still weakly developed.

Interaction

"Of course these tasks cannot be seen in isolation from our political activity. There is definitely an interaction here. Activity on the job to carry out our political demands also provides the basis and prerequisites for new organizations, increased circulation of NORRSKENSFLAMMAN, and so forth.

Concrete Steps

"It is a fairly general feeling that we must now start being more concrete in our work. A relevant example in this direction is the conference for central Sweden which we are now preparing. We intend to examine in detail the problem of deindustrialization and along with the workers of Vastmanland, Sormland, Dalarna, Orebro and Varmland prepare a background report and action program on business policy issues related to mining, forestry, the steel industry, etc.

May Day Preparations

"Activity in the current contract negotiations and in connection with May Day preparations is also part of the current work load, of course," Ingvar Loov continued. "The May Day statement approved by the congress should be seen as an appeal not only to march under the union banner on 1 May but also to develop prior to and on 1 May a broad activity to sell NORRSKENSFLAMMAN, collect signatures for the Swedish Peace Committee's peace appeal, etc.

New Action Forms

"As one who has been active in municipal affairs in Kungsor and Eskilstuna for 16 years and as a member of the county council for 10 I feel it is appropriate to stimulate an increase in activity on the municipal politics level in all areas where we carry out organized party activity.

"Even when we don't have a seat on a municipal council this should not prevent us from engaging in political activity on the municipal level. On the contrary, under such circumstances it is necessary for us to resort to many other forms of action.

Adjusting Activity

"And the fact that we are heading into summer and vacation time does not have to mean a lull in political activity either," Ingvar Loov went on. "Of course even a political organization has to take the shifting seasons into account and comrades who have worked actively in politics during most of the year also deserve rest and relaxation. But I feel it is important for district and local organizations to try to adjust their activities to the changed conditions in the summertime.

"For example rallies on the street, on the square or wherever people get together could be successfully arranged during the summer, gala meetings for NORRSKENSFLAMMAN could be held, various summer camps could be set up together with SKU [Swedish Communist Youth], 'Red Saturdays' as conducted in some places around the country could be arranged. These are all examples of activities that can be coordinated with political objectives.

SKU, Future of the Party

"With respect to SKU I would like to point out the importance of having the party give all the support it can to the continued expansion of our youth league," said Ingvar Loov. "SKU has gotten off to a fine start and giving the organization even more of a boost would not only benefit SKU but be the best investment in the future the party could make."

One thing we can guarantee after talking with Ingvar Loov--our new party secretary has a wealth of good intentions and ideas. He can't carry them out alone, as he himself is well aware, but through the efforts of thousands of party members around the country the Workers' Communist Party will take a new step forward, we are totally convinced of that.

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POLL SHOWS SOME WOULD USE VIOLENCE TO STOP NUCLEAR-POWER

Stockholm REPORTAGE in Swedish 27 Mar 80 p 85, 86

> [Text] Some 47,000 Swedes will continue to fight against nuclear power: "We can resort to violence! Continue to fight--using violence if necessary!" That is the opinion of 47,000 Swedes following the defeat of line three in the referendum, according to a Sifo poll. But what is meant by violence? A swedish expert on international terrorism believes there could be a small group of fanatics in Sweden which is prepared to commit murder for the sake of its convictions.

Sifo ran this poll especially for REPORTAGE 2 weeks prior to the referendum vote.

The majority of those opposed to nuclear power was prepared to continue its work to dismantle nuclear powerplants.

Only 22 percent of the opposition were willing to accept the majority decision on future energy supplies.

According to Sifo, there is also a group which is prepared to go even further than the majority opposition.

Among those polled, 10 percent said that a convinced nuclear-power opposition should continue to fight in every way--using violence if necessary.

If this is actually so, it means that approximately 47,000 Swedes hold that opinion today.

But it is important to point out that these are estimated figures, as is always the case in at-random polling. Only a small number of interviews are made in subgroups, so there is a large margin of error.

Sifo asked:

"If the yes-side wins in the nuclear power vote, what do you think the opposition should do?"

Line Three

Accept the decision and live with what the majority decides to do about nuclear power without protesting--22 percent.

Accept the decision and protest with demonstrations, articles and other peaceful means in order to shut down nuclear powerplants--64 percent.

Refuse to accept the decision and continue to fight, employing all kinds of tactics, even violence if necessary in order to close nuclear powerplants--10 percent.

Undecided, don't know,--5 percent.

However, the picture changes when the response to all the lines in the referendum is considered:

Some 46 percent of the Swedish people believe that the opposition should accept the decision on nuclear power without protesting.

Some 43 percent believe the opposition should accept the decision, but continue to protest and demonstrate by legal means.

But no less than 6 percent believe that the opposition should continue to fight, using violence if necessary.

The poll also showed that those who favor line three were most strongly convinced of their cause.

Remarkably few of those who favored line two were strongly convinced. Those who favored line one were more strongly convinced than those who favored line two, but not as convinced as the opposition.

The question was:

"Is your conviction about nuclear power strong or weak?"

[The answer in percent for the respective lines:)

Very Strong

Line One	Line Two	Line Three
29	15	35

Quite Strong

Line One	Line Two	Line Three
41	35	29

Quite Weak

Line One	Line Two	Line Three
22	36	19

Very Weak

Line One	Line Two	Line Three
4	6	7

But the picture changes with respect to involvement; a large majority did not become involved at all, either for or against.

The involvement was greatest in connection with line three. Three percent said they had been heavily involved and 18 percent somewhat involved.

The involvement was less in connection with line one and least with line two, where one percent had been very active and seven percent somewhat active.

What does the militant opponent look like?

(By militant Sifo means a person who has been engaged in the popular campaign, who is adamently opposed to nuclear power and who thinks that an adament opponent should continue to fight, with violence if necessary.)

This person is most often a woman. We are talking about 38,000 women and 9,000 men.

She is a Social Democrat or a Communist. Some 16,000 Left-Wing Communists and 11,000 Social Democrats consider themselves militant. To this we can add 9,000 Center Party members.

She holds a lower-salaried middle-class job in the fields of education, recreation or science, alternatively nursing or social work.

We should repeat that the number of persons "inclined toward violence" cannot be stated with any certainty, but ovbiously there is such a group in Sweden today.

Are there potential terrorists among them? Are some prepared to go so far as to attempt murder in order to stop nuclear power?

"This question is hypothetical--but that risk does exist," said Sheriff Bertil Haggman, one of Sweden's experts on terrorism. He wrote a book on the subject and is now working on another. On several occasions he studied with the Rand Corporation in the United States, a private research institute which specializes in terrorism.

"I am not really surprised to learn that 10 percent of the population may be inclined to resort to violence. The connection between nuclear power and violence is quite common abroad," he said.

"So far, nuclear power demonstrations in Sweden have been peaceful; but undoubtedly there are violent attitudes in this country. Popular campaign groups in Sweden have sister organizations abroad that have been involved in attacks on nuclear powerplants.

So far, there is no "domestic" terrorism in Sweden. Acts of terrorism have been executed by foreign terrorists."

But we did have one violent incident in connection with nuclear power. That was at the end of the 1970's when a person or group identified as "M" used explosives in the center of Goteborg.

The explosion was preceded by a letter to a Goteborg newspaper, demanding that the letter, which protested the development of nuclear power in Sweden, be read on radio and TV. If nto, a bomb would be detonated behind the courthouse in Goteborg.

The letter was not read and the bomb exploded at the said location. But nothing happened after that until explosives were later found outside the nuclear powerplant in Barseback. Police suspects that "M" was also behind that.

But nothing has happened since.

"I am of the opinion," said Bertil Haggman, "that we cannot exclude the possibility of terrorist activity. There may be a small group which is now prepared to resort to violence. The nuclear-power issue has reached that status in Sweden today."

8952
CSO: 3109

TALK WITH YOUTHFUL ANTINUCLEAR VOTERS SHOWS ANGER AT PALME

Stockholm REPORTAGE in Swedish 27 Mar 80 p 86, 87

[Text] "It is bitterly disappointing. We have campaigned very hard for line three, without seeing any support for the other lines out here. Now we have to accept line two, and that is hard. It was to be expected, but I cannot help but feel that this is unjust."

It is the evening of 23 March, the day before the vote on the nuclear referendum, and we are on Runers Road in Uttran, south of Stockholm.

Several persons live here in a large villa, three teachers, a curator and a future letter carrier. They are Gunnar Landborn, (who is responsible for the statement above), Staffan Mendel-Hartvig, Barbro Falck, Gun Alstrom and Bunilla Borgstrom.

They are all in their thirties, except Gunilla, who is 18. For 6 months they have spent their spare time working on the popular campaign against nuclear power. Since early this morning, taking turns with other opponents, they have been distributing ballots outside the polling place in Brovang school, and it has been a long day.

The election festivities will be somewhat subdued.

When Lars Orup's sad face appears on the TV screen, they already know deep down that the race is over. No one seriously dared to believe in a victory for the opposition since the Social Democrats and the Liberals took their own position on the issue of nuclear power. It was clear that it was going to be partly loyalty as a matter of conscience.

Staffan said:

"Line three was hurt mostly by party politics. We actually tried very hard to keep party politics out of the campaign. Most of the people involved in the popular campaign did not have any experience in political work."

"It is embarrassing that line two was so widely supported," said Gunnar. "People know less about nuclear power now than before because line two intentionally helped confuse them. That was part of their strategy. The more muddled they made the issue, the more inclined people would be to follow the party line. That was definitely so."

An atmosphere of resignation, but not abandonment. The opposition had won the first round, but the match was not over.

"We will come back," said Gunnar, and he seemed a little more cheerful now. "We will now concentrate our efforts on line two. We will make sure they actually carry out the plans to put an end to nuclear power."

"Have you already planned your future strategy?"

"We have pushed that in order to be ready for the final spurt. There will be a national meeting in a few days and various support groups will get together in Botkyrke to discuss the future."

Gunnar said that the opposition to nuclear power is so important that it simply must be continued. "We must continue to influence the politicians."

"And all who stood up and fought, they are not just going to let their involvement go there..."

The future does not seem so dark any more, in spite of everything. Staffan, a teacher, told about a vote he had taken among students which clearly favored line three.

"Actually, anyone 15 years of age and older should have been allowed to vote on the referendum," he said. "They are just as well informed as the adults, and this is also of concern to them.

"It could be that line two won a pyrrhic victory. It is quite obvious that this alternative lacks the support of youth. In the long term it could endanger the Social Democrats."

"This victory could well mean a loss for the Social Democrats and the Liberals in the long term," said Gunnar. "Many Social Democrats and Liberals saw through the act, and that could have its consequences."

There are a few disappointed Social Democrats within this group, like Susanna (who does not want to give her last name), for example, She is a member of the Social Democratic Party, but wants to leave the party as soon as possible.

"The party failed the people when it took a position between 'yes' and 'no,'" she said. "I believe many Left-Wing Communists were placed in a difficult position--loyalty to the party or to their own conviction? That became the question. And, in the general 'line two hysteria,' it soon became clear that you had to be made of tough timber to vote for line three as a Social Democrat."

Lars Siggelin, mechanical engineer and a member of the Swedish Foremen's Union (SALF), is disappointed with his party and his union:

"It was disgusting how the union supported line two on behalf of everybody. I very nearly left the union. It is quite obvious that I cannot continue to vote for the Social Democrats."

Susanna and Lars are also disappointed in their party leader, Olof Palme.

"He dismissed those of us who fought for line three as 'guitar players' and as 'people who never stood on a workshop floor.' His contempt will be harmful to the party, we are convinced of that."

8952
CSO: 3109

COMMENTATOR SUGGESTS POST NUCLEAR VOTE POLITICAL NECESSITIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Apr 80 p 6

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] By means of the popular vote, the Swedish people clearly expressed the desire for no more than 12 nuclear powerplants, followed by liquidation "within reason." The result by and large means a return to the old. In an case, there has been no major change since the Ullsten Liberal-Party government submitted its energy-policy proposal, which called for a limit of 12 reactors, just prior to the Harrisburg accident.

Has the popular vote changed the political outlook for the 1980's?

That question is difficult to answer. We do not know how the political parties will respond to the new situation. Furthermore, the 1980's, with their uncertain economic and social conditions, will make new demands on the politicians.

However, a couple of things are clear. After a 4 to 5-year nuclear-power struggle, Falldin-Werner clearly lost their case, but gained voters through line three.

The opposite situation is true for line two. Palme, and especially Ullsten, won their case, but both the Social Democrats and the Liberals lost many voters in comparison with the 1979 election.

Conservatives, Liberals, Social Democrats Fell Back

Roughly figured, the Conservatives lost 3 percent of the voters compared with the 1979 election, the Liberals-Social Democrats a scant 20 percent, while Falldin-Werner gained 8 percent of the voters. At the same time, voter participation was 75 percent, compared with 90 percent in the last election.

Where do the non-voting 15 percent actually belong?

Let us say that a couple of percent of the Conservatives voted for line three, primarily women.

Prior to the referendum vote, opinion polls indicated that one third of the Liberals supported line three, let us say two to three percent.

That means that altogether four to five percent of the Liberals and Social Democrats supported line three.

Since Falldin-Werner gained eight percent of the voters, three to four percent of the Social Democrats must have supported line three.

Non-Voting Social Democrats?

In order to complete the equation, we might conclude that a major share of the non-voting 15 percent must be Social Democrats who did not approve of either lines two or three or who rather protested the idea of putting nuclear power to a vote.

In any case, as a matter of mathematical necessity, 10 to 15 percent of the non-voters must belong to the Social Democratic base.

Regionally, the situation could be somewhat different from that of the country as a whole.

Line three obviously had greater support in big-city areas than in the country as a whole and line one received more votes than line two in the bigger cities. This situation undoubtedly reflects the Conservative strength in big-city areas.

Line three also got considerable support in the Free-Church districts and in Norrland, while line two did well in the industrial areas in central Sweden.

Work Determining Factor

The conflict between those who work in industry and those whose positions are rendered secure with tax money is obviously reflected in the popular vote.

The question is how long it will take before the voters get the connection. The public sector can only continue to grow, provided that industry can manage to finance Sweden's importation of oil, among other things.

What will happen now?

The most immediate result of the popular vote will be that Falldin one day will ban the loading of nuclear powerplants because conditions have not been met and the next day will approve the loading because conditions have been met.

Voters will have to decide how they wish to judge this faithlessness at the next election.

In 1976, it would have been possible to halt the development of nuclear power with 10 nuclear powerplants, but Falldin could not do that following his categorical statements. In 1979, we could have stopped with 11 nuclear powerplants, but Palme-Bohman did not want that.

Now it is, and remains, "a maximum of 12" nuclear powerplants. And the important question now is how to handle the liquidation of nuclear powerplants and how to develop alternative sources of energy.

Before Next Election

Statements from the Social Democrats are unambiguous. It is important to make the liquidation of nuclear power credible in order to effect reconciliation between the supporters of lines two and three as well as the non-voters before the next election.

One possibility is to settle with the Falldin government how to go about such liquidation and how to develop alternative sources of energy. That means an energy minister must be appointed from the supporters of line two. A nuclear-power agreement between Falldin, Palme and Ullsten as well as nuclear-power hawk Bohman should settle the issue as far as the election is concerned and make it easier for these parties.

No one knows at this time whether that will be possible.

The other alternative would be for Falldin to refuse to appoint an energy minister from among the supporters of line two.

In that case, there would be no advance agreement between Social Democrats and the government, but an all out battle with respect to the liquidation of nuclear power.

That means that Palme, in order to hold together his supporters of lines two and three as well as the non-voters, would have to outbid Falldin on the issue of liquidation. That in turn would mean chaos in parliament because Ullsten would not be outdone by Palme on the issue of liquidation and Falldin would not be outdone by line two.

STUDY ANALYSES NUCLEAR REFERENDUM VOTE MEANING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Apr 80 p 2

[Reportage by Torsten Osterman and Roger Bernow]

[Text] In response to an assignment by DAGENS NYHETER, Torsten Osterman and Roger Bernow with the Research Group for Social and Informational Studies (FSI) here submit a resume of the significance of the popular vote. Together with sociologist Anders Wikman, they have annually polled and interviewed the Swedish population on the issue of energy since the beginning of the oil crisis in 1973.

It is relatively well known today how different groups of people stand on the issue of nuclear power--we often find greater opposition to nuclear power among women than men, among youth and the very old than other age groups, among tenants than homeowners, etc. What is probably less well known is that these differences are often rather insignificant.

Differences of opinion about nuclear power can also be attributed to a number of general social-political evaluations--nuclear-power supporters are more concerned about prosperity, less concerned about international solidarity and foreign problems, have greater confidence in the future and consider environmental issues as well as the problem of future energy supplies to be comparatively less important. To a greater or lesser degree, these value differences have largely existed since the 1973-74 oil crisis. Curiously, we can also mention that nuclear-power opponents have lowered their home temperatures by a few degrees for a number of years and have generally been more determined to conserve energy than the rest of the population.

These value differences are interesting in many respects, but should not be exaggerated--they do not agree sufficiently with other differences about the issue of nuclear power, even though the tendencies are obvious.

"Social Machine"

To say that the opposition to nuclear power somehow symbolizes the technical society, our willfulness or the "social-machine" concept is to repeat a commonly used expression which is acutally not consistent with reality. These critical attitudes toward society are indeed greater among nuclear opponents but are also widespread among the supporters of nuclear power.

The really significant distinctions appear when we come to an understanding of facts--it is here that we can also discern clear outlines for an "explanation" of the line of demarcation with respect to the nuclear-power issue.

Roughly summarized, voters seem to have been in agreement on the directional consequences of a "yes"or a "no" on the referendum. All opinion groups seemed inclined to believe that Sweden's economy would be harmed more by a "no" than a "yes," that a "no" would mean greater dependence on oil than a "yes," etc. However, those who believe there are great risks associated with nuclear power were inclined to choose the certain negative consequences of nuclear-power liquidation.

By constructing a mathematical-statistical model, we find that variations in the understanding of facts most of the differences of opinion among voters as to whether or not to have nuclear power. Hence, we can now draw the conclusion that it was voters' understanding of the facts that determined the popular vote.

This makes voter knowledge one of the main issues in the evaluation of the population vote. Here, it should be said that we--like most other evaluators who have access to our material--generally judge the level of knowledge as "good," considering the body of voters as a whole. We have made great efforts to measure public knowledge of issues with respect to energy since 1973. During the 1973-74 oil crisis, we found that public knowledge of the energy situation rose considerably. Since then there has been no further improvement in public knowledge as far as we can judge.

The campaign helped raise the level of consciousness generally and voters undoubtedly took note of much of what was said and thought in the debate, who took what lead here and there and who wished to assert this or that. But the fact is there was no improvement in basic knowledge, according to our measurements--using more than 50 questions--between October 1979 and March 1980.

Key Areas

This is noteworthy. No less striking is the fact that the areas about which we found the least knowledge happened to be some of the key areas in the popular campaign. "Yes"-proponents obviously managed to exaggerate the

importance of nuclear power with respect to our dependence on oil. The more exaggerated the voter's opinion on this point, the greater the importance of oil-dependence on his/her position. We figure that at most one in 10 voters had a fairly accurate view of nuclear power's influence on oil dependence in Sweden. "No"-proponents obviously failed to provide this information--they, instead, spread other exaggerations.

It is hard not to suspect that a misunderstanding of this kind could at least have been counteracted by the traditional role of politicians in a campaign. The abundant factual information which is normally presented by different campaign groups could thus have been lost to the general public, which instead was exposed to exaggerated blackmail and political frontal attacks. Such campaign elements are very newsworthy and easily understood by both journalists and the public, which probably helped give them broad coverage and big headlines. A more competent and independent journalism could have provided greater moderation in the argument, even if it meant smaller headlines.

It is also possible that the continued trend toward declining confidence in politicians since the sixties provides a partial explanation of the heavy accent on the final period of the campaign. We found results of this in another connection lately. A large majority of voters holds views which express a strong so-called contempt for politicians. The public debate gave us reason to view this with greater seriousness and interest than before.

Party Politics

In general, the role of party politics during the election campaign and prior to the referendum vote should be interpreted with care. On the one hand, it seems obvious that voters largely took a position on nuclear power for reasons other than on the basis of their political party sympathies. On the other hand, it is also clear that line two primarily gained support on the basis of purely political party sympathies. These voter groups, more often than others, had relatively little interest in nuclear-power issues, but more and more followed party lines during the final period of the campaign. Thus, the mobilization along party lines for line two appear conspicuous. Yet, we can reasonably say that line two, in particular, got the least support from party voters. Line three seems to have fared best in that respect. We estimate that every fourth supporter of line three actively participated in the campaign--if nothing else but to wear a campaign button. Comparable figures for line two show that one in 30, or three percent of its voters were involved in the campaign. The same was true of voter participation in study courses, study circles and the like as well as reading special literature--line three voters show completely superior activity.

The activity among line three voters is impressive, but seems to have been largely inward directed, i.e. primarily designed to activate relatively sure "no" voters prior to the campaign. On the other hand, the "no" campaign did not succeed in making any significant gains among other groups. Opinion has swung more and more in favor of nuclear power and, in spite of the fact that a majority of voters was clearly opposed to nuclear power as late as a week before the referendum vote, opponents were not able to capitalize on that when it came to an actual vote.

Among those who favored further development of nuclear power, all voted for lines one or two, but these lines also won the support of some who say they are against further development. The larger group--about 30 percent--which says it is undecided about further development of nuclear power, voted "yes" four times more often than "no." That can be explained this way: Partly that a few of these undecided voters did not understand line two as being in favor of development, partly that up to half of those who voted for line two report that the deciding factor on their part was that line two actually promises liquidation of nuclear power in the long term.

This is something to bear in mind as we observe politicians' actions in the near future. If the popular vote yields negative results with respect to the parties' ability to draw votes in the future, the opposition to nuclear power will provide the greatest risk. The nuclear-power issue did not draw as many voters as do traditional political party elections--this is reflected in many ways in answers to our questions--but it did draw many who previously were little affected by politics.

Almost half of the body of voters states that the nuclear-power issue is one of the most important, or absolutely the most important, political issue in their lives. If the popular vote had been taken among this large minority of the population, line three would have won by about 60 percent of the votes, while the other lines together would have shared a maximum of 40 percent. The ability of the nuclear-power issue to influence future voter behavior will to a large extent depend upon "no"-sympathizers' reactions to politics. Others pay considerably less attention to what happens in the area of energy policy.

It should also be emphasized that perhaps the most sensitive issue as far as all voter groups are concerned, and thus politicians, is that the complicated tactical turns with respect to having or not having nuclear power must now come to an end.

It has probably eroded the public's confidence in politicians and, without this confidence, no energy policy whatsoever can be meaningful in the long term.

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FALLDIN, STRANG DISCUSS NUCLEAR REFERENDUM OUTCOME

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 80 p 5

[Reportage by Kae Eneberg]

> [Excerpts] "The government has not issued any dictate in its movement toward agreement. Terms with respect to a wage ceiling, among other things, in exchange for the government package with rent and price ceilings are not conditions imposed by the government. These conditions are based on crass reality if we are to manage our budget deficit."

That message was delivered by Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin in a rainy and hazy Flen Saturday. It was his first appearance following the popular vote, and the audience consisted of 400 Sormland party representatives who had gathered for an annual rally in Stenhammer school.

If the Center leader deep down felt insecure about his popularity following the election defeat, the feeling was dispersed as he entered the packed auditorium, for there seemed to be overwhelming enthusiasm and trust among the party representatives, and they received him warmly with repeated applause and bouquets of flowers.

Obviously Pleased

And an obviously pleased prime minister later stood among all Center symbols, the green clover, and handed out pins to deserving party workers before he spoke to and answered questions from troubled Center Party members, who, among other things, wondered how to stem the Conservatives.

"The popular vote was no defeat! It was a victory for the Center Party and its ideas." This became the theme in the almost 1-hour long tender which the Center leader offered the party representatives. Another was "It is not the Center Party that should be concerned about the popular vote, but the Social Democrats, since many Social Democrats voted for line three."

"I cannot ignore the fact that the Social Democrats' bemoaning the idea that the Center Party will now carry out the energy policy decided by the people is only designed to cover up the problems in its own party," explained Thorbjorn Falldin.

The Center leader pointed out that many Social Democrats today oppose the party's official position on energy.

"Listen Palme"

"Palme and other party leaders should listen to the many party members who urge reflection."

The fact that the popular vote was a victory for the Center Party, in spite of the defeat of line three, (nothing was said about the Left-Wing Communists) was formulated by the Center leader thusly:

"When the Center Party initiated the debate to stop nuclear power in 1973 no one believed it would be possible. But that stoppage is now a fact. Sweden is the first nation in the world to decide on the liquidation of nuclear power.

Liquidation became an honorable word in the popular campaign. Everybody wished to liquidate nuclear power. It was different when we began to talk liquidation 2 years ago and were met with jeers.

Falldin explained "No one can rob us of the fact the election was a victory in the sense that the road ahead is no longer a march toward a nuclear-power community. Instead, we are now marching away from a nuclear-power community."

Falldin promised that the Center Party's role in government would not be to make sure we actually get the promised liquidation. "The results of the popular vote is important to the Center Party," he asserted several times.

Falldin doubted that other parties felt the same way.

"No Dictate"

"As we now move forward and formulate practical policies in this important area, we shall see what their attractive figures are actually worth in practice."

With respect to the government package, its price and rent ceilings and base profits, Falldin explained that this cannot be considered a government dictate. "The government did not impose the conditions of a wage ceiling. These conditions are based on reality. We must overcome our deficit, and do so before a solidarity by all parties is required."

"The 'package' bears the Center stamp," said Falldin in calm response to a rally delegate who was concerned about the Conservatives' influence and "initiative."

In a local press conference prior to the address, Falldin declared that the package was designed to facilitate movement toward an agreement and that the parties concerned were free to reject it and find other solutions.

Strang in Uppsala

The government's conditions to facilitate a movement toward agreement was the subject of Social Democratic speeches preceding party district congresses at the end of the week. Former finance minister Gunnar Strang visited Uppsala and delivered a brief speech on the art of government. First he lectured the non-socialist parties:

"We are not used to negotiating under the threat of a school-master's point in this country," he said.

As an experienced trade union man, he later told how things should be done according to old traditions in this country.

"Political interventions should be made in time for union parties to take them into consideration when they discuss and establish their proposals for agreement. Later, the negotiation machinery will take its course. After that, we just await the result of the negotiations. It is only when these fail and we end up with a dramatized situation that the government can acceptably renew its activity," Strang solaced.

While Social Democrats and Liberals talked about the economy and wages, the Center Party continued the nuclear-power debate and discussed the popular vote. (See above report on Prime Minister Falldin). The parliamentary Center-group chairman, Claes Elmstedt, was an exception as he saw the government's economic program moving toward agreement as "a challenge to the entire Swedish society."

"The Swedish model is built on the principle that no one forces demands based on simple and unrealistic hopes," he said in Eslov.

Elmstedt stressed that the basic solidarity of our society will not be tested.

He later regretted the difficult situation for farmers under the pressure of high interest rates.

"Their situation can only be improved by measures which in the long run, reduce the interest burden on agriculture," said Elmstedt.

"Drastic measures are required to restore balance in the economy. The very large budget deficit, which was necessary in order to safeguard jobs during some difficult years, must now be reduced," said Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten in Tallberg Saturday.

"With too much money in circulation, prices are running out of control. That is precisely what has created the problems in the labor market.

For this reason the government has submitted a package that should provide the basis for an agreement, which should largely preserve present wage levels. We intend to hold prices, rent and taxes in check and reduce the tax on the average income.

It is by no means a matter of forcing the parties to agree, but rather to create conditions for an economic development that will be favorable to all."

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FALLDIN AT CENTER PARTY MEETING: NUCLEAR DECISION 'RESPECTED'

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Apr 80 p 6

[Reportage by Dick Ljungberg]

> [Text] "The Center Party will respect the popular vote and, according to democratic principles, carry out an energy policy supported by the majority. That was clearly agreed upon when the three-party government was established. All speculations to the contrary should thus be ignored."

Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin made that statement as he met with the party confidence council, the parliamentary group and party representatives in Medborgarhuset in Stockholm on Monday. The confidence council, whose members come from all parts of the country, is the highest decision-making body within the party.

At a press conference following the meeting, Falldin said he was very pleased with the day-long discussion. The 250 Center-Party representatives "completely and fully" supported the action guidelines drawn up by the party leadership. The primary objective is to liquidate nuclear power as quickly as possible through intensive efforts with respect to conservative and alternative sources of energy.

The message at this meeting was that the popular vote was a victory for the idea of liquidation. "But we will have to wait and see what the promises in lines one and two are worth," warned Falldin.

"We Can Influence"

Falldin hoped that many of those who had been involved in the popular campaign would now choose to continue their work within the Center Party. "But the Left-Wing Communist Party (VPK) leader Lars Werner has said that VPK is now the only party continuing the fight against nuclear power."

"I do not believe Lars Werner can ignore the fact that the Center Party's chances of influencing this development are much greater than those of VPK," answered Falldin. "There are people who believe, falsely I think, that a socialistic society can best handle the liquidation. But there are no examples of this and the popular vote did not change the Center Party's view on nuclear power."

During the closed meeting of the Center Party representatives, there were some verbal attacks on the Conservatives, but they also stressed that it is important that the Center Party remain in the government.

"No one in the Center Party is happy about the Conservatives' growth, but no one believes that this growth will make itself felt in government policies," said Falldin.

"Same Purport"

Falldin said Thursday that the economic program presented by the government to facilitate a movement toward agreement could only be carried out provided the parties agree "on largely unaltered conditions." He did not want to specify the "meaning of largely," but it was interpreted by the parties as a ceiling on wages.

Budget Minister Ingemar Mundebo said Saturday that the government's proposal leaves some room for wage increases, but that the price ceiling cannot function if the wage increases are too big.

"I have no further comment on the formulation I submitted on Saturday," said Falldin. "Mundebo has used another formulation, but I believe the purport is the same as mine."

In his address to Center Party representatives, Falldin said that organizations have the freedom to choose the action guidelines submitted by the government or to opt for something else. But he believed that in practice it would not be easy to find better or simpler solutions than those submitted by the government.

"But the responsibility does not only rest with the negotiators," he said.

"Unrealistic"

"The political opposition and others also have a responsibility not to spread unrealistic ideas about what can possibly be achieved in today's international economic situation," said Falldin.

"The government package cannot solve all economic problems. Industrial investments and the possibility of attracting capital are key issues. The government will have a chance to come back to these problems in a so-called supplementary proposal at the end of April."

This is a harsh pitch, in spite of the fact I am convinved that the 1980's need not be "the ghastly 80's," said Falldin. "But the important thing is that we are prepared to tackle the problems immediately."

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FÄLLDIN DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC MOVES AHEAD

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Apr 80 p 4

[Report of an interview with Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin by Elisabeth Crona and Claes-Göran Kjellander]

[Text] A big omnibus economy package is coming in the fall. That information is provided by Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He emphasizes that it will be a complete package: "Coherence must be considered."

"The various measures should be presented together as far as possible."

Work on the new economy package is already going full speed ahead. Thorbjörn Fälldin also believes that the political soil is good right now for getting understanding of the need to economize:

"I have encountered growing understanding among the Swedish people of the fact that we must stop and fit into our clothes instead of letting them out all the time," he says.

[Question] Then isn't it important to get ahead quickly with the economy package?

Thorbjörn Fälldin shakes his head at that, and also at the question of whether he is prepared to risk a vote of confidence on a long list of economy measures.

"That is starting at the wrong end," he answers. "We in the Center Party want at least to have a regular proceeding in the party Riksdag group first.

Discussion Internally

"We must debate internally and go through the economy measures. We are already in full swing with that."

But the prime minister will not wait until the government's budget bill in January.

"It is a question of taking hold of this situation before we get into a real emergency," he says.

He will not go into specific parts of the package. With regard to its size he says, "Nine billion is not a figure that has been approved in government circles."

Not Hit the Exposed

Concerning the content, Thorbjörn Fälldin says only, "It must be acceptable from the point of view of distribution policy. It must not hit those who are most exposed."

That point of departure is also the reason that Thorbjörn Fälldin wants to have a unified package. The distribution policy effects must be clear. If a group is hit by one measure it can be compensated by another proposal that is put forward at the same time. If the reduction comes first a political deadlock can easily develop. That is why getting the whole thing is so important, the prime minister says.

It may still be hard to pilot a big economy package through with a one-vote majority in the Riksdag. Thorbjörn Fälldin hopes that "the opposition will show responsibility."

He believes that the Social Democratic grassroots will demand that their leaders take responsibility for the economic situation. "The realization that we must come to a stop will communicate itself upward through the political hierarchy," he expects.

Reduced Imports

"The Social Democrats also say that the deficit is too big. If they will not make active contributions to solutions, the moment of truth will come when they have to take a position on our proposals.

"We have yet to see any interest on their part at all in discussing economy measures. But I am convinced that we shall not have to wait the whole term to hear their 'nay.'"

Sweden's economic situation needs more than economy, however. We must also reduce our imports and increase our production and exports, Fälldin emphasizes.

"We must show great resoluteness when it comes to developing domestic energy production. That will reduce our oil bill at the same time that we get dramatic effects on the domestic economy and employment."

But we must not forget that the starting position in Sweden is good, with high average income, high service, low unemployment, and effective production apparatus:

"If we are serious when we say we will work for a new economic world order, we must also accept the fact that it will hit parts of our own export industry, for example shipyards.

In the Long Run

"We must be ready to take the adjustment. Besides, it will also involve an advantage for us in the long run, with increased purchasing power and increased demand for our goods."

Thorbjörn Fälldin has great understanding of the fact that it seems to people in the forest districts that the shipyard towns get large subsidies in proportion to the numbers involved:

"The physical situation is that we just cannot cast thousands of people out on the street, with no jobs. It was a hard decision when we tried to make the period of adjustment as short as possible." On the main question, that employment shall be provided where the labor force is, Thorbjörn Fälldin is "personally unshakable":

"Our proposal for a temporary contribution to construction workers was based on the fact that the government and the Riksdag had gotten so much construction under way in Stockholm that we found we were partly responsible for a shortage of construction workers for other planned projects."

No Room

The prime minister considers that wage increases now exceed what room there is available for private and public consumption. That worries him, although it is not just wages but the sum of the cost-raising factors that determines how much we here in Sweden will see of the international inflation.

Nobody can make out a case today that there is room for tax relief, according to Thorbjörn Fälldin. Before the next round of wage agreements he wants to have discussions in good time, preferably with the opposition at the table:

"We will look into how we can initiate discussions from the government's side. It will not be a matter of any big lead in the initial stage, but more of exploratory talks. But the government must assume a responsibility of its own, and not be tied up by the demands of the parties [labor and capital].

"We have not only the right but the obligation to act when the country's economy demands it. And when the demands by the parties on the job market are as far apart as was the case last year, a government must be prepared to present a proposal over the heads of the parties."

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INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT STRIVE TO ADJUST TO TIGHT ECONOMY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8, 15 Apr 80

[Two part article by Hannu Leinonen and Hannu Olkinuora]

[8 Apr 80, p 29]

[Text] "Sweden Becoming Middle-Weight"

The Swedish People's Home--Folkhemmet--has been clearly operating above its means in recent years. Social reforms and employment have been bought with borrowed funds.

This is a new situation for the People's Home wards. The Swedes are not used to giving up on the continuing growth of their living standard, let alone giving up on the present one.

The makers of economic policy are now trying to convince the welfare state citizens that the mere maintenance of the present social security will mean that something else has to be given up.

Presently, wages are being discussed, and that touches everyone. In income policy, the Swedes have dug out their battle axes which are traditionally kept buried.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT will be investigating the economic vistas of the neighbor country in a two-part report. Today [8 Apr], the present economic situation will be investigated: national economy, the thoughts of political economists, and the seeming dead end in the income policies. A week from now, means of livelihood, difficulties in maintaining employment, and industrial relations will be discussed.

Sweden the welfare state has come to face a turning point many other western industrial countries have faced. It is feared that economic growth is failing and that the country has to be looking for new roles in the international division of labor.

Halting of taken-for-granted economic growth, a high level of comfort reached partly by borrowed funds, a partially antiquated industrial structure, and a burden of debt made worse by inflation--all come together to create a bad tangle which, according to economic experts, might cause the fall of Sweden from a top place among the industrial nations to a second-rate one.

The past two years in Sweden have shown recovery from recession with magnificent figures to show. The total production rose last year by 4.1 percent and the country is clearly experiencing the peak of the boom. However, it is feared that the turning point is at hand, and it is making both the industrialists and the workers frown. Despite sectorial differences, Swedish industry as a whole has been doing well in recent years. It has even been possible to keep the rate of inflation fairly reasonable. This all has resulted in creating a pie the division of which is now causing a fat quarrel.

Two Interpretations of the State of Economy

Behind the coming to a never-to-be-forgotten crisis point of the Swedish labor market situation are two different interpretations of the country's economic potential.

The interpretation based on the gloomy international forecasts is that Sweden will have to bring itself to accept a much slower growth rate than before. The industry itself is betting on a continued growth of only a couple of percentage points a year, if even that. Last year, industrial production went up by 6.1 percent. For this year, the Swedish budgetary forecast still indicates a 4.7 percent growth of production. The industry is forecasting a growth of 2.5 percent for the Gross National Product. Last year, GNP went up by 4 percent.

From the point of view of labor, growth will not necessarily come to a halt if Sweden's industrial problems can be handled better than at present. However, not even labor is expecting all that much of the future.

The two basic questions in the Swedish national economy in the recent past have been the rapidly rising cost of oil and the partially antiquated industrial structure.

The rising cost of oil is rapidly increasing Sweden's foreign trade deficit, and there is growing concern about the refunding of the deficit. Last year's deficit went up to 1.8 billion kronor and this year the deficit is expected to go up to 3.7 billion kronor.

The rapidly expanded public sector has also become a topic of debate and investigation; the financing of the public sector devours an extremely big part of the total production. Over 70 percent of jobs are in different areas of the public sector that includes medical and social care which have been swelling enormously in recent years.

Public services are costly. Sweden's taxation level has risen already to 53 percent when it is still 40 percent in Finland.

The economic boom period has also greatly accelerated the rate of inflation. In January, consumer prices were 12.6 percent higher than the previous year, and the trend appears to be only intensifying. Inflation is expected to be at its highest in Sweden next fall, unless the price and wage freezes declared by the government will start biting more effectively.

Enormous State Indebtedness

The modest growth forecasts and balance of payments deficit that is expanding with the import oil have prompted the Swedes to express horror at the enormously expanded foreign debt, the repayment of which appears impossible.

The Swedish government debt is 55 million kronor, which amounts to over a quarter of the final total of this year's budget. The moneys have gone mainly to managing employment and paying for the public services.

It has been possible in Sweden to keep open unemployment at about 2 percent by governmental subsidies. If workers in retraining and those employed in public works projects are taken into account, the total unemployment rises to 6 percent, which means there are 240,000 people without jobs.

According to industry, intensive unemployment benefit system together with other means of social assistance have caused a new problem to develop. It is no longer possible to get labor to move in the desired way within the country from one place or field to another.

Investment Readiness Fell to Zero

As early as during the recession peak of the mid-1970's, there was discussion both in Sweden and in Finland over changes in the industrial structure.

During the recession years, the Swedish industry's willingness to invest fell away to nothing, which portended no good for the structural changes.

According to a researcher of the Industrial Research Institute of Sweden, docent Bo Carlsson, the decline in investments that started in 1976 was reversed only last year. The productivity of capital has fallen to the 1974 level. According to Carlsson, there is no prospect of growing willingness to invest. In the past 2 years, it has been more profitable to buy government bonds than to invest in industry.

Labor organizations have been eagerly criticizing both the lack of investment activity and the owners of business enterprises for growing their profits. Big enterprises especially have raised their dividends enormously as their profits have increased.

Shipyard Subsidies to Be Cut in Half

The traditionally strong fields of the country are now in the worst difficulties. Best known are the difficulties of the shipyards. It is expected that there is going to be a significant decrease in ship building in the immediate future.

Ever since the shipyards were nationalized last year, ways have been sought to encourage the ship building industry which is in difficulties. It now appears that the government intends to chop a half off from the subsidy that Svenska Varv shipyard company is requesting. According to information acquired by VECKANS AFFAR paper, Svenska Varv is going to be granted only 3.2 billion kronor for raising its capital stock instead of the 6.5 billion kronor demanded by the company.

Also nearly all the sectors where Sweden's own raw materials are being refined are battling alongside the shipyards. Expenses have risen too high for instance in the iron and steel industries. A limit is also being approached in forest industry, which had been maintaining a healthy competitiveness.

However, even in the crisis sectors, not everyone is doing badly, since the industrial giants are growing just fine regardless of the others' problems.

The Solution: Expanding Export Industry

In Sweden nearly everyone agrees that export is the only solution to the present problems. Industry is in fact now feverishly seeking for areas which will make it possible to keep up with the game. Since expenses have risen sky-high, the solution has been found in adding capital and technical knowhow to the growing sectors.

Swedish exports grew last year by 11.1 percent while the corresponding Finnish figure was 23 percent. It is forecast that Sweden next year will only reach 8.4 percentage growth in exports.

Several investigations of Swedish primary industry have shown that the Swedish economy will be salvaged by strong machine industry and powerfully growing chemical industry. The ability of machine industry to cope with difficulties is clearly manifested by the 79 percentage point growth the machine industry companies in the stock exchange recorded last year.

Machine manufacturers and chemical industry however do not bear the whole export burden, but it is necessary to widen the industrial base quickly. In recent years, for instance, medical manufacturing has indeed expanded friskily in Sweden.

Industrial Structure Dependent on Financing

There has been much debate in Sweden on financing the industrial structure changes. According to Bo Carlsson, the industry should itself find the new directions on the basis of the clues the markets give. According to him, the government's hefty investments in some areas bring along also great risks. Carlsson believes it is a cause for concern that the market prices not determine only a third of the economy.

Sven-Eric Ohdner of LO [Landsorganisation], the organization equivalent to the Finnish SAK [Federation of Labor Unions] is of the opposite opinion. According to him, the state has to participate in industrial policy more actively. More investigation of the problems has to be conducted with state funds. A separate industrial policy fund should also be established by the state through which it would be possible to finance new profitable investments.

According to Ohdner, the employee funds advocated by LO could be one solution to the structure problems. At least they would encourage investment willingness, says Ohdner.

Neighbor Learning to Cope with Scarcity

Swedish politicians have long been in agreement on what the economic state of the country is. The differences of opinion between the bourgeois government and the Social Democrats are found only in disagreement over details of the remedies. In the government, the problem is seen mainly as a power struggle between ministries, and this reflects well the entire nation's attitude: no one would want to surrender anything of their own territory, reducing one's high standard of living is an alien concept for the Swedes.

"There are no differences of opinion in interpretation of the problems. But how to make the Swedes to comprehend that something has to be given up. They all have everything so devilishly well." The government official thinks aloud as he ponders the Stockholm inhabitants' welfare from the top floor window in the highest quarters of the government machinery.

The central federation of Swedish employers, SAF [Svenska Arbetsgivar-forbund] threatens 700,000 workers with a one-week lockout. The lockout, due to start April 10, is a counterattack to the LO-organized refusal to work overtime after income bargaining reached an impasse.

The income policy package from the government that included price, wage and rental freezes was not received very enthusiastically by the employee organizations. As the employers hold doggedly onto their zero offer, and the LO is demanding from 11 to 12 percent wage increase, the Swedish labor market has drifted into the worst situation since the 1909 general strike.

The situation is still very new for the Swedes. During the long period with the Social Democrats in office, the LO/Government contact was without a hitch. After the three bourgeois parties came to power in 1976, reasonable wage agreements were possible to make with the help of devaluation, for example. There has been no need so far to interfere with the sacrosanct collective bargaining mechanism.

The Swedes see the recent development of the negotiations into an open battle as a political matter. The employers side with Finance Minister Gosta Bohman from the Coalition Party, and the LO battle is a battle over the Social Democrats' economic policy.

Adding its own bit of salt in the soup is the economic policy of the government of the Center, Folk Party and the Coalition Party dir ed by Thorbjorn Falldin, which even industry, not to speak of the opposit , accuses of having no clear line and for applying a loose grip.

No Money for Wage Increases

The staff of Economy Minister Gosta Bohman provides the visitor with precise figures on how impossible it is to increase private consumption this year any more. When the budget was being compiled for the budgetary year starting in July, the growth of the gross national product was calculated as 3.6 percent. By now, the goal already has been reduced to 2-2.5 percent.

"The private sector is going to be left with nothing as 2.7 percent of the GNP growth is going to be already eaten up by the price of oil, stockpiling (reduction of stocks is no more possible), growth of public expenditure and investments," Bohman's assistant calculates.

The bourgeois government accepts no guilt for the going astray of the economic development of the late 1970's. "It all started with the 1973 oil crisis. When the rest of the world was exercising restraint in economic policy, Sweden was stimulating hers. The wage increases of 1975 and 1976 and the expanding of the public sector created an impossible situation, according to the Ministry of Finance.

Referendum Stimulating Investments

The government is now wanting to create opportunities for investing and raising productivity. It is believed that the referendum which came out in favor of nuclear power is in part going to stimulate businesses' investment readiness. State Finance Minister Ingemar Mundebo says he understands those enterpreneurs who are reluctant to invest in a society where the use of ready-made investments worth 30 million kronor is being questioned. In Mundebo's opinion, the biggest reason for the investment recession is however the poor productivity.

All over Sweden it is claimed that the economic departments of enterprises have been their most profitable units. The best results have been reached by putting the money outside the businesses themselves.

The government is trying to reach economic balance during the early 1980's. The government believes this will be possible. It is already quite clear that maintenance of production by crisis industry, which reached a peak in 1978, is dissipating.

Easy Credit a Problem

Director of the state's economic trend institute, Lars Lindberger says: "Securing loans has not been Sweden's problem but rather than it has been too easy to acquire loans."

"As the actual interest rate for these debts is growing to nearly 5 percent, we will end up paying much more than we were counting on," Lindberger says.

"To attain balanced development, we have to bring up productivity of enterprises. In the long run, this can be done with the help of industrial politics and exchange rates. Of course it is possible to sail along a bit by the help of industry," Lindberger states.

"Unfortunately the present vistas leave us with nothing much in the way of possibilities for raising actual income."

Artificial Growth

Ragnar Bentzel, political economy professor in Uppsala University, reads imprecations to those who are responsible for the Swedish economic policy. "The direction at the moment certainly does not promise a balanced budget. The level of consumption has been kept high with the aid of two whippersnapper tricks: borrowing from abroad and reducing investments. The share of consumption of the gross national product has grown all too great to allow us to even speak of balanced growth."

According to Bentzel, even a 1 percent growth in private consumption will delay attainment of balance to as late as 1990, and 2 percent growth correspondingly to the end of the century. Without covering for consumption, a yearly economic growth rate of 2.5 percent will bring balance to the Swedish economy only in 6-7 years.

Devaluation an Alternative

Bentzel mentions that Swedish industrial production started to go downhill in 1975 and continued downhill for 4 years in a row. This has not happened during the industrial age even in the war years.

"Budgetary deficit, deficit in the balance of payments, inflation and unemployment have one common denominator: the transformation of economic life into a great big public service institution."

According to professor Bentzel, wage agreements that weaken competitive strength cause inevitably a need to devaluate the krona immediately.

Government Looked Over Investments

The Social Democrats sitting in opposition consider that the most severe sin committed by the present bourgeois government was to forget investment activity. The leader of the Social Democrats, economy expert Carl-Johan Aberg, blames the government and business enterpriese for neglecting to employ society's strong support on investments. Aberg, who came to opposition politics from the state Finance Ministry is now working on the last alternative budget proposals before transferring to the chief editorship in AFTONBLADET owned by the LO.

"Industry's problem is not at all high wage expenses but the wrong structure. Swedish shipyards used to weld plates for big tankers. Shipyard collapse was not caused by wages but by the fact that demand for these simple tankers dropped.

The government now should stimulate the competitive ability of the export industry in Aberg's opinion. "Those in power should create the best possible circumstances for income policy. Curbing inflation is an important goal.

Revaluation--an Alternative

"I have long been suspicious of revaluation. But I now have started to believe that the right time has come. Finland for example has a slower rate of inflation, and changes in the exchange rates must certainly have dampened inflation."

According to Aberg, society has to stimulate investment activity for example by forcing enterprises to invest part of their profits and by making currency control more effective. The flow of capital abroad has to be prevented."

"Productivity already went up a fair bit in export industries last year. The government's income policy package meant that employees' wages went down by 3-4 percent. Also, the rentals have already been taken up this year, so the freeze was unnecessary."

Abert says that raising of income is necessary because 1981 might be a bad year. If there are no increases now, an altogether too uncontrolled atmosphere among the workers will result. Workers are also miffed because civil servants already have won sizable salary increases.

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[Quotes:]

Economy Professor: "The difficulties have one common denominator: transformation of the Swedish economic life into a great big public service institution."

Government Official: "How could we get the Swedes to comprehend that one has to give up something. They've got it all so devilishly good."

Opposition Economist: "The problem for the shipyards that manufactured big tankers is not the high salaries. The problem is collapse in demand."

Civil Servant: "The Swedes are not used to financing reforms by cutting down on expense elsewhere."

(1) Talouden tunnuslukuja Pohjanlahden molemmin puolin

	1979		1980	
	Ruotsi	Suomi	Ruotsi	Suomi
Bruttokansantuote (2)	4,0	7,0	2,5	6,0
Teollisuustuotanto (3)	6,1	9,0	4,7	5,5
Kokonaistuotanto (4)	4,1	6,5	3,3	
Vienti (5)				
— määrä (6)	6,2	10,0	2,3	6,0
— hinta (7)	12,3	12,0	9,6	
Tuonti (8)				
— määrä (9)	10,9	18,0	4,3	9,0
— hinta (10)	15,6	15,0	8,8	
Inflaatio (11)	12,6	8,0	12,0	8,5
työttömyysaste (12)	2,2	6,2	n. 2	4,7

Key:
1) Significant figures in economy from both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia
2) Gross National Product
3) Industrial Production
4) Total production
5) Exports
6) -amount
7) -price
8) Imports
9) -amount
10) -price
11) Inflation
12) Unemployment

The figures for Sweden are based on the information used for this year's budget. Also the Finnish figures are from the economic trend survey used as the basis of the state budget.

[15 Apr 80, p 25]

[Text] Public Sector Continues To Swell--Sweden Forcefeeds Full Employment [

Maintenance of high employment is now Sweden's main economic policy goal. The residents of the welfare state all agree on the goal. Full employment is stressed regardless of the government's political make-up.

Employment in Sweden has been maintained by swelling the public sector. The number of industrial jobs has been going down concurrently. Artificially maintained full employment is gradually beginning to impede the structural changes within industry itself.

Swedish workers are very unwilling to change from one field or locality to another. Also, legal protection against firing is very strong.

The Swedish worker is shedding his old skin. The greasy-handed laborer is transforming into a well-schooled, sophisticated public servant in overalls who presses robot machines' buttons with manicured fingers.

The current change in the worker archetype is caused by the quick development of industry's internal structure. The Swedish industry is becoming transformed from one based on raw materials to a technical one that calls for extensive knowhow.

The worker in traditionally strong machine industry is changing the fastest. Machine industry is being automated with great speed in hopes of maintaining competitiveness.

Among the machine plants that have changed structure the quickest is one situated in Vasteras. On the roof, the Wallenberg family's flag ship Asea colors are being flown. The old factory plant has been reorganized in the past few years and robot machines have taken over from workers in many places.

According to Veikko Arponen, who is the "robot division commander" in the Asea factory in Vasteras, it has been possible in recent years to get the production system of the factory to fit the flow of material very well.

The established unit system in production has brought significant savings, and the reform has brought robot machines into the factory. The dirty and heavy work that earlier was the lot of the immigrants has now transferred for the machines to do.

According to Arponen, the transfer into unit production factories also changes requirement for the workers. Traditional skills are no longer needed as much as before. Instead, it is necessary to know the complicated machinery very thoroughly and to take the responsibility for the capital bound up in them during operation. Arponen says a totally new generation of a new type of skilled worker is in the making.

In addition to the robot machines, Asea has also brought to the factory a new generation of machine tools. Asea has at the moment 200 so-called numeric machines that cost up to a million marks. The whole of Finland has only about half that number of these machines. According to Arponen, utilizing these expensive new machines calls for raising the workers training level very decisively. Asea has in fact always had a shortage of good skilled laborers.

Finland Troubled by Director Vacuum

The current transfer into product workshops is in Sweden a continuation of a long-standing industrial tradition. The power of tradition is apparent in both the director's and laborer's achievements.

Modernization of industry places great demands especially on the directorship of business enterprises, and these have been better met in Sweden than in Finland because of Sweden's longer tradition.

Consultant Kaarlo Wirta, who has gone through many enterprises on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia emphasizes that in Finland, directors often are pulled to important posts directly from schools. "A vacuum results, the kind that does not occur in Sweden."

Wirta has been investigating the floor-level problems in tens of enterprises both in Finland and in Sweden. Lately, he has been spending his time in Asea in Vasteras.

Investigation by SITRA [Finland's Independence Anniversary Fund] that compared Finnish and Swedish machine manufacturing industries resulted in criticism of the Finnish directors' professional skills. Kaarlo Wirta reprimands the Finnish directors even harder than that: "In Sweden, the managerial level devotes itself with great enthusiasm to investigations and problem-solving. In Finland, they don't even show interest in ready-made knowledge, although there are of course exceptions."

Wirta sees the basic difference between Finnish and Swedish industries to be the Swedes' continual willingness to change--it is decisively greater than in Finland. It is also apparent in the personnel policies of businesses. In Sweden, especially the technical personnel is expected to show active results. In Finland, they think that every new engineer on the staff will have taken a job from a productive worker in the machine shop.

Equipment Astray in the Finnish Machine Shop

The SITRA investigation revealed that there is often idling in a Finnish machine shop. Over a third of the working time is ineffective in Finland, whereas the Swedes squander only about a quarter in nonproductive time. Therefore, the Swedish factory produces 30 percent better than the Finnish one.

According to Wirta, a major part of time in the Finnish factory is spent in useless search for equipment and materials. In Sweden preparations are considered very important. No time is squandered, because the materials and equipment are well on hand when needed.

Also in the paper sector, the Swedes pay a lot of attention to smoothness of the work process in the shop. In Finland, material orders tend to be sent late, planning and blueprints are also often late, and it is very difficult for production to make up for the delays.

Wirta has often been involved in changing a Swedish factory into an effective production shop where the machines have been placed so that unproductive time is minimal and things get done more quickly. Also the administrative burden becomes lighter and much paper work can be done away with.

It has been found that unit-type product shops lessen planning pressures and raise the quality of the manufactured products.

Creation of product workshops demands thorough planning and Finnish business enterprises have not yet felt enough need to go into this kind of expense.

Wirta says that Finland still has a lot to learn from Sweden in utilization of semi-finished products and raw materials. The greatest difficulties are caused by the fact that the Finnish engineers don't get training in economics. According to Wirta, altogether too much in the way of semi-finished products are made by the Finnish workshops themselves.

It would be possible to cut expense a lot by effective standardization and by purchasing parts. "Without standardization, several different products for one and the same purpose are thought up by planners even within one enterprise. That does not make any sense," Wirta says.

Wirta also suggests that Finnish machine manufacturing industry, in addition to ground-level rationalization, should ever more quickly transfer to using miniature computers in directing and supervising production. This, however, requires that the hand-made routines are first in order.

According to Wirta, the Finnish mentality does not adapt easily to making long-range plans. Small, important details are often left to be improvized, and this causes a lot of trouble during the final stages.

Old Iron Works to be Discontinued

The sleepy little industrial pockets in the middle of the best-faring welfare state in Vastmanland have been rudely awakened one after another with cold showers.

It is no more possible for a Swedish foundry to compete in the world market, no matter how new the production facilities might be.

The 12,000 inhabitant municipality of Surahammar has grown around its iron works. The municipality expanded and everyone was doing well until the present manager of the foundry, Asea, announced that something had to be done, there had been too many years of losses. An official decision has not yet been made, but it is expected to be announced any moment from the Asea headquarters at 20 kilometer distance from Vesteras.

The Japanese are doing much better in the world market. The Spannahyttan melting furnace, only a few years old and close to Surahammar, is going to have to be closed and 300 workers will be left without work. At the same time, 300 workers must be laid off from Surahammar itself which gives livelihood to 1,300 people in the municipality.

"The community is not going to live through this. It is so unbelievable that people don't take it seriously yet. In the employment agency there isn't the slightest sign of an unemployment threat," Valter Bodin, director of the Surahammar employment office says.

It is difficult to get businesses into the municipality, and it has been especially difficult to find employment for women, Bodin says.

The women are helped somewhat by municipal employment. Old people and children are doing especially well in Surahammar. It has been possible to arrange for child care in an exemplary way. There is for instance a children's "night daycare center" available for shift workers.

Valter Bodin who is soon going to retire from his job as municipal employment agent reminisces that such problems were not known in this area earlier on. He is due to retire after full service but jokes: "I am retiring when the trouble begins."

Bodin says the young don't easily move from their home areas. In the old days, once you graduated from school, you packed up and moved to where the work was."

The employment agent has also often noticed that the young show the least interest in practical work.

The schools have an internship program which gives the younsters an opportunity to acquaint themselves with different fields through working.

"However, the youngsters should be given more guidance. There is no point in going to just work where your friends go. More attention has been given lately to cooperation between the school and the employers, and this is immediately obvious. For such a long time, nothing had been done in Sweden."

4 Percent of Labor in Protected Jobs

The Swedish unemployment figures are extremely impressive when compared with other western industrial nations. At the moment, 1.9 percent, i.e. about 82,000 people are unemployed out of a labor force of approximately 4.3 million.

The official unemployment figures don't, however, tell the whole story. About 4 percent of the labor force is employed in public and protected works or being retrained. If these are included, unemployment figures climb to the level of other western countries. They would even climb higher if it was possible to figure out how many jobs have been established in the public sector in Sweden only in the name of full employment.

At the same time, employment offices showed that over 66,000 jobs were not filled, and these were mainly in the public sector and in industry.

The latest Swedish budgetary proposal allocated about 10 billion kronor, that is about 5 percent of the total budget, to labor administration. In Finland, the corresponding figure is over 5 times smaller.

This allotment to the labor market in the budget does not however include the subsidies that have been given to business enterprises rather freely in recent years. Shipyards, which are in especially great difficulties, have been given public money in different ways to the tune of 600,000 kronor per a worker in 1976-79.

Employment Subsidies Have Certain Advantages

"It is most certain that with the economic situation getting worse, it will be necessary to discuss whether it is possible to continue the present employment policies," remarks Bert Isacsson, the director of the international secreteriat in the Labor Ministry.

"It is after all a question of human beings' livelihood. Actual social service assistance is so great that employment maintenance doesn't become all that much more costly."

"There are obvious advantages to maintaining employment. The old people and children are better cared for, and also big problems for the unemployed will be avoided. England is a horrifying example of what sort of problems are created by lay-offs in the public sector," Isacsson says.

The labor market administration is convinced that there is fairly deep-going agreement in Sweden on the employment questions. A "more humane society" is given as the goal. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the entire political field in Sweden is "leftist," i.e. all Swedish parties are a step to the left from the corresponding parties in other countries, "because the Sos Dems kept telling the Swedes to look left for 44 years in all."

Government Assists Relocating Workers

Sweden was long able to take advantage of itinerant labor. The industrialization process happened with perfect ease, shipyards and iron works were placed in ideal spots, and the workers collected themselves around them.

It is no longer possible to relocate Swedes very easily. A shipyard worker will not agree to changing his independent work for a production line, even if it is paid just as well.

Moving to a new locality is a sticky proposition for average Swedes who have entrenched themselves in their little homes. The government does all it can to get workers to move to where there is work. The families are given an orientation tour to the new work locality with per diem expenses, the government pays for the move and then gives 6,000 kronor as "getting started assistance."

The shipyards, which are among the worst problems at the present, are considering paying a year's or two years' wages as a lump sum compensation for the workers who agree to leave.

To become profitable, the shipyards should lay off 10,000 workers out of the present 27,000 by 1984.

Immigrants Move the Easiest

The phenomenon of so-called backsack men has made the shipyard workers even more reluctant to change their field. Rented workers are willingly substituted for permanent laborers. They are much cheaper for the shipyard company Svenska Varv, because it is not necessary to apply the fairly far-reaching employment security system to them.

These professionals, mostly from Finland, are cheap labor even despite the fact that they might earn as much as 100 kronor per hour whereas an ordinary shipyard worker must be satisfied with 32,50 kronor.

Otherwise too, the immigrants have proved themselves to be quicker-moving than the Swedes in the Swedish labor market. As they are used to moving often, they are readier than the Swedes to move to new localities.

Since the 1950's, about 225,000 immigrants have gravitated to Sweden. About half of them are Finns. In recent years, however, most immigrants have been from countries like Chile and Turkey.

Regional Policy Garners Meager Results

Sweden's very ambitious development area policy has fallen noticeably short of its goals. Regional policy, which was long looked to as a model system by other countries has been able to create, out of its prolific funds, about 20,000 new jobs in the ten years from 1965 to 1975.

Even the Center Party which was most vehemently pursuing dispersal policy and now has the government responsibility has modified its stand. The party's industrial minister, Nils Asling, now says that the structural changes should happen only within counties, whereas earlier, the party was advocating the dispersal of commerce and industry all through the country.

Those in power will have to admit that the willingness of businesses to move to new localities has decreased. The government of the Coalition Party, Folk Party and the Center has also avoided bringing up again the matter of locality directives.

[Quotes:]

Rationalization Engineer: "Rationalization is a lazy man's job. He has enough time to ponder whether the employed work systems make any sense."

Consultant: "I must say I think it's senseless that a Finnish factory may stock goods in 66 different places. It amounts to the goods being lost."

Civil Servant: "Even immigration is changing. The number of workers among incoming immigrants is getting smaller as it's the relatives--children and grandparents--who are arriving now."

Employment Agent: "In the old days, once you graduated from school, you packed up and moved to where the work was. Now you can't get the young to move even by waving money at them."



Key:
1) Industrial Wages and Labor Costs in Sweden and Finland 1978
2) Swedish kronor
3) Clothing
4) Textiles
5) Machine manufacturing
6) Paper
7) Graphic industry

9571
CSO: 3107

COALITION MAY SPLIT UP OVER PLANNED SAVINGS PACKAGE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Apr 80 p 7

[Article by Kaa Eneberg, Dick Ljungberg, Magdalena Ribbing, and Sven Svensson]

> [Text] The Fälldin government will be exposed to serious internal frictions when it has to get together in the fall on a savings package of 7 to 9 billion kronor. But all three party leaderships are firmly resolved to fight to keep the three-party bourgeois coalition from breaking up once again. To get the savings package through the Riksdag it may be necessary to threaten resignation.

That it takes a firm grasp to hold the three bourgeois Riksdag groups together is shown by experience in the spring Riksdag.

With a one-vote majority for the government in the Riksdag, on several important questions it was a matter of either a dead stop or some log-rolling because either one of the Riksdag [party] groups or some individual bourgeois members set themselves in opposition.

A typical example is the shipyards question, in which two Liberal Party members presumably upset Minister of Industry Nils G. Åsling's bill to close down the Öresund shipyard. Fälldin showed his determination to pull the government together by sanctioning a compromise and thus overriding Åsling. But it split through Gösta Bohman's personal intervention.

[Line of type missing in source]...also jumped in personally in the question of the forest spraying. He wanted to have a prohibition only against spraying from the air. The Liberal Party protested wildly and wanted spraying from the ground prohibited as well.

Through trickery on the part of Minister of Agriculture Anders Dahlgren (Center Party), the bill was written as a prohibition against spraying

by plane, and consequently moved toward certain death in the Riksdag.

Trickery also lay behind the government bill to give construction workers from the forest districts 15,000 kroner in starting bonuses if they moved to Stockholm. The Center Party group flatly said no.

The most serious friction was occasioned by Fälldin's attempt to force an emergency situation on the job market. He ran the risk in this of having the Liberal Party desert the government. The emergency situation changed into an agreement package containing a demand for a wage limit.

Lack of Coordination

After the defeat in the plebiscite on nuclear power and the charging of four additional units, Fälldin was conscious of a great need to act as unifying prime minister after having joined with the VPK [Left-Wing Communist Party] during the plebiscite campaign.

After failing with the emergency situation, Fälldin, pointing to his position as prime minister, demanded that the government place itself behind his own formulation that the agreement package presupposed "largely unchanged conditions" for the wage-earners. The Liberals wanted to have a looser formulation that would not freeze the negotiating position.

It is difficult to be unifying prime minister in a three-party government. Some of the ministers do feel that there is a more peaceful working climate in the second Fälldin government, but they complain of lack of coordination.

"Talk and maneuvers to right and left have a devastating effect," says one Center Party minister.

It is mostly the Conservative ministers that lead out. Gösta Bohman is considered to be very skillful and unscrupulous when it comes to courting the voters.

Government colleagues mention as an example Bohman's speech at the Skärgård council last Saturday on unchanged house taxes for the resident population. His unreserved utterance concerning the wage-earners' side in the wage-agreement negotiations also aroused great irritation in the government.

Courting the Horticulturists

Defense Minister Eric Krönmark provoked his government colleagues by insisting that the armed forces needed another billion a year, and Trade Minister Staffan Burenstam Linder courted the horticulturists in the matter of duties on tomatoes and cucumbers.

Gösta Bohman has an easy time getting publicity, while Fälldin has a hard time exploiting the mass-media advantages that the post of prime minister

should give him. But a good method for journalists to get Fälldin to talk is to ask him for comments when Gösta Bohman has been out playing prime minister.

The Conservatives' big gains in opinion polls at the expense of the Liberals has contributed to the friction between the government parties. The Conservatives are now approximately as strong as the Center Party and the Liberals together.

The Liberal Party was coupled with the Social Democrats in cooperation for Line 2 in the plebiscite. The Liberal Party is now trying to reassure the government about that connection and about certain flatteries from Social Democratic quarters by assurances that it is planning to stay in the bourgeois government until its term runs out. Ola Ullsten came out with the latest such promises Monday at Östersund.

Economy Bills a Conservative Policy?

Conservative gains increase the risk that all economy bills will be stamped as Conservative policy. Gösta Bohman is also the member of the government that is most eager to save in the public sector. He would have liked to press for specific economy bills back in the spring, effective in part as of 1 July. Now he will have to wait patiently until the beginning of the year.

Various memoranda containing economy proposals are already circulating in the government office. Among the proposals that officials have gone through are reintroduction into health insurance of the initial uncovered period, review of rules on partial disability pensions, revision of the cost-of-living adjustment in the pension system, limitation of subsidies for housing construction, and restrictions on housing contributions. But the big political difficulties remain.

One economy package will come in the fall and another in the next regular budget on 10 January 1981. It will probably be signed not by Ingemar Mundebo but by some other Liberal. Gösta Bohman would like to take over all the budget work, but that is politically impossible.

Increased Taxes on Tobacco, Alcohol

The package will contain, in addition to savings, tax increases on alcohol, tobacco, and energy. The increases will come into effect as of the first of the year.

A boat tax, increased taxation of realized capital gains, higher house taxes, and a general clause against tax evasion are also among the proposals.

The basis for the 1981 wage agreement negotiations must be laid down as early as the fall in the form of an economic policy that increases the prerequisites for the wage-earners to keep or even increase their

purchasing power. The savings package and the tax increases should not automatically push wage demands up.

The failure with this year's wage-agreement package lessens the government's chances of getting together by "round-table discussions" with the job market parties before the next agreement on measures that will reorganize Sweden's economy and strengthen the export industry.

With its agreement package of 27 March the government "gave away" 2 billion [kronor] in the promise of food subsidies and extra tax relief. To take the subsidies back in 1981 and take away the extra tax relief would render the next wage-agreement negotiations difficult and lead to demands for higher wage increases to maintain purchasing power.

In addition to the 7 billion, therefore, the government would have to save another 2 billion to get back to the budget situation before presentation of the wage-agreement package.

The political situation has grown tenser since the big conflict. The Social Democratic opposition as well as the VPK will oppose practically all economy demands that involve a lower social standard for ordinary wage-earners and low-income persons. Nor will it be easy to get the wage-earner organizations simply to accept bargaining that leads to worse social standards.

For that reason it may be unavoidable for the government to frighten its own Riksdag groups into strict cohesion by staking the fate of the cabinet on the savings package, which will be very unpopular.

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STRIKE WAS MANIFESTATION OF UNDERLYING SOCIAL STRAIN

Stockholm DAGENS HYHETER in Swedish 17 May 80 p 3

[Report of an interview with Lars Anell, Foreign Ministry economist, by Karin Berglund]

> [Text] Why have we got a conflict now, when we got along so long? "Well," says Lars Anell, economist with the Foreign Ministry, "that is a sign that the crisis of the welfare state is much more serious than the economists in general are willing to admit. Many have lost faith in the whole social system. We see every day how laws are broken, how certain groups feather their own nests while others have it worse. Loyalty to the system is threatened."

Why should I pay so much tax when multimillionnaire Anders Wall pays no income tax at all?

How can the employers say that Sweden can't afford higher wages at the same time that Håkan Gergils in Aktiespararna [Share Savings] gets his pay doubled?

Whom do the company profits really belong to when the state has given Swedish firms a total of 23 billion kronor of tax money in subsidies?

"For the first time in the postwar period more and more people are beginning to question the social system. When people feel that the society is unjust and begin to ask questions in the style of those three, we are in a dangerous situation." So says Lars Anell, internationally oriented economist and head of the development aid section of the Foreign Ministry.

He has recently completed a report for the Secretariat for Studies of the Future. It is called "Världsordningen och välfärdsstatens kris" [The World Order and the Crisis of the Welfare State].

One of the chapters describes fairly exactly the crisis he says Swedish society is in and how we got there!

"Throughout the postwar period it has been obvious that our social system was functioning for the benefit of all," says Anell. "Now that the growth has stopped, people can no longer be sure of getting their slice of the pie. Injustices are becoming more conspicuous. But the citizens must feel that society is just. Otherwise democracy is threatened.

"Every week we read in the papers how more and more people are making money in dishonest ways. There is ordinary crime, tax chiseling, dubious contracts.

Only Way

"It is no wonder there is conflict when there are no regular wage increases. Wage negotiations, after all, are practically the only way left for honest people to get more money," says Anell.

He ponders over what the point of equilibrium looks like in a capitalist society where most people feel they are justly treated. The answer is that the capitalist social system presupposes inequality. Social reforms and income distribution are the price that the upper class has been forced to pay thus far to be allowed to keep and increase its control over other slices of the pie. E. g., such as power and influence, seaside lots, antiques, status.

"It is the mass-produced slices of the pie that have gradually been distributed more equally," says Anell. "More clothes, food--incentives for everybody. But most of what is scarce, e.g. seaside lots, is still owned by a smaller group.

Mass Problems

"But not even the mass-produced parts are without problems. The automobile, for example--when almost everybody has a car there are traffic jams and poorer mass transit. There are fewer bus tours and the service on the SJ [Swedish Railway?] gets worse even though you or I stop buying cars.

"The private automobile, which was once a luxury for a certain few--and therefore desirable--is becoming a thing you have to have to maintain a given standard," says Anell. "People feel they have been cheated."

He feels that society is in the midst of a mass of extremely threatening problems that have to do with a lack of equality. For example:

- The basic principle of democracy is that everybody is equally valuable. Then how can the differences that exist be defended?

- The welfare policy is aimed at giving more to those who are worst off--but where and why will it come to a stop?

- How can we account for the fact that speculative activity is rewarded more generously than honest work?

– What happens to unemployed youths that have been taught in school that everybody is equally valuable when they discover that they are unwanted?

– And what happens when they discover that they themselves are right at the bottom with few honest opportunities to get ahead?

Standard of Living

Another problem is that people judge their standard of living from their position in their own society, not by absolute measures.

Certain differences have been found, for example, when a cross section of the population of a relatively poor country was interviewed and compared with the answers obtained in a corresponding inquiry in rich countries. On the other hand, it is found that persons with high status and material standards in all societies judge their situation more positively than those who are worse off. People compare themselves to others in every society.

"It is thus better to have a rising standard of living than a very high but stagnating one. And that is undeniably a depressing observation in one of the world's riches countries," says Anell.

New Feeling

That people feel themselves to have been cheated is something new that grew up during the 1970's. Before that, confidence in the future was overwhelming.

"There is one indomitable generation," Lars Anell observes. "The one my papa belonged to. They could see year by year that they were really better off. That is the generation that did not get to go to school even if they were gifted. That worked at relief jobs during the 1930's and were called up during the war. It is the generation that literally got the society they had dreamed of.

"Papa was chairman of the labor union in Katrineholm. He voted in his home town 33 years. He who had not gotten to go to school could see his son continue even up into the university gratis. He and his comrades knew the unheard-of difference of moving up to hot water, central heating, and refrigerators. Later came enlarged old-age pensions, ATP [general supplementary pensions], health insurance...

"For that generation it was easy to see what they got for their tax money. For us it is considerably harder," says Anell. He is convinced that the Conservative policy will push its way into the public sector during the 1980's to cut down and cut away. That can be done because it is so unmeasurable and incomprehensible for many. People see what they are paying but not what they are getting for their money.

Prosperous Life

"Our own generation has lived its whole life in prosperity. We have not experienced the big problems of justice, in spite of the fact that society is unjust. We see that expenditures for schools have increased by 130 percent since we went to school ourselves, and we read every week in the papers that it will get worse. You really have to go into the matter thoroughly to find out where our money has gone.

"That is the way it is in one field after another. The money goes for more and more complicated, expensive, and personnel-intensive activities that affect smaller and smaller groups. If we really go into it thoroughly it is obvious that we will be putting our stakes on that sort of thing.

"For the healthy public it is hard to imagine what everybody gets for the great increase in health care costs that has taken place. Moreover, large parts of the increased expenditures within the public sector go for reforms that have already been decided upon.

"Or else they are accounted for by 'negative problems,' that is restoring and protecting the environment, combatting crime and drug abuse, etc. And when it is also possible to cheat on taxes and many feel that the tax system is unjust--well, the citizens' loyalty to the social system is strained."

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BRIEFS

SAUDI OIL CONTRACT DEFENDED--"Our oil agreement with Saudi Arabia contains no clause in which we obligate ourselves to refrain from criticizing the country. The question has never been discussed at all." That is stated decisively by Sture Agvald, managing director of Svenska Petroleum, in a comment on the excited debate in Denmark on the Danish state's contract with Saudi Arabia. In December 1979 Svenska Petroleum signed two contracts with Saudi Arabia for direct purchase of oil. One was a supplementary contract that came into force the last quarter of 1979; the other runs from 1 January. "Our contract is entirely commercial. It contains no clauses that deal with the attitude toward Saudi Arabia." Svenska Petroleum has continuing discussions on new oil contracts with Saudi Arabia, but according to Sture Agvald no new contracts are in prospect for several years. "It is impossible to predict what these new contracts may contain in the way of clauses. I do not know what position we will take in case Saudi Arabia makes a demand that Sweden abstain from criticism of the country." [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 May 80 p 19] 8815

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ISTANBUL'S MAJOR PROBLEMS DETAILED

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 26 May 80 p 8

[Text] It is estimated that the population of Istanbul province, in which 3,900,000 people live according to the 1975 census, will reach 6 million toward the end of this year due to rural immigration and the birthrate.

Istanbul governor Nevzat Ayaz in a lengthy statement said that every aspect of the city's problems will multiply in proportion to the growth in population and that these problems must be resolved. What are Istanbul's problems and what must be done to tackle them? The governor explained:

"The responsibility for running a city in which 6 million people live falls to the governor's office. The management of 150,000 civil servants is the responsibility of the governor's office both directly and indirectly. Achieving speedy cooperation between scattered public institutions has become difficult. We are without a staff of qualified experts that could take charge and set about the works stressed in the five-year plan. Civil administrators are distressed over location. As a result, the only remedy for this is, as a first step, to temporarily transfer our governor's office to a suitable building and preserve the present one as a museum. This would be beneficial. In the long term we should consider establishing a Government Center and bringing important units there, thus making it easier for the people to carry on business and ensuring their supervision. Most district magistrates work in inadequate, highly objectionable, and even dishonorable conditions in rented buildings, commercial buildings, or in Branch Directorates. Government buildings in the districts--particularly the Provincial Government Center--must be inspected and personnel transferred to suitable accommodations.

"A special administrative law would be drawn up for Istanbul. Capable administrators should be appointed to head the province's institutions. The governor's office must ensure that various institutions and units (like industry, trade, and tourism) function better. Remuneration and wherewithall for civil administrative heads must be provided on time.

"Every year Istanbul province grows as much as Samsun province. Rural immigration to the city is essentially the root of Istanbul's major problems. Structures defined as gecekondu amass in areas in which they grow like cancer cells, without internal order. Eighty percent of the population lives in these structures and constitutes for us a large army of unemployed. Right now there are close to one million persons in Istanbul awaiting work. Sectarian conflict, ethnic discord, regional incompatability, and blood feuds, all these are and have been reflected in Istanbul. The largest labor army is in Istanbul; all of its problems are reflected in Istanbul. The tendency to forcefully make others accept new ideas and alternate views using as pretext freedom of thought provided in the 1960 Constitution raises new problems with respect to organizations' security functions.

"Istanbul is the province that has the most widespread unrest, disorder, and anarchy in our country using the criteria we are trying to stress. Today in Istanbul there are 8,200 police, 2,900 guards, and 3,000 gendarmerie. This number is inadequate. To my mind, a staff of 36,000 is required immediately in Istanbul, to include 24,000 police, 6,800 gendarmerie, and 6,000 guards. It is obligatory that these personnel have professional training. The police have 650 vehicles. This must be increased at least several times. Moreover, along with the police need for radios, weapons, and bullet-proof vests, the police laboratory must be expanded and the quota requirements must be met. It is unnecessary [sic] to modernize police operations, develop a computer system, or increase staff and intelligence capabilities.

"Public transportation measures are inadequate for today and far from effective. The city's inadequate streets can hardly support Istanbul's more than 300,000 vehicles. We should consider developing low-cost, mass transit in newly developed areas, adding ferry transits to the Bakirkoy-Yesilkoy line, and in this regard reestablishing the association for free traffic inspection. Rewards should be given to those providing tips and making arrests so as to make the campaign against smuggling effective. Forty new police stations should be built to answer this need."

Governor Ayaz touched on issues concerning institutions associated with various banks and the Prime Ministry and stated that a law pending in the Assembly will be passed to classify 80 million documents possessed by the General Directorate of Archives. He also stated that besides new mosque construction, historical works in the storehouses of the Directorate of Pious Foundations will be exhibited in museum fashion. He added that historical remnants in the environs of Sultanahmet will be made use of and that the assignment of a staff of 150 imams and muezzins to the governor's office would be in order. Ayaz continued:

"The need for judicial buildings in Istanbul ought to be met. Modern prisons with a 750-man capacity should be built again. Attention should be paid to the quality of the building in which terrorists incarcerated therein

"will be separated from others. The old prisons should be used for female criminals. Yassiada should cease to be used as a prison.

"An issue that encompasses Istanbul's most significant problems is national education. In Istanbul today 100,000 students study in 25 advanced schools. The number of teachers is 29,382, the number of students is 937,660, and the number of schools is 1,299. It is expected that the Ministry of Education will allocate another 500 million lira this year to meet education needs. Ten new buildings are needed this year for middle schools. Personnel quotas for teachers must be forwarded punctually to prevent discord between teachers and students.

"The Topkapi-Buyukcekmece expressway should be extended to Kumburgaz. The second Bosphorus Bridge and road links should be built. Work on the Yenikapi-Taksim-Levent metro line must be completed by the Ministry of Public Works. Priority should be given investments in construction material. Maintenance checks on the Karakoy Ataturk bridges ought to receive state support. The wheat allocation for Istanbul, whose actual need for wheat to make bread is 60,000 tons a month, must be at least 36,000 tons.

"There are 21,307 beds in Istanbul hospitals and Istanbul has 76 hospitals. Besides a rapid increase in beds, there is a desperate need for 100-bed first-aid stations on the Levent-Bakirkoy and Ankara roads. The number of mental hospitals must reach one dozen to meet needs.

"In our concerns with regard to the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies, the number of police required to prevent the illegal import and smuggling of Tekel [State Monopoly] goods should be increased. The Sirkeci Customs Office should be moved to Halkali immediately. Helicopters should be given the Customs Protection Organization. Moreover, quality hand guns and rifles should be issued.

"The Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Husbandry should look into the matter of 2,000 ton ships tying up at the port of Silivri.

"With regard to the Ministry of Labor's problems, the Work and Worker Placement Organization was able to find employment for 8,861 persons against work requests from 88,787 people. The disabled who applied numbered 3,490. Those registered with the organization who want to go abroad numbered 92,000. Last year, 2,480 persons were sent abroad to find their own jobs.

"The most important fact of our relations with the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources centers on electricity. Because it is thought that difficulties will persist in obtaining heating fuel in the years ahead, the conversion of the heating system to coal is being planned. Istanbul should be provided with 1,500 tons of gasoline and 1,000 tons of diesel fuel a day as well as 150,000 tons of fuel oil a month.

"Istanbul is a province that has much to offer the tourists. There are 13,000 beds in 113 guest facilities suitable for tourists. But this is

"not enough. New guest facilities to satisfy tourists must be built. Facilities should be established on the historical Sarayburnu and Sultanahmet peninsulas. The Camlica Hills and the Belgrade Forest should be upgraded to benefit domestic and foreign tourism.

"The Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction deals with public improvements in 34 municipalities and 267 villages within Istanbul province. The ministry has control over the beautification or the degradation of Istanbul. It must be very careful in its decisions. The greatest gecekondu phenomenon is evidenced in buildings constructed unlawfully on parceled tracts of land. The condition of buildings constructed on treasury land or on lands belonging to public institutions should be examined. Wide birth should be given to the SSK [Social Security Organization] public housing project in order to speedily complete the Halkali residential area. New legal authority should be given municipalities to protect old structures and an inventory of these should be made.

"Lastly, I want to say that we all must work together hand in hand and find a remedy to these problems so that this beautiful city can attain the image desired."

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